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Abstract
This thesis studies the development of the power of judicature 
which was exercised jointly by the two Houses of Parliament in the 
early seventeenth century. It examines this against the background 
of the medieval procedural inheritance from the century after 1350 
when a somewhat similar power was being exercised by Parliament; and 
it also sets the seventeenth-century development alongside the growth 
in the jurisdiction of each House separately in the early Stuart period. 
This study is concerned primarily with procedural developments, but 
the political circumstances from which these are derived are not 
completely ignored.
It is argued that there was, in the early seventeenth century, 
a general but cautious expansion in the judicial activities of both 
Houses, together and separately. In this expansion, the revival of 
joint judicature is probably the most important theme, but it cannot 
be isolated from the remainder, upon which, as upon the medieval 
inheritance, it is, to some extent, dependent. It is suggested that 
joint judicature developed in a flexible and varied manner, responding 
more to the needs of the moment than to any long-term objectives, 
evidence for the existence of which is lacking. This thesis also 
questions the view that joint judicature was revived in any very
mature form in 1621. It is argued that this opinion conceals the 
very important procedural developments which occurred during the 
trials of the l620s, developments which may point to a change in the 
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Introduction
During the reign of James I, the two Houses of the English 
Parliament joined together to exercise a power of criminal jurisdic­
tion which had lain unused since the middle of the fifteenth century* 
The revived power claimed its initial victims in 1621, when Giles 
Mompesson was the first, and Francis Bacon the most prominent, of the 
men to be ruined. Three years later, the same weapon was employed 
to destroy the career of the Lord Treasurer, the Earl of Middlesex.
In 1626 it was used to attack the Duke of Buckingham, Charles I*s 
favourite and chief adviser; and in 1628 the process was turned 
against an ecclesiastic, Roger Manwaring. From 1621 onwards there 
was constant resort to this type of criminal jurisdiction and Parlia­
ment found in it a potent means of attacking its enemies. Ultimately, 
it assisted in weakening the foundations of the Stuart monarchy.
This type of jurisdiction - in which the Commons act as accusers 
and the Lords as judge and juiy - has long been given the name 
*inpeachment*. It is widely believed that 'impeachment* was evolved 
in the Good Parliament of 1376 as a means of punishing William Latimer, 
Richard lyons and a number of other men influential and important in 
the closing years of the reign of Edward III. Subsequently, it was 
used on a number of occasions in the reigns of Richard II and his
three immediate successors, but towards the end of Henry Vi's reign 
it sank into obsolescence, replaced by other methods which, although 
achieving similar results, did so by rather different processes.
It will be immediately apparent that the political circumstances 
which prevailed in the seventy-five years after 1376 bear some 
similarity to those in the early seventeenth oentuiy. In both 
periods monarchs were often ineffective and their governments were 
subjected to damaging political attack. It is also clear that 
Parliament's criminal jurisdiction was frequently used as an instru­
ment in such conflict, and was, in large part, a product of it. 
However, it is not the purpose of this study to attempt a comparison 
of two sets of political circumstances, separated from each other by 
almost two centuries. Such a comparison would, in any case, have a 
strictly limited value, and such similarities as do exist can readily 
be observed without a detailed examination. Nor is it intended to 
explain in any detail the political situation in either the one period 
or the other. The broad outlines of this situation are well enough 
known, and will provide a sufficiently adequate background to this 
study. Instead, this thesis is an attempt to examine, largely in 
terms of procedure, the revival and development of the joint criminal 
jurisdiction of both Houses of Parliament in the early seventeenth 
century. Naturally, the ultimate explanation for this revival is 
to be found in the politics of the reign of James I - which determined 
the type of procedure which was adopted - but an attempt will also
8be made to see this revival in the light of the practice followed 
in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.
It would seem tempting to call this thesis a study of 'impeachment*, 
yet to use this word would be dangerous. There is ample evidence 
that, when Sir Edward Coke end his colleagues re-introduced Parliament's 
criminal jurisdiction, they did not confine their search for guidance 
to those precedents which the medieval records and later historians 
describe as 'impeachments*. Their gaze took in what are, apparently, 
other types of case, and this thesis will necessarily examine other 
forms of Parliamentary procedure upon which they bestowed their atten­
tion. Moreover, whether by accident or design, the cases of the 
earlier lé20s are rarely, if at all, described in the contemporary 
accounts as 'impeachments'. In order, therefore, to avoid pre-judging
the character of the jurisdiction revived in those years, it has seemed 
best to avoid using this term except where it can clearly be justified 
from the records themselves. Unfortunately, such a course contains 
its own danger: it may implicitly attach to 'inpeachment* a signifi­
cance it perhaps did not possess. However, Coke referred to the 
judicial powers of the Houses, both when they collaborated and when 
they operated separately, as their ' judicature', and I have in conse­
quence used the phrase 'Parliamentary judicature' to describe the 
joint criminal jurisdiction of the early Stuart Parliaments. It is 
possible that, in the early seventeenth century, 'impeachment* may, 
in fact, have been a synonym for 'Parliamentary judicature ', but it
seems more likely that it formed one part of that judicature. Yet 
whatever name is eventually given to it. Parliamentary judicature was 
undoubtedly both complex and flexible in the early seventeenth century. 
The iaruth of this will become manifest when the cases themselves are 
examined; and, with the intention of rescuing the wood from the trees, 
an attempt has been made to show, in tabular as well as descriptive 
form, the chief procedural characteristics of each of the cases studied.
The development of Parliamentary judicature in the early Stuart 
period appears to form part of the same story as the growth in those 
years of the unicameral judicature of each House acting separately 
from the other. It seems likely that the Commons' decision in 1621 
to revive Parliamentary judicature stemmed, at least in part, from a 
realisation of the limited nature of their own unicameral judicature.
It therefore follows that, in describing the evolution of Parliamentary 
judicature in the l620s, it will be necessary to pay some attention 
to the growth of both Lords' judicature and Commons' judicature in 
James I's reign.
This study begins with an examination of the medieval inheritance 
available in the early seventeenth century, and ends with the trial 
of Manwaring in l628. That trial did not, of course, mark the demise 
of Parliament's power of criminal judicature: it flourished and
remained effective long after l628. Yet it operated subsequently in 
circumstances very different from those prevailing in the l620s, and 





During the first session of James I's third Parliament, in 
1621, the House of Commons joined with the House of Lords to bring 
to judgment six men who had offended them. In doing so they were 
employing forms of procedure whose halcyon days lay in the period 
from 1376 to 1459. Clearly, the urgency of affairs in 1621 did not 
allow the Houses to embark on flights of historical fancy for their 
own sake: Parliament behaved as it did because of the conditions of
the time and if it employed a medieval process this was because it 
seemed appropriate to those conditions. The Commons, in particular, 
were led by lawyers well versed in precedents: good use was made of
these but the House did not become the slave of precedents and the 
lack of them merely provided it with an opportunity to exercise its 
procedural imagination. Nevertheless, the medieval influences upon 
both Commons and Lords were considerable, at least potentially, and 
in any examination of the judicial proceedings of early seventeenth- 
century Parliaments it is necessary to explore this heritage and the 
means by which it became available to members.
To investigate this inheritance and to relate what we find to 
what the lawyers of the seventeenth century would have found is not
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an easy task. A twentieth-century analysis of medieval Parliamentary 
judicature is unlikely to bear much similarity to the deductions made 
from the records by the politicians and antiquaries of the seventeenth 
century, despite the revolution in historical processes of thought that 
was then in progress. Not only do our motives for making such an 
enquiry differ fundamentally from those which inspired the Parliaments 
of the early Stuarts, but our own view of the medieval procedure is 
inclined to be coloured by our knowledge of its further development 
in the seventeenth century.
In addition, the inheritance is a complex one. It can be explored 
only by studying the Parliamentaiy cases of the period, but these 
reveal a variety of procedure which is often bewildering. In conse­
quence, it is very difficult to make statements about procedure which 
are not so hedged about with exceptions and provisos as to be rendered 
almost valueless. Moreover, even when clawsifications are devised, 
these normally will not fit into the seventeenth-century context. On 
occasion, for instance. Coke and his colleagues in the l620s illustrated 
a point of procedure with precedents which appear to us to have little 
in common with each other, and we are left to guess at the basis upon 
which they were chosen.
Nevertheless, despite - or even because of - the variety and 
complexity of the medieval inheritance, some attempt to identify and 
describe procedure must be made in order to show the range of 
precedents available to seventeenth-century politicians and the
12
selectiveness of their choice.
It is often stated that in l621 Parliament revived the medieval 
process of impeachment. As this study progresses, it will be shown 
that this statement cannot be accepted without qualification, but for 
the moment two points must be made about it. First, it is perfectly 
true that maiy of the medieval cases quoted as precedents in 1621 to 
support the revival of Parliamentary judicature are described in the 
records of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as impeachments.
Yet it is also true that some of the cases used in l621 are not 
identified in the medieval records as impeachments, and seem to differ 
significantly from those which are given this name. The second point 
is that historians are by no means agreed upon an exact definition of 
the medieval impeachment. It is, for example, not clear whether the 
term refers to a distinct judicial procedure or whether it refers to 
a particular characteristic common to a variety of judicial procedures, 
Nevertheless, the word cannot be ignored in an examination of the 
medieval heritage, and, before considering the variety of procedure 
bequeathed to the seventeenth century, it will be as well to summarise 
what are at present generally regarded as the distinguishing features 
of impeachment.
Until recently, historians have always set impeachment within the 
framework of Parliament, regarding it as essentially a Parliamentary 
procedure. It appears first in connection with the trial of 
Edward Ill's chamberlain, William Latimer, in the Good Parliament
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of 1376; it then reappears frequently in the Parliamentary records 
of the next sevenly-five years but fades away in the middle of the 
fifteenth century. From the beginning, impeachment was associated 
with moments of political crisis and was often enough used as a 
weapon in factional rivalry. Whether it would be correct to conclude 
from this that it was regarded as primarily a political procedure is 
another matter, but it certainly has claims to be considered in this 
way and it was emplqyed by both the King and his opponents.
To mauy historians, one of the primary features of a medieval 
impeachment derives from the parts played by the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords: in the words of Professor Wilkinson, the "essence
of Impeachment was, as it has always been considered, accusation by 
the Commons and judgement by the Lords".^ The Commons might base 
their charge upon evidence supplied to them by private individuals, 
but the case was presented to the Lords not on behalf of such indivi­
duals but by the whole Commons, representing the interests of the 
community. The charge was then maintained in common before the 
peers, and without any naming of individual accusers. However, the 
prosecution was conducted in the name of the Crown, even where the 
monarch himself was an unwilling observer of the proceedings. A 
hearing took place before the upper House - normally in accordance
^ B. Wilkinson, Constitutional History of Medieval England, 
1216-1399 (London, 1948-58), ii, p.205.
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with due legal form, however politically inspired the charge might
be - and judgment was eventually pronounced by the Lords.^
Some historians of the medieval process of impeachment have
also laid stress upon the terminology of the records, pointing to
the occasions upon which 'impeached' or 'impeachment* is, or is not,
used, and relating this evidence to the procedural characteristics
of the cases under examination. One of the problems of this type
of approach is that the word was in general use both in the middle
ages and later, carrying the connotation of 'hindrance' or
'embarrassment'. Nevertheless, the more technical meaning of an
accusation in a court of law appears in the reign of Edward II, and
in the records of the Good Parliament of 1376 the word is used in
connection with charges brought by the whole Commons in Parliament.
It is therefore possible that, when conten^oraries described a case
as an impeachment, they recognised that it conformed to a particular
2
type of judicial procedure. Yet whether or not this is true, and
^ G. Lambrick, 'The Inq)eachment of the Abbot of Abingdon in 1368'.
E.H.R. (1967), vol. Ixxxii, no. 323, pp.268-9 , 270 , 273 , 275;
Wilkinson, op. oit.. ii, p.214; T.F.T. Plucknett, 'The Impeachments 
of 1376'. Trans. Royal Hist. Soc. (l95l), 5th Series, vol. i, pp.
161-2; T.F.T. Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II'. Trans.
Royal Hist. Soc. (1952), 5th Series, vol. ii, p.167.
 ^M.V. Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment'. In L.S. Sutherland 
and M. McKisack, eds., Fourteenth Century Studies (Oxford, 1937), 
p.243; Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II', loc. cit.. pp.
164-5. Miss Clarke's terminological approach to the usage of 1376 
has, however, been challenged by J.P. Collas in Year Books of Edward II, 
vol. XXV (London, 1964: Selden Society, vol. Ixxxi), pp.lxvi-lxvii.
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whatever differences there were in the details of procedure, there 
can he no doubt that a precise linguistic formula was invariably 
employed whenever a case of inç>eachment arose. The Commons "accuse 
and impeach" or "impeach and accuse" their victim, and these words 
appear, harnessed in exactly this manner, again and again from 1376 
to 1459.^
So far we have examined those aspects of impeachment upon which 
some measure of agreement has existed among historians. However, 
we must now turn to consider three theories which extend or modify 
parts of what has been said.
first concerns the character of the Commons' accusation in 
an iizqpeachment, Maude Clarke maintained that these accusations were 
treated as iniictments and that, in this respect, impeachment marked 
an important break with the past. Previously, judgments by the Lords 
had been given upon petitions presented to Parliament, often by private 
citizens, and the Commons were only loosely, if at all, associated with 
this procedure. Impeachment, however, brought the Commons to the 
centre of the stage to present an indictment to the Lords, and Miss 
Clarke contrasted "procedure by indictment, which is an assertion of 
right" with "procedure by petition, with all its implications of grace 
and favour". She saw the change in procedure as taking place between
^ On very few occasions "impeach" or "impeachment" stands alone: 
see Table I.
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the trial of Sir John Lee in 1368 and that of William Latimer in 
1376. Lee, who was steward of the household, was accused of 
various malpractices. The accusation was presented to Parliament 
in the form of five petitions, four of them anonymous and the fifth 
from an inhabitant of Dorset. The charges were examined in the 
presence of the King, the Lords and some members of the Commons.
Lee’s defence proved inadequate and he was sentenced, presumably by 
the Lords, though at a later stage the fifth petition was the subject 
of a separate judgment by the Council. The whole case has its 
obscurities, but Miss Clarke emphasised the limited character of the 
Commons* part in it.
On the other hand, the Commons* part in Latimer*s trial was 
considerable. Latimer was the most prominent of a group of people, 
all associated in one way or another with the King, who were tried 
in the Good Parliament of 1376. As will be seen, the cases of the 
others - men like Buiy, Ellis, Lyons, Neville and Peach - show varia­
tions, but they are all described in the records as impeachments and 
Latimer*8 case may serve as a model to show the part of the Commons.
As was true of so mapy impeachments, Latimer*s trial took place 
in an atmosphere of political uncertainly. In 1376 Edward III was 
old and his heir, the Black Prince, was dying, and half way through 
the trial a council of reform was appointed. Latimer, closely 
connected with one party in the political struggle, was accused by 
the Commons of indulging in treasonable and fraudulent activities.
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The House, as a body, took a vital part in initiating proceedings, 
collecting evidence against him and dravd.ng up a schedule of charges 
which ended by accusing him of "notoriously accroaching royal power". 
Then, in the presence of the Lords, he "was impeached and accused by 
the clamour of the commons", following vhich the lower House demanded 
his ai'rest until he had given satisfaction to the King for his misdeeds 
The Commons were present during part of Latimer’s defence before the 
Lords, and made a reply. They evidently suggested a punishment, and 
when judgment was given they v/ere apparently present,^
Although the cases of Lee and Latimer were both quoted in 1621
in support of the revival of Parliamentary judicature, without ary
indication that the one might be more relevant than the other, there 
are clearly substantial differences between them. Moreover, while 
Latimer’s case has frequently been regarded as the archetype of 
impeachment, that of Lee is not, apparently, an impeachment at all.
If the latter case has to be categorised, it must be placed in a
class of non-impeachment cases in which the Commons were, nevertheless, 
involved. However, be that as it may. Miss Clarke’s opinion that, 
in the transition from the one case to the other, procedure on 
petition gave way to procedure on indictment has been challenged, 
notably by Professor Plucknett. Plucknett has argued that the
^ Clarke, op, oit.. pp.243, 258-60, 262ff; Plucknett, 'The 
Impeachments of 1376', loc. cit.. p.162; Rot. Pari, ii, pp.324-6.
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distinction cannot be substantiated from the evidence, since there
is nothing in the language of the records to suggest that the Commons
ever indicted.^ He has received support from Professor Wilkinson:
It could, indeed, be plausibly argued that the idea of 
Impeachment as an indictment and not a petition by the commons
before the lords (and not before the king) was, like the idea
of a Feudal System, a legal invention of the seventeenth 
century. (2)
The exact character of the Commons* accusation in cases described 
in the records as impeachments must, therefore, remain at present 
an open question.
The second of the three theories which necessitate some 
modification of what was said earlier about the nature of impeachment 
strikes at the assumption that it was a distinct judicial procedure, 
suggesting instead that it w^s a method of instituting criminal 
proceedings. This theory - the work of Plucknett - was derived from 
a study of the trial of Latimer. Plucknett drew attention to the 
fact that this impeachment was based upon "the clamour of the commons", 
and he suggested that the use of the term * impeachment* in this context 
implied that it "was not a jurisdiction of the Lords, nor a mode of
^ T.F.T. Plucknett, *The Origin of Impeachment*. Trans. Royal 
Hist. Soc.(1942). 4th Series, vol. xxiv, pp.49-50, 54-5.
2
B. Wilkinson, Studies in the Constitutional History of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (Manchester. 1952). p.87.
Professor Wilkinson believes that the alteration in procedure occurred 
because the source from which the Commons were seeking redress was 
changing - from the King to the Lords: p.87.
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trial, but a means of initiating criminal proceedings, based not 
on indictment, information or appeal of felory but on •clamour*".^ 
Although Plucknett* s theory has received little support from other 
historians, it cannot be ignored in any attempt to investigate the 
essence of impeachment.
The last theory to be considered recognises impeachment as a 
distinct judicial procedure but questions the assumption that it 
could operate only in a Parliamentary context. In 196? Gabrielle 
Lambrick published an account of a trial, described in the records 
as an impeachment, which did not take place in Parliament and in 
which the Commons were, therefore,, not the accusers. The case is 
that of the Abbot of Abingdon who, in 1368, was impeached before
justices of oyer and terminer for levying certain dues and for
2
usurping royal privileges. As waw normal in Parliamentary 
impeachments, the prosecution wfts in the name of the Crown, but 
the accusation was instigated by a single local community - the 
townsmen of Abingdon - and had nothing to do with Parliament, although 
as in Parliamentary impeachments, the charge was maintained in common. 
Moreover, whereas Parliamentary impeachment was a criminal judicature, 
the case of the Abbot hovered in an indeterminate way "between
^ Plucknett, *The Impeachments of 1376*, loc. cit.. p.159.
 ^Lambrick, op. cit.. pp.250-76. The Abbot was not, apparently, 
"accused and in^eached" but merely "impeached".
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criminal and civil jurisdiction".^
One of Miss Lambrick*s suggestions is that impeachment was
already an established procedure before 1376, and that Latimer*s
case of that year represented the transfer of the process to
Parliament. She concludes her study;
The Abingdon case shows us in^eachment in a light so different
from the traditional aura of parliamentary procedure that it 
becomes necessary to take a very much broader view of this 
versatile form of medieval legal action. It seems that it 
could embrace many different permutations and combinations 
of procedure, while resting on firm foundations of legal 
principle ; and that it wqs primarily evolved to fulfil a 
need for a legal yet efficient method of dealing with 
various kinds of difficult case, arising from various kinds 
of special circumstance, where the interests of king and 
communiiy were equally at stake and for which satisfactory 
remedies could not usually be provided at common law. (2)
The case of the Abbot of Abingdon clearly strikes at the root
of the traditional view of impeachment as essentially a Parliamentary
process,^ even though it may be possible to regard impeachment in
^ Ibid., pp.257, 268.
2 Ibid.. pp.270 , 275-6.
^ Ibid.. pp. 270, 275. Miss Lambrick comments (p.275): "In
fact, even when it is recognized to be wrong-headed, the seventeenth- 
century lawyers * view of impeachment as essentially a parliamentary 
affair, an indictment by the Commons before the Lords, has so 
influenced subsequent thought on the subject that it has been all 
too easy to ignore the significance of medieval impeachments which 
did not take place in parliament, or in which the Commons were not 
the accusers and prosecutors." This is not perhaps entirely fair, 
at least to the lawyeirs of the early years of the century.
Although they maintain that impeachment was a Parliamentary process, 
they do not, at any point, state that it was exclusively Parliamentary.
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Parliament as having a political significance which impeachment 
outside Parliament lacked. Miss Lambrick*s work, together with 
that of Miss Clarke and Professor Plucknett, demonstrates the diffi­
culties of arriving at a precise definition of medieval impeachment.
We may now turn to consider the variety of judicial procedure 
bequeathed by the medieval Parliament to its seventeenth-century 
successors. In theory, such a task involves a survey of all the 
records of all the medieval Parliaments; but as in practice the 
Parliamentarians of the early seventeenth century selected the vast 
bulk of their precedents from the years between the middle of the 
fourteenth and the middle of the fifteenth centuries, this examina­
tion will be confined to procedures used during that period. An 
attempt will be made to construct a conq)osite model, to show the 
variety of methods which might be adopted to deal with a case as it 
passed through the main stages in Parliament.^ Such a model must, 
of course, be based upon all cases which appear to have relevance 
in the context of 1621, whether or not they were actually quoted 
as precedents then. Some of these cases are described in the 
records as impeachments, some of them are not; and it must, in any 
case, b;e remembered that the Parliament men of 1621 did not select
To prevent this exercise from appearing too theoretical, 
reference will be made to the specific cases from which the model 
has been derived; but, as far as possible, this information will 
be confined to the footnotes unless the case was one quoted as a 
precedent during the revival of Parliamentary judicature in 1621.
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their precedents merely from among cases which are called impeach­
ments.
Several methods of introducing criminal proceedings into 
Parliament were employed during the century after 1350. Proceedings 
might be based upon the notoriety of the crime, upon the clamour of 
the community, upon petitions or bills presented to Parliament, or 
upon appeal of treason or felory.^ Appeal was confined to the Lords
and seems to have concerned the Commons little; it need not, there-
2
fore; be discussed. However, the first three methods formed the 
foundation for proceedings which often involved both Houses, and 
each must be examined.
At one time, a statement by the King that the facts in a crime 
were notoriously known had been sufficient to secure a conviction. ^ 
By the middle of the fourteenth centuiy this was no longer true.
^ Plucknett, 'The Origin of In^eachment', loc. oit.. pp.51*
55-6; Lambrick, op. cit.. p.269*
^ For appeal, see M.V. Clarke, 'Forfeitures and Treason in 1388*. 
Fourteenth Century Studies. pp.l33ff; T.F.T. Plucknett, *Impeachment 
and Attainder*. Trans. Royal Hist. Soc. (1955), 5th Series, vol. 
iii, pp.l45ff; A. Steel. Richard II (Cambridge, 1962), pp.l41ff;
S. Rezneck, 'The Early History of the Parliamentary Declaration of 
Treason*. E.H.R. (1927), vol. xUi, no. l68, p.5H; J.G-. Bellany,
* Appeal and Impeachment in the Good Parliament*. Bull. Inst. Hist.
Res. (1966), vol. xxxix, no. 99, P*43*
^ Mortimer, 1330. See also Plucknett, *The Origin of Impeachment*, 
loc.cit.. pp.58-9 , 64ff.
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but the concept of notoriety survived as a basis for an accusation.
In 1376, Latimer was accused by the Commons of having "notoriously
accoo'aohed royal power", and the lower House used similar language
in its case against lyons in the same year,^ while the concept appears
2
again in subsequent trials.
Judicial proceedings in Parliament might also be based upon 
clamour® Latimer was "impeached and accused by the clamour of the 
commons" and similar phraseology was used in the trial of Bury in the 
same Parliament. ^ Yet it is difficult to know exactly idi^ t meaning 
should be placed upon the word - which appears again in the seventeenth 
century. Plucknett considered that the clamour of the Commons wfts 
"the old theory of conviction by notoriety with the sole difference 
that it is the Speaker instead of the King who asserts that the misdeeds 
are notorious".^ Miss Lambrick suggests that it lies somewhere 
between "the suit of an identifiable local community ... and ... the 
expression of general pubJJLc opinion in the * notoriety* of the crimes
Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 1376 *, loc. cit.. pp.l58-60;
Rot. Pari, ii, pp#323, 325; Lambrick, op. cit.. p.2b9; Plucknett,
*The Origin of Impeachment*, loc. cit.. p.71#
 ^For example, the trial of Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich, in 
1383. See also Lambrick, op. cit.. p#275; Plucknett, *Impeachment 
and Attainder*, loc. cit.. pp.150-1; Plucknett, 'The Origin of 
Impeachment', loc. cit.. p.70; Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard 
II', loc. cit.. p.1^3; Rot. Pari, iii, pp.153-4, 378; E.M. Thompson, 
ed., Chronicon Angliae (London, 1874), p.lxxviii.
^ Rot. Pari, ii, pp.324, 330.
^ Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 1376', loc. cit., p. 159.
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with which the accused was charged".^ Neither of these theories 
seems capable of positive proof, and it may be that we are doomed to 
perpetual uncertainty about the meaning of 'clamour* ; but Miss 
Lambrick*s work, taken in conjunction with Professor Plucknett*s, 
prompts us to ask whether we have not tried to find too deep a meaning 
in this word. It is possible that, as two methods of initiating 
proceedings, cl§mour and notoriety were barely distinguishable, and 
that it was the clamour of the people, or of the Commons, which made 
the facts in a case notorious.
The third method of initiating judicial proceedings in Parliament 
was by petition or bill - the terms are often interchangeable at this 
time. A petition might be presented to Parliament by an individual 
or a group of people from outside it, or it might originate within 
Parliament. Procedure by petition necessarily contained implications 
of grace and favour, and a recognition that the petition mi^t be 
rejected. (in this connection it is as well to bear in mind the 
suggestion made by Miss Clarke, though not generally accepted, that 
the Good Parliament of 1376 translated procedure by petition into 
procedure by indictment - "an assertion of right" - thereby establishing 
one of the characteristics of in^eachment. ) It appears that a
^ Lambrick, op. cit.. p.274.
^ Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment*, loc. cit.. p.265. See
p. 15 above.
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petition might become the basis of judicial proceedings in Parliament 
in one of two ways* In the first of these the Commons would adopt 
a petition as their own cause - as in Lee's case of I368, in which 
the lower House made a direct accusation cast in the form of five 
petitions which had been received*^ In the Good Parliament itself, 
the Commons certainly seem to have been less inclined than previously 
to adopt petitions as a means of instituting proceedings* However, 
at least part of their attack on Latimer took this form, and there 
seems to be evidence of a similar procedure during the case of Bury 
who, like Latimer, is recorded as having been impeached. But such 
evidence is lacking in the trials of Ellis and Peach, a fact which, 
as these are also described as in^eachments, supports Miss Clarke's 
interpretation. Nevertheless, one of the grounds upon which 
Professor Wilkinson has challenged this interpretation is that 
procedure on petitions adopted by the Commons continued after 1376.
He thinks "it might even be argued that the idea of petition was still 
implicit in the 'complaint'" by the Commons of 1386 against Michael
^ Plucknett, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc* cit..pp.65ff< 
Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit.. pp.257-9; Rot. Pari, 
ii, pp*297*8. See also p. I6 above.
^ Wilkinson, Studies, pp.88 and n.l, 91; V.H. Galbraith, ed.. 
The Anrmimalle Chronicle. 1335 to 1381 (Manchester, 1927), pp.88, 90.
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de la Pole.^
The second way of proceeding by petition was for the Commons to
deal with it without actually taking it over themselves. The best-
known example is probably the petition brought against the Chancellor,
Michael de la Pole, in 1384-, two years before his greater ordeal in
the Wonderful Parliament. The petition was presented to the Commons
by John Cavendish, a London fishmonger, and de la Pole had to defend
himself, first before the Lords and subsequently before the Lords and
Commons together. His defence succeeded and Cavendish was fined for 
2
defaming him.
It is possible that the fourteenth centuiy recognised other 
methods of instituting judicial proceedings in Parliament. Perhaps 
to impeach somebody was, or became, one of these methods, instead of 
being some kind of procedure originated in one or more of the three
Wilkinson, Studies. pp.86-7. He appears to ignore the fact
that Miss Clarke noted the use of procedure by petition a gainst 
Despenser in 1383, perhaps because Miss Clarke herself did not seem 
to regard this case as a genuine impeachment: Clarke, 'The Origin
of Impeachment', loc. cit.. p.265. Ellis was eventually complained 
of in petitions, but only after his impeachment had failed: Plucknett,
'The Impeachments of 137&*, loc. cit.. p.l63.
 ^Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II', loc. cit.. pp.
164-5; Rot. Pari, iii, p.l68. Plucknett pointed out that the Roll 
is "careful not to call this an impeachment".
The process of turning petitions presented to the Commons into 
private bills for enactment by Parliament became quite well established 
in the reign of Henry IV. Private bill procedure was distinctly 
judicial in character: IP. Erskine May, A Treatise on the Law.
Privileges. Proceedings and Usages of Parliament (London, 1924), 
p.609.
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ways which have been discussed. But enough has been said to show 
that several means existed for beginning proceedings, that they might 
all co-exist in one case, and that none of them was totally excluded 
from a case described as an impeachment.
Before concluding this survey of the means by which a case might 
be introduced into Parliament, it should perhaps be noted that 
attainder - a Parliamentary process which was to reach its climax 
in a later period - seems to have had some of its origins in the 
century after 1350. Professor Tout saw, in the doctrine of the high 
court of Parliament enunciated in 1388, a foundation for acts of 
attainder, and elements of this process have been found in the case 
of Sir John Mortimer in 1423.^
We must now consider the procedure followed once a case had been 
brought before Parliament. This shows as much variety as the 
methods used to originate an action. It will be discussed from 
various angles. First of all, the fact that an accusation was intro­
duced into Parliament did not necessarily mean that every stage of the 
case would be conducted there. It was possible for part of a trial 
to take place before the Council outside Parliament. Lee's case is
Also in the case of Lord Stanley in 1459: T.F. Tout, Chapters
in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England (Manchester, 1920- 
33), iii, p.432; Rezneck. op. cit.. p.506; Pludmett, 'Impeachment 
and Attainder', loc. cit.. p.157. See also Wilkinson, Constitutional 
History of Medieval England. ii, pp.258ff; Steel, op. cit., pp,152, 
178-9 ; L.W.V. Harcourt, His Grace the Steward and Trial of Peers 
(London, 1907), p.388.
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an example of this, while the Council may have taken a separate part
in the hearing of Latimer's trial, even though the Lords dominated 
the later stages of it. Both the Lords and the Council heard the 
reply of William Weston in 1377, while the ill-defined body of 
"Seignurs et Baronage", whom the Commons asked to punish him and his 
companion in misfortune, John de Gomeniz, possibly included the 
Council. However, by 1386 the Council no longer receives a mention 
in such trials, and the Lords and King alone gave judgment on Michael 
de la Pole - like Latimer, described as having been impeached.^
Central to much of the discussion of Parliamentary judicature 
in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries has been the 
position and function of the House of Commons, and its part in these 
procedures will now be considered. Towards the end of Edward Ill's 
reign, the practice had arisen of the Commons' sending a deputation 
to the Lords to ask for a committee to confer with them,^ and this, 
together with favourable political conditions, perhaps assisted the 
development of the Commons' part in judicature. The extent of their 
share fluctuated considerably. It appears to have been small in 
Lee's trial, where some of the Commons merely seem to have been present
Clarke, 'The Origin of Inç>eachment*, loo, cit.. p.243; 
Wilkinson, Studies. pp.89, 98 and n.l, 99; Plucknett, 'The Origin 
of Impeachment', loc. cit.'. p.53; Rot. Pari, ii, p.298; iii, pp. 
10-11, 2l6ff.
2
H.G. Richardson and G.O. Say les, 'The Parliaments of Edward 
III', Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. (l93l), vol. ix, no. 25, p.15, a.3.
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during part of the ezaMnation, and then oniy as listeners.^ But 
in 1376 it expanded considerablor, doubtless assisted by the lack of 
a Court initiative at the veiy end of Edward's reign. In that year, 
and particularly in the impeachment of Latimer, the Commons mounted 
a collective action through their Speaker, who insisted that all, 
and not merely some, members should be present during the hearings. 
Furthermore, the House established an effective "coalition" with the 
Lords, and insisted, in fact if not in words, that Latimer's trial 
should be held in full Parliament.^ Acting through the Speaker, the 
Commons dealt in detail with the charges against Latimer, asked for 
"the sworn evidence of witnesses to be given to their House, a-nH 
demanded his arrest. During the trial itself, the Commons assumed 
corporate responsibility for their accusation and undertook the duties 
of prosecutor, although maintaining that they were acting on behalf 
of the King. In addition, while part of the defence seems to have 
taken place in their absence, they are recorded as having been
^ Pari, ii, pp.297-8; Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment*,
loc. cit., p.258.
2
Galbraith, op. cit., p. 84; Wilkinson, Constitutional History 
of Medieval England, ii, p.209; A.F. Pollard, 'The Authorship and 
Value of the Anonimalle Chronicle *. E.H.R, (1938), vol. liii, no.
212, p.588.
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responsible for securing Latimer's removal from office.^ The 
surviving records for the other cases of 1376 are less substantial 
than those for Latimer's trial, but they suggest that the Commons took 
a fairly prominent part in these cases, too. The House preferred 
charges in Parliament against Lyons, demanded his arrest and prayed 
for judgment upon him. It conducted its own examination of Ellis 
and asked for judgment upon him and Neville. It accused Peach on 
behalf of the King and of the injured parties simultaneously. ^ All
these men are, of course, described as having been impeached.
The case of Alice Terrers, Edward Ill's mistress, is altogether 
more obscure, even though it was, at one stage, referred to as an 
impeachment. After hearing of her great influence over the King, 
the Commons of the Good Parliament of 1376 petitioned for her removal. 
She was unable to reply to mary of the charges against her and, havigg 
been declared guilty, apparently in the Lords, "by the judgement of 
many", she was banished from Court by an ordinance made in Parliament. 
But she had been restored to her place by the following spring and the
^ Plucloiett, 'The Impeachments of 1376*, loc. cit., pp.156, 158, 
161-2; Wilkinson, Studies, pp.88, 89, 91; Clarke, 'The Origin of 
Impeachment', loc. cit., p.243; Rot. Pari, ii, p.326. One of the 
witnesses for whose sworn evidence the Commons asked was a member 
of the Lords. The lower House recognised that to examine peers on 
oath was beyond their competence, and it therefore obtained the King s 
approval to do this : Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 1376', p. 156.
 ^Plucknett, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc^»_cit., pp.69-70; 
Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 1376*, loc. cit#, pp.156, 158, 1 3*4; 
Galbraith, op. cit., pp.89-50; Clai'ke, *The Origin of Impeachment ,
loc. cit.. p.243; Rot. Pari, ii, pp.327-9.
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attack on her was renewed in Richard II's first Parliament. She
was caused to come" into Parliament — by whom was not stated - and
brought before the Lords. The ordinance and charges against her were
read out; she was given a day to answer; and witnesses were sworn
and examined. There is no indication that the Commons took aiy part
in the proceedings, but she was eventually found guilty on the articles
"contained in the impeachment".^
In the early years of Richard*s reign, the Commons' part in
Parliamentary trials seems to decline. They made a supplication
against Gomeniz and Weston, and the latter, at least, addressed his
reply to them as well as to the Council and Lords; but in a trial of 
2
1383, at the prayer of the Commons, the Chancellor conducted the 
proceedings and presented the charges.^ In 1386, however, "All the 
commons together and of one accord came before the king, prelates, and 
lords in the hall of Parliament to complain grievously against Michael 
de la Pole ... and there present to accuse him ..."^ When de la Pole 
made his defence, the Commons replied to it and demanded judgment. In
Thomson, op. cit.. pp,95ff; Plucknett, 'State Trials under 
Richard II', loc. cit.. pp.l60-l; Wilkinson, Constitutional History 
of Medieval England, ii, p.220; Rot. Pari, iii, pp.12-14*
2
Despenser, Bishop of Norwich.
 ^Rot. Pari, iii, pp.10, 152-3; Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeach­
ment', loc. cit.. p.265; Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II', 
loc. pit., pp.163-4 .
^ Rot. Pari, iii, p.2l6.
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his turn, de la Pole responded to the Commons' reply, and his arrest 
is recorded as having been at their request.^
Later trials serve largely to confirm some of the Commons* 
functions. In 1423 the House is reported to have endorsed the 
accuracy of the indictment of Sir John Mortimer, but in 1430 it 
encountered difficulties in the early stages of its case against the 
Duke of Suffolk. The Duke, a member of the Council, had admitted that 
rumour accused him of scandalous misconduct, and on the strength of 
his acknowledgement the Commons asked the Lords to commit him to prison. 
The peers refused to do so without a specific accusation. In fact, 
the Commons soon provided this, charging Suffolk with making treasonable 
overtures to the French. Accordingly, the Lords sent him to the
Tower and formal articles of impeachment were presented a few days
2
later - an order of events which was to be followed two centuries 
afterwards when Strafford was impeached.
Some understanding of judicial procedure in medieval Parliaments 
may also be gained by examining the requests made by the accused and 
the replies these received. For although mary of the trials were 
blatantly political and Parliament, on occasion, doubtless made up
^ Ibid.. pp.2l6ff; Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II', 
loc. pit.. p.165.
^ Rot. Pari, iv, p.202; v, pp.176-7; Harcourt, op. cit., pp. 
383-4; Rezneck, op. cit.. p.506.
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the rules as it went along, those on trial normally seem to have 
received a full and seriously conducted hearing, with d m  attention 
paid to legal form. Latimer made at least five requests or 
complaints during his trial. He first asked for the charge in writing, 
but it is likely that he was forced to pleads? to each article as it 
was read to him. Such treatment was probably not untypical and oral 
proceedings seem to have been common, though in 1377 Weston was 
allowed to make a written answer. Latimer also asked for the presence 
of counsel, but he was allowed no more than expert assistance behind 
the scenes, and de la Pole fared no better in 1386. Latimer's 
complaint that there was no accuser for him to answer was perhaps 
hardly met when the Commons accused him as a body, but vdien de la Pole 
faced the same situation he raised no objection - and this practice, 
which most historians believe to be a characteristic of impeachment, 
became common. Latimer also asked for time to prepare his answer, 
a concession which would, however, have been of little use without 
written charges, and which was apparently refused. However, his 
fifth demand - that he should be tried as a peer - was satisfied by
^ For example, careless drafting prevented some of the charges 
against de la Pole from being pressed. For this and other cases, 
see M.V. Clarke, 'The Lancastrian Faction and the Wonderful Parlia­
ment'. Fourteenth Century Studies, p.48. M. Aston, 'The ImpeacWent 
of Bishop Despenser'. Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. (1963), vol. xxxviii, 
no. 98, P.13O; Wilkinson, Constitutional History of Medieval England,
ii, pp.263-4 .
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the form of the trial. Finally, while discussing the pleas made 
by the accused, it is interesting to note that two of the men 
* impeached and accused” in 1388 tried to defend themselves on the 
ground that what they had done had been at the King's express command. 
Although the two were convicted, the Lords reached no decision on
this defence, and the point was not determined until the trial of
2
Danby.
Normally the judgment in the Parliamentary trials of the late 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries was given by the Lords, but 
some exceptions should be noted. In 1376, lyons, Ellis and Peach 
were judged or punished with the assent of, or on the advice of. 
Parliament; and in de la Pole's case of 1386 the Commons asked for 
"the judgment of Parliament". It is difficult to know how significant 
such phraseology is, though Professor Wilkinson, basing his view on 
two of the chronicles, believes that its use in 1386 indicates that 
the Commons had advanced beyond "the simple ... judgement by Lords 
of 1376". In the event, however, judgment on de la Pole seems to 
have been given by the King and L o r d s . Y e t  de la Pole's earlier
For these and other cases, see Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 
1376', loc. cit., pp.138-61; Plucknett, 'The Origin of Impeachment', 
loc. cit.. p.70; Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II', loc. 
cit.. p.163; Clarke, 'Forfeitures and Treason in 1388', loc. cit.. 
p.138; Clarke, 'TThe Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit.. pp.262, 363; 
Thompson, op. cit.. p.lxxviii; Rot. Pari, ii, pp.324ff; iii, PP.
10, 216.
2 Plucknett, 'Impeachment and Attainder', loc. cit.. pp.146-7.
^ C.P.H. 1374-7, PP.439-40, 448 , 455; C.F.a.1369-77. p.350;
Rot. Pari, iii, p. 218; Wilkinson, Constitutional History of Medieval 
KnpianH, Ü ,  pp.234-5 and n.l9; Wilkinson, Studies, p.98.
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case, in 1384, suggests that participation of the Lords was not 
absolutely essential at every stage of a judgment. On that occasion, 
the Lords, having cleared de la Pole, delegated to the judges the task 
of dealing with the man who had wrongfully accused him, though it 
should be added that this was not a case which the Commons had taken 
upon their own shoulders.^
As for the punishments inflicted in trials before Parliament,
these ranged from enforced restitution of property to execution, and
included forfeiture, banishment and imprisonment. On occasion, as
in Latimer's case, the Commons suggested penalties, and these were
sometimes adopted. Furthermore, a sentence, once awarded, could be
increased - a fate which befell Lyons when the Lords decided that they
2
had been too lenient.
It is difficult to be certain of the theoretical position occupied 
by the Crown in Parliamentary trials, but it seems probablje either 
that the proceedings were ex parte regis, or that, at the least, the 
King's assent was required or assumed. It has already been observed^ 
that prosecution by the Crown appears to have been a consistent feature
^ Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II', loc. cit., pp.l64-5.
For de la Pole's case of 1384 see p. 26 above.  ^The punishment of 
his accuser should perhaps be regarded as an action distinct ii*om 
that against de la Pole himself.
^ Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 1376*, loc. cit., p.l63.
^ See p. 13 above.
%of impeachment, but this characteristic does not seem to distinguish 
such cases from cases which are not described in the records as 
impeachments. In the case of Lee, for instance, in 1368, the prosecu­
tion was apparently conducted ex parte regis. but there is no suggestion 
in the contemporary records that this was regarded as an impeachment: 
as for Latimer's case, which was, the Commons* repeated protestation 
that they were prosecuting on behalf of the King, speaks for itself.
When Richard asked the judges in 1387 whether the Lords and Commons 
might impeach the King's officers and justices without the King's 
permission, he was told that they could not; and when, in the following 
year, these judges were themselves impeached, the King is said to have 
given his consent to the judgments passed upon them. Furthermore,
the Commons of 1397 sought the Crown's permission before bringing the 
impeachments of that year.^
Although part of the difficulty in categorising the procedures 
of the medieval Parliament in judicial caaes arises from the fact that 
these procedures were so flexible, this veiy flexibility enabled it 
to deal with potentially difficult situations. For instance, the 
presence of the accused was not always necessary. In 1388 the judges 
were probably sentenced in their absence, while in 1397 bhe fugitive 
Sir Thomas Mortimer was accused, A day was appointed for the hearing
^ Plucknett, 'Impeachment and Attainder ', loc. cit., pp. 147, 153; 
Plucknett, 'The Impeachments of 1376*, loc. cit., p. 162; Clarke,
'The Origin of In^eachment', loc. cit., pp.258-9; Rot., üi;
p.233.
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of his case, writs were issued for his arrest, and penalties laid 
down if he defaulted. In addition, Parliament showed itself quite 
prepared to punish people who misled it either with evidence which 
they later contradicted, as in Neville's trial of 1376, or with false 
accusations, such as those against de la Pole in 1384.^
We may conclude this survey of judicial procedure by speculating 
upon the theoretical basis of the law administered by Parliament. 
During 1388, great use was made in the Lords of the procedure known 
as the appeal, a process with which the Commons were barely connected. 
At that time the Lords declared that "in so high a crime as is alleged 
in this appeal ... the process will not be taken arywhere except to 
parliament, nor judged by aiy other law except the law and court of 
parliament..,"^ We do not know whether this lex Parliamenti was 
thought to operate in any other trials than the appeals of 1388, but 
it is a concept which reappears in the seventeenth century in the 
broader context of judicature in Parliament.
This survey of late-medieval judicial practices may show, if
Clarke, 'Forfeitures and Treason in 1388*, loc. cit.. pp.136-7; 
Plucknett, * Impeachment and Attainder*, loc. cit.. pp.147, 151; 
Harcourt, op. cit.. p.358.
 ^Plucknett, 'State Trials unier Richard II', loc. cit.. pp.164-5; 
Rot. Pari, ii, p.329.
^ Wilkinson, Constitutional History of Medieval England, ii, p.280; 
Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II'. loc. cit.. pp.168-9;
Rot. Pari, iii, p.236.
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nothing else, the considerable variety and lack of definition that 
prevailed. It is not at all certain that impeachment was considered 
by contemporaries to be a special type of procedure, markedly different 
from other procedures - though this may have been the case. Virtually 
the only feature common to all cases described as 'impeachments* is 
the use of the fonnula "accuse and impeach", or some variation of it, 
and it may be as well to observe, at this point, that such a formula 
was not employed in the seventeenth century until the trial of the 
Duke of Buckingham. It is not, of course, surprising tliat procedures 
overlapped and became confused. Like their seventeenth-century 
successors late-medieval Parliaments had to deal with the crises of 
the moment and adapted their procedures accordingly. It may be that 
early Stuart Parliaments did the same, and that to refer to *the 
revival of impeachment in 1621* is to over-simplify what was in fact 
a complex inheritance and a tentative process.
This enquiry into medieval procedure has included cases which 
were ignored, as well as cases which were quoted, in the Parliaments 
of the early seventeenth century: for this reason, if for no other,
it would be dangerous to assume that Stuart England received unaltered 
the heritage wliich appears to us to have been available. It is, 
therefore, important to make some attempt to understand what the men 
who assembled in James I's Parliaments chose to regard as their 
inheritance. The starting point for such an enquiry must be the 
recoils which were available in the early seventeenth centuiy.
These were the priaaary source of guidance - whether to those who 
initiated Parlimnent's attacks, to their victims, to the monarch 
whose prerogatives stood to suffer from Parliamentaiy pretensions, 
or to the Lords threatened by the Commons' encroachments. For while 
it may be fantasy to imagine the agents of opposing parties confronting 
each other across a pile of records, it is nevertheless true that those 
under attack made good use of precedents, sometimes formulating their 
theories of the Commons' power with more accuracy, if with less lasting 
effect, than their assailants. The story of the records is closely 
linked with the work of the antiquarian scholars; both will now be 
considered.
The seventeenth century was, of course, by no nffians the first 
to realise the value of records. A search for precedents had been 
going on since the days of Brae ton, and during the middle ages faith 
in the past led men to take good care of what, sometime during the 
fourteenth century, they came to regard not merely as the royal records 
but as the public records.^ As this notion of public ownership 
developed, so too did demands for right of access. In 1372 Edward III 
granted a Commons* petition that the records should be accessible to 
aryone, whether to be used in favour of or against the King's interests.
F.S. Fussner, The Historical Revolution. English Historical 
Writing and Thought, 13~80-l64Q (London, 1962), p.31; V.H. Galbraith, 
Studies in the Public Records (London, 1949), PP.84, 87.
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and on 7 March, 1621 the House of Commons remembered this concession.^ 
However, in the interim, enthusiasm for looking after the records
waned and by the early seventeenth centuiy their condition had
2
deteriorated. Coke protested to James I that the Ordnance Office 
had stored gunpowder beneath the records in the Tower. In July 1620 
James ordered its removal - though whether out of concern for the 
records or for the crown jewels which were stored nearby and therefore 
equally vulnerable, we have no means of knowing. In fact, nothing 
was done and the gunpowder was still there more than a century later.^ 
Nevertheless, the collections of public records had by this time been 
centralised in four main groups of repositories, all within easy reach 
of the Parliamentary committees which were appointed to search them, 
and in about l606 the zealous and energetic Thomas Wilson was appointed
Galbraith, Studies. p.85, quoting from Rot. Pari, ii, p.314;
C.D. iv, p.132. The concession made in 1372 did not last long as 
a similar petition was presented in 1384, and in 1439 the King refused 
a Commons* petition that King's Bench and Common Plea records be made 
available for reference; Galbraith, p.85; Rot. Pari, iii, p.202.
^ Galbraith, Studies. p.87; &.B. Wernham, 'The Public Records in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*. In L. Fox, ed., English 
Historical Scholarship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(London, 1956), pp.12-16; H. Mirrlees A Fly in Amber (London, 1962), 
p.101; J. Butt, 'The Facilities for Antiquarian Study in the seven­
teenth century'. Essays and Studies (1938), vol. xxlv, pp.64-79•
Marc Friedlaender takes a somewhat more optimistic view: ' Growth in
the Resources for Studies in Earlier English Histoiy, 1534*1625* 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis of the University of Chicago, 1938), p.l73.
^ C.S.P. Dorn. 1619-23. P.I6O; Wernham, op. cit., p.27. Friedlaender 
is wrong in stating, p.l72, that the powder had been removed as a 
result of James' order. His source, S.P. Dom. 14/156, .4 , s ws
this quite clearly.
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Keeper of the Records. In the early seventeenth century increased 
use was made of the records and this must have led not only to a 
wider knowledge of their organisation, assisted by Thomas Powell's 
publication in 1622 of the first guide, but also to a greater opportunity 
for the medieval heritage to influence thinking.^ In addition, abstracts 
and abridgements of the Parliament Rolls made a knowledge of these 
widely available; Selden certainly produced his during 1621 and a 
catalogue of them was compiled by Robert Bowyer who was Clerk of the 
Parliament from I6IO to 1621.^
Although much of the medieval evidence used by the Parliament of 
1621 came directly from the Parliament Rolls, there existed at this 
time, in private collections but available for examination, several 
manuscripts of chronicles telling, inter alia, the story of some of 
the medieval trials. Unfortunately, as the Journals and Parliamentary 
diaries of I62I refer only in the briefest possible way to the
D.N.B. under Wilson; Fussner, op. cit., p.71. Repositories had 
been established at the Rolls House and Tower, the four Treasuries at 
Westminster, the State Paper Office at Whitehall, and in various 
offices of the courts and departments of government. In (or possibly 
before) 1621 the Jewel Tower in the Palace of Westminster came into 
use as a storage place for Parliamentary Records: A.J. Taylor,
The Jewel Tower, Westminster (London, 1965), p.12.
^ Fussner, op. cit.. p.33. Nine years after publishing his 
Direction for Search of Records. Powell, until 1622 solicitor-general 
in the Marches of Wales, published the much fuller Répertorie..of 
Records : D.N.B. under Powell.
^ E.R. Foster, ed., Proceedings in Parliament, I6IO (New Haven, 
1966), i, p.xxii, and n.9.
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precedents, it seems impossible to state categorically that such 
records were used by the Parliament men or their opponents. But 
their history and ownership makes it at least possible that thqy 
formed part of the heritage. For the trials of the reigns of Edward 
III and Richard II, to which the men of 1621 repeatedly turned, two 
chronicles are of considerable value. The first is that section of 
the St Albans chronicles which has been edited and published as the 
Chronicon Angliae and whicii covers the Good Parliament and the years 
up to 1388. Of the manuscripts of this part of the chronicle two are 
basic. Both these were known in the late sixteenth century when they 
were owned by Matthew Parker. Foxe used one in his Acts and Monuments 
while Stow seems to have employed a translation, though probably not 
the Latin originals, of the other. Much of Parker's library went 
to Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, but although these manuscripts 
were included they did not stay: one eventually found its way into
the Harleian library ; the other turned up on the shelves of the 
Cottonian collection as Otto C. ii* It is listed in the manuscript 
catalogue of Cotton's library in 1621, and it may therefore have helped 
to colour the advice that its owner was to give during and after the 
trials of that year. For of all the surviving manuscripts of the 
chronicle this is the one which adopts the line most vehemently 
critical of John of Gaunt, and it was Gaunt’s inabiliiy to protect
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his dependants that conferred success upon the impeachments of 1376,^  
The second chronicle, a record of fundamental importance for the 
history of the Good Parliament, is the Anonimalle Chronicle. Although 
its ownership in the seventeenth century is in doubt, and it subse­
quently disappeared from view until rediscovered forty years ago, this
chronicle was known to Stow who used it in the later editions of his
2
Annals. In recounting the story of the impeachments of I376 it 
places much more emphasis than do the Parliament Rolls on William 
Latimer, who has not only been traditionally regarded as the first man 
to be impeached, but whose trial was probably the precedent most 
commonly used in l621. Further, this chronicle is the only source of 
the proceedings and debates of the Commons before they came into full
Cotton's catalogue, which should be better known, is now in 
Harleian MS 6OI8. It is entitled ' Catalogus Librorum Manuscriptorum 
in Bibliotheca Roberti Cottoni l621'. Otto C. ii is entered on 
f.ll4v. For the history and character of the manuscripts of the 
chronicle see Thompson, op. cit., pp.xii-xxx. Of the less important 
manuscripts of this part of the chronicle one, Bodleian MS 316, bears 
what appears to be a seventeenth-century monogram, and another is the 
Cottonian Faustina B. ix. (which, however, does not appear in Cotton's 
catalogue). The latter, which was found by Leland in Tynemowtii 
Priory is later in date and more guarded in its views than Otto C. ii. 
For a passage, found only in Otto C. ii, showing Gaunt in a bad light 
see pp.74*5 of Thompson's edition of the Chronicle.
^ Galbraith, The Anonimalle Chronicle, pp.v, xix. Galbraith 
believes that it had passed into the possession of the Ingilby family 
before the seventeenth century but this is disputed by Pollard whb, 
however, makes no alternative suggestion; A.F. Pollard, 'The 
Authorwhip and Value of the Anonimalle Chronicle*, loc. cit., p.604.
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Parliament to demand the impeachments.^
If the men of the early seventeenth century required further
evidence of the peculiar relevance of the reign of Richard II to
their own time it could be found, in easily digestible form, in the
theatre. At least two plays, apart from Shakespeare:/s, dealt with 
2
Richard's reign; Shakespeare dramatised only the last eighteen 
months of the reign but he makes one reference to what is almost 
certainly the power of judgment of the Commons and to their hostility
J.G. Edwards in his review of Galbraith’s edition of the 
Anonimalle Chronicle in E.H.R.. (1928), vol. xliii, no. I69, pp.l06, 
107; Pollard, op. cit., p.587. This account of the chronicles
available in the early seventeenth century makes no claim to be 
exhaustive. It merely indicates the major sources accessible to, 
or probably accessible to, members in 1621 for the precedents which 
they most frequently used. It could be multiplied, but with little 
profit. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that several Tudor 
chroniclers, whose work was printed and therefore easily available, 
referred to mary of the medieval impeachments, but did so only briefly, 
Furthermore, although the Hi3toria Anglicana gives more space than the 
Chronicon Angliae to the case of de la Pole in 1386, it adds little 
to the information provided by the latter and there is no evidence 
that the manuscript (now B.M. Royal 13Ë ix) of this section was 
available to the Parliament men of the early seventeenth century.
For a detailed study of the St Albans chronicles, see V.H. Galbraith, 
’Thomas Walsingham and the Saint Albans Chronicle, 1272-1422’, E.H.R. 
(1932), vol. xlvii, no. I85, pp.12-30; and the same author's intro­
ductory essays to his edition of The St. Albans Chronicle 1406-1420 
(Oxford, 1937).
2
One, in production in I6II, began with Wat tyler’s rebellion 
and introduced Gloucester's death, but not, apparently, Richard's 
deposition and death. The second, probably written in the period 
1620-30, was The Tragedy of Richard II concluding with the murder 
of the Duke of Glouces"^r: A.W. Verity, ed.. Richard II (Cambridge,
1899), p.xLv.
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to the King's servants.^ However, the judicial conflict with which 
the play is chiefly concerned is the appeal, a process in which the 
Commons were not involved, and which died out in 1399, to be revived, 
unsuccessfully, by Charles I in his attempt to "impeach" the five 
members.^
But it is unlikely that such uncertain literary evidence played 
any substantial part in the reign of James I. For active in these 
years were some of the very best of English antiquaries. We shall 
probably never know exactly how far the influence and knowledge of 
these men guided the development of Parliamentary judicature, but 
there is no doubt that their expertise was made available for use, 
that they were prepared to embroil themselves in the feud and that 
their skills were regarded as sufficiently dangerous for the government 
to be provoked into retaliation in and after 1621. Antiquarianism 
had, of course, emerged particularly strongly late in the reign of
1 Act II, Scene 2, line 125ff. Bushy, Bagot and Green are 
discussing their predicament after the King's departure for Ireland 
and the news of Bolingbroke's invasion:
Green: ... our nearness to the king in love
Is near the hate of those love not the king.
Bagot: And that's the wavering commons: for their love
Lies in their purses, and whoso empties them.
By so much fills their hearts with deadly hate.
Busly: Wherein the king s tands generfi-ily condemn'd.
Bagot: If judgment lie in them, then so do we.
Because we ever have been near the king.
The first quarto of Richard II was published in 1597.
 ^Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit.. p.270. The
five members were not. of course, impeached - at least, not in the
traditional sense of the word as defined above (p. 13) - for the 
Commons did not present charges against them to the Lords.
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Elizabeth with the foundation of the Society of Antiquaries: but
members were concerned with the collection of facts, rather than with 
problems of explanation and historical context. Despite its relative 
harmlessness the Society had ceased to meet in about l608 because of 
the disfavour of the King, and attempts in I614. to revive it, with 
its sharper teeth drawn, were again blocked by James. But the torch 
was carried into the seventeenth century by men such as Spelman, Camden, 
Ussher, Cotton and Selden. Their work led to a vastly more critical 
approach to English historical scholarship which ultimately helped to 
undermine notions of the unchanging character of institutions and the 
common law on which many of the claims of the Parliament of 1621 
rested.^ But meanwhile, of this group of men. Cotton and Selden 
made their knowledge readily available for use as ammunition in the 
legal-cum-political disputes of their day and it is hard to believe 
that the historical revolution was not helped forward by the increasing
P. Styles, 'Politics and Historical Research in the early 
seventeenth century*. In L. Fox, op. cit.. p.52; J.H.M. Salmon,
The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought (Oxford, 1959), 
pp.66-7; Fussner. op. cit.. pp.94-102, II4» On p.95, Fussner 
suggests that James' refusal in I614 to permit the Society to reform 
was due to the growing use of precedents in relation to comtemporary 
constitutional issues. If so it is curious that James did not raise 
objections at their first appearance in the Parliament of 1621, as he 
was to do later in the same Parliament. For the date of cessation 
of meetings of the Society of Antiquaries, see D.S. Berkowitz who 
maintains that formal sessions ended in l604: 'Young Mr. Selden.
Essays in Seventeenth-century Learning and Politics' (Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis of the University of Harvard, 1946), chapter VI, p.48.
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demand for precedents and expert advice which arose from such phenomena 
as the development of Parliamentaiy judicature.
In 1621 Cotton was less committed to one side than was Selden 
although later in the 'twenties he was to become increasingly the 
adviser - and friend of the Parliamentary leaders. His interests were 
well rooted in the past: William Camden, himself a friend of Stow,
had been his schoolmaster and friend, and Cotton was a member of the 
Society of Antiquaries - one of the few who was not a lawyer. He was 
a member of James* first and last Parliaments and as early as I6O7 was 
supplying information for use in Parliament. During the following 
years he was enployed by both King and Parliament in searching records, 
opportunities which he used to augment his own library.^ It is likely, 
too, that he was at this time engaged in collecting what was later 
published as An Exact Abridgement of the Records in the Tower of London. 
With friends who were influential enough to gain him access to 
collections of records without payment of the normal fees, with a 
library splendidly organised and strategically placed in his house 
close to Parliament, and with a wealth of knowledge of his own, he 
must, by 1621, have been without rival as an expert guide and adviser. 
Nevertheless, while he was undoubtedly of use to Parliament, there is
1 D.N.B. under Cotton and Stow; Mirrlees, op. cit.. pp.149, 
365-6; Fussner, op. cit.. p.132; British Museum. A Guide to a Select 
B^diibition of Cottonian Manuscripts (Oxford, 193l), p.33.
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less evidence than one would need to claim that he had any greqt
influence upon its activities. Shortly after the first session
opened the Commons asked for his help in solving an election dispute
and, later, when the lower House became entangled in its own extravagant
claims to jurisdiction over Floyd, he wrote A Briefe Discourse
Concerning The Power of the Peeres, and Commons of Parliament, in point
of Judicature; but his identification with the Commons was not so
strong as to prevent the King from appointing him to the committee of
enquiry to search Coke's papers.^ Indeed, it is highly probable that
Cotton was too impartial for the liking of the Parliamentary leaders,
that searching the records was still, for him, an academic exercise.
He was not prepared to accept the precedents blindly: there is, in
the Abridgement. a note condemning as an "Injustice in Parliament" the
2
process there against Alice Perrers, Edward Ill's mistress. The case
C.D. iv, p.54; Fussner, op. cit.. pp.126, 133. Cotton, whose 
authorship of this work has now been conclusively settled by 
Berkowitz, dedicated A Briefe Discourse to Sir Edward Montagu, a 
supporter of the Crown who was, nevertheless, prepared to join in 
the search for precedents and talk to Cotton in an attempt to justify 
the Commons’ action over Floyd: C.D. iii, p.191; C.J. i, p.6l9;
Berkowitz, op. cit., appendix E; Fussner, op. cit.. pp.133-4.
Fussner also points out that Cotton’s The Antiquity and Dignity of 
Parliaments was much used as a source of precedents during the debates 
of December 1621.
2
R. Cotton, An Exact Abridgement of the Records in the Tower of 
London (London, 165?), p. 158. The note concludes that Perrers' 
"mishap was, that she was friendly to many, but all were not so to 
her. The Record is strange and worthy of sight". The article 
on Cotton in the D.N.B. suggests that the Abridgement was written 
by William Bowyer, assisted by Robert Bowyer, but gives no reason 
for this opinion.
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against her was one of the precedents that the Parliament men of 1621 
were inclined to quote. Furthermore, he was ready to give some 
encouragement to Parliaments victims. In July l621, Michell, who 
had been accused in the spring, heard that Cotton has spoken in his 
favour at the hearing before the King which led to his discharge from 
prison and the remission of his fine. He hastily wrote to Cotton 
asking for confirmation and further help, thereby inaugurating a 
correspondence which, despite the discouragement of its apparent one­
sidedness, was remarkable for the persistence with which its author 
justified himself. Shortly before this Cotton received a letter from 
Sir John Bennet, who had recently been attacked. Bennet asked for 
precedents from the Parliament Rolls of cases similar to his, adding 
a request that if Cotton could not supply these he should provide 
directions to enable Bennet to conduct his own searches in the Tower.^ 
However, if Cotton himself sat on the fence in 1621, the contents of 
his library, with which he was always generous, were available to help 
transmit the medieval inheritance and it was presumably through fear 
of the use to which Bacon might put it that the government forbade 
him access to Cotton’s library after his fall.^ But if the libnzary
For Michell’s letters see Cottonian MS Julius C. iii, ff. 253, 
254 and '256. It is possible, of course, that Cotton replied to 
Michell but that his letters have not survived. For Bennet’s letter, 
f.23. This letter was written on 24 June, 1621, not, as Fussner 




was closed to Bacon it m s  readily available to John Selden, who had 
his own key, and there can be little doubt of the importance of Selden 
in the trials of 1621,^
Selden was, of course, a lawyer and was probably friendly with 
Cotton by I6O5 when Cotton was 34- and Selden 21. It was a friendship 
which lasted well and which, increasingly as the years passed, was 
placed at the service of Parliament. Less cautious in his views than 
Cotton, Selden probably found Cotton’s help invaluable in overcoming 
official resistance to his requests to examine records, and by 1621, 
having published his History of Tithes, he became a scholar of the 
first rank. Yet his realisation of the inadequacies of the previous 
generation of antiquaries in its approach to the past did not make him 
wholly immune to persuasion "to submerge his critical faculties in the 
tide of political sentiment", though he was "never so crudely 
unhistorical as his associates".^ The conjunction in Selden of 
outstanding scholarship and a committed point of view leads to the 
conclusion that, in hiring his services, in l621, the House of Lords, 
and indirectly the House of Commons, acquired an employee of peculiar 
quality.
E.N. Adams, Old English Scholarship in England. 1566-1800 
(London, 191?), p.63% By a judicious marriage - to a former countess 
of Kent - Selden had money enough to build up his own remarkable 
library: ibid., p.68.
2
Eussner, op. cit., p.135.
 ^Salmon, op. cit., p.66. See also Fussner, op. cit., p.277.
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In or about 1621 Selden* s knowledge took shape in two pieces
of writing, the treatise Of the Judicature in Parliaments and the
collection The Priviledges of the Baronage of England. The first
will be discussed later in this chapter; the second was without doubt
composed during the first session of the Parliament of l621, at the
request of the House of Lords. As early as mid-February seven peers
had inaugurated a search by William Noy of the Tower records, and
towards the end of March, probably at the instance of the same peers,
the investigation was stepped up and a committee appointed to look
for precedents for judicature, accusations and judgments in Parliament.^
This committee was doubtless responsible for recruiting Selden, who
2
was certainly in the employ of the Lords by 27 March. He must have
worked hard, for his collection of privileges, covering more than
Carte MS 78, ff. 495, 501. Thomas Knyvett was appointed, on 
30 March, to make notes of the records in the Tower and elsewhere, 
paying no fee: H.g.C. Third Report (London, 1872), Appendix, p.21,
The committee consisted of Huntingdon, Warwick and Haughton, three of 
the seven peers: L.J. iii, p.65. Huntingdon w§s especially interested
in Lords* procedure and privileges. From l607 to l621 he sat regularly 
in the House of Lords and wrote accounts of the Parliaments of l6lO,
1614 and 1621, Later certainly»-, and possibly in I6IO, he received 
reports from the Commons of their activities: Foster, oh. cit.. i,
pp.xxxff.
2
F.H. Relf, ed., Notes on the Debates in the House of Lords, 
officially taken by Robert Bowyer and Henry Elsing, Clerks of the 
Parliaments. A.D. 1621. 1625. l628. (London, 1 9 2 9 ; Camden Socieiy,
3rd Series, vol. xlii), p.48, which tells us that Hakewill was also 
employed by the Lords at this time. Selden was associated with the 
Lords earlier still, though less directly; the first roll of Standing 
Orders for the Lords was produced in March 1621 by Elsynge with 
Selden*s help: M,-F. Bond, *The Formation of the Ai:chives of Parliament,
1497-l693:^i, Journal of the Society of Archivists (1957), vol. i, 
no. 6, p.156.
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250 sheets, was apparently completed by the beginning of June,^
The Lords p#,id Selden for his services, so they presumably made 
the maximum use of his work* For their money they received what was 
very largely merely a translation without comment of those sections of 
the Parliament Rolls containing the precedents most frequently quoted 
in the debates on judicature in 1621. The precedents translated are 
similar to those Coke gave when he made his speech on judicature in 
March 1621. This makes it likely that Selden *s work was designed to 
enable the Lords to weigh up, and if necessary refute, Coke * s asser­
tions, a guess which receives backing from Selden*s inclusion of the 
case of Sir John Lee, tried in I568. Coke said that Lee was 
"punished by the Lords, at the Prayer of the Commons", a claim 
unsupported by the Parliament Rolls which merely indicate that some 
of the Commons were present in the earlier stages of the examination
This is inferred from a letter of 23 June, l621 which indicates 
that as soon as Peurliament went into recess in June Selden*s 
Parliamentary papers were seized. It is most unlikely that he could 
have continued his work in these circumstances and when the second 
session opened the efforts of both Selden and the peers were concen­
trated on recovering the papers and filling the gaps found to exist 
on their return, preparatory to having them bound: L.J. iii, p.l?6;
H.M.C. Third Report. Appendix, p.25; R.F. Williams, ed., The Court 
and Times of James the First (London, 1848), ii, pp.260-1. While 
engaged on these historical researches Selden also seems to have been 
regarded by the Lords as a proper recipient of the records of their 
current judicial activities. At the command of the sub-committee 
Elsynge lent him records of the proceedings against Mompesson:
Petyt MS 538/7, f. 336. He doubtless used this material when he 
wrote Of the Judicature jjn Parlieiments.
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but apparently only as listeners.^ Despite its inadequacy, for 
many men in 1621 the case seems to have held all the magic of a 
relevant precedent. Selden was stretching the record less harshly 
than Coke when he translated Lee’s case omitting all mention of the
3
Commons.
Selden*s collection of privileges contains one considerable 
nystery. For the most part it is a word-for-wopd translation of 
the Parliament Rolls without abbreviation or editing.^ But when
C.J. i, pp.545-6; Rot. Pari, ii, pp.297, 298. Reference has 
already been made to the case, but for a full discussion of it and its 
place in the development of impeachment see Clarke, *The Origin of 
Impeachment*, loc. cit., pp.258-9, 267-8 and Plucknett, *The Origin of 
Impeachment *, loc. cit., pp. 53-4. Coke repeats the mistake in The 
Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, I671), 
p.23: "Sir John at Lee adjudged by the Lords and Commons". For Lee*s
case see p. I6 above. For Selden*s precedents see Table I.
2
Including Bacon: J. Spedding, The Letters and the Life of
Francis Bacon (London, 1861-74), vii, pp.232-4. It was also one of 
the precedents reported to the Lords by the committee appointed in 
late March to search for precedents: Braye MS 11, f.l05.
^ J. Selden, The Priviledges of the Baronage of England when they
sit in Parliament (London, léS9), pp.34-6.
^ He does not translate the whole of the record of Ellis* case 
but this was relatively unimportant, occupying little space in the 
Parliament Rolls. He makes a minor change in the record on 
Latimer by translating "... Latymer estoit empeschez & accusez par 
clamour des ditz Communes" as "Latimer was impeached and accused 
by the Vote of the said Earls", but as he later renders "... Latymer 
y estoit empeschez par le dit Commune" as "Latimer was impeached by 
the Commons" this change is unlikely to be due to anything more than 
an innocent mistake, even if one favourable to the Lords. He also 
mistranslates part of the section recording Latimer’s punishment:
Rot. Pari, ii, p.324 paragraph 20, p.325 paragraph 24; Selden,
pp. 42, 46, 53.
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he reaches the case of Michael de la Pole, the ex-Chancellor who 
was impeached at the complaint of the Commons in 1386, wholesale 
omission and abbreviation talce place. The editing is extremely 
spasmodic and if this were our only record of the case parts of the 
proceedings would be virtually incomprehensible. Selden omits or 
summarises part of de la Pole's defence, though he gives his most 
successful plea, but he prints in full the Commons* reply to the 
defence he has suppressed. When he comes to the judgment he omits 
one of the charges which went against de la Pole and he leaves out 
the record of the dropping of three charges brought against him.
Now, when Coke discussed judicature in March 1621, he quoted de la 
Pole*s case in substantiation of the first of his four types of judica­
ture, that exercised by the King and magnates, and Bacon listed it as 
possibly relevant to his own situation when he was considering this 
round about Easter l621.^ As it was evidently regarded as a case of 
some significance, the reasons for Selden*s editing are worth examina­
tion. The simplest explanation is that the omissions are due to the 
King or his servants* failure to return all Selden*s papers which had 
been seized during the summer of 1621; but if so it is strange that 
confiscation afflicted o©ly this translation whose missing portions
^ Spedding, op. cit.. vii, p.232. Coke does not seem to have 
mentioned de la Pole's case until the debate itself. His views on 
judicature will be discussed later; see pp.67ff, below.
 ^ iii, p.176.
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can hardly be construed as adversely affecting the royal prerogative.
A man less scholarly than Selden might be accused of carelessness but 
this cannot possibly account for all the omissions, nor does it explain 
why he should summarise here when he normally translates verbatim 
elsewhere. These considerations, together with the fact that Selden 
concealed his omissions by not translating the words used in the 
Parliament Roll to number de la Pole's pleas, make it clear that the 
alterations were deliberate. The explanation of intentional falsifica­
tion of the record can surely be found only in the circumstances of 
1621.
If, as was suggested earlier, Selden made his collection to 
assist the Lords to defend themselves against the Commons, it is 
possible that he altered this record in an attempt to weaken the 
Commons* position; but it is difficult to see how the changes he made 
could have achieved this. Furthermore, Coke, in his speech on 
judicature, had not claimed - surprisingly enough - that de la Pole*s 
case supported the Commons* claims to participate. The explanation 
must lie elsewhere. It may very well be that Selden was translating 
the Parliament Rolls during the very weeks when Bacon was being tried. 
It was vital to Parliamentary judicature that this attack should 
succeed, as Selden knew better than most. The Lords* will needed 
strengthening when it was on a collision course with the Lord
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Chancellor, and this could perhaps be acJiieved by judicious alteration 
of the record of what might appear to be the most relevant of all 
precedents, the impeachment of a previous Chancellor. For the overall 
effect of Selden*s alterations was to weaken de la Pole's very
successful defence, leaving a picture of a man unable to answer charges
2
of fraud and receiving draconian punishment from the Lords. This 
explanation cannot be wholly satisfying because Selden's translation 
fails to eliminate completely hints that de la Pole w#s not as great 
a fool as he is made to appear. Nevertheless, if Selden was less 
able as a forger than as a historian, he obviously felt that his part- 
time occupation was worth the effort involved. ^  It would seem that 
he, as an antiquary, believed that his knowledge was so relevant to
According to F.H. Relf Coke too believed in the need to strengthen 
the Lords* will: see p. 155 , below. It is fascinating to note that, 
in Wilkinson's view, the impeachment of de la Pole took place at a 
time of great assertion of the power of the Lords in Parliament: 
Wilkinson, Studies. p.99; ' and p. 28 above.
2
As already indicated, de la Pole's impeachment has been 
discussed by Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit., p.265; 
Clarke, 'The Lancastrian Faction and the Wonderful Parliament*, loc. 
cit., pp.48-52; Plucknett, 'State Trials under Richard II*, loc. cit.. 
pp.165-6; Wilkinson, Studies, p.98; N.B. Lewis, 'Article VII of the 
in^eachment of Michael de la Pole in 1386*. E.H.R. (1927), vol. 
xlii, no. 167, pp.402-7; J.J.N. Palmer, 'The impeachment of Mchael 
de la Pole in I386*. Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. (1969), vol. xlii, no.
105, pp.96-101. Steel, Richard II, p.123, also discusses the case 
but he has misread Lewis* article and fastens onto de la Pole charges 
of usury which Lewis was discussing (p.405) with reference to Lyons.
 ^Fundamentally Selden rated the value of precedents lower than 
his use of them in 1621 would suggest: Fussner, op., cit., pp.288-9;
Lansdowne MS 173, ff. 50v. - 52.
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tne events of 1621 that it could be used to guide them; it would 
also seem that he felt that the House of Lords, or part of it, shared 
his belief.
In compiling The Priviledges of the Baronage of England Selden 
was writing propaganda and his influence was evidently regarded as 
sufficiently dangerous for his arrest and examination to follow the 
conclusion of the first session of the 1621 Parliament.^ But that 
his influence was not confined to Parliament is shown by his 
correspondence with Bacon in February 1622 about the latter*s sentence. 
Paradoxically, if the explanation suggested for Selden*s alterations 
of the record of de la Pole's case is correct, he told Bacon that he
questioned the validity of his sentence because of inadequacies in
2
the recording of the judgment. Selden, the historian, had re-emerged.
It seems clear, from this examination of medieval records possibly 
available in the early seventeenth century and of the work of Stuart 
antiquaries in summarising and explaining their contents, that lack 
of information is unlikely to have circumscribed the range of 
procedures open to those who looked for guidance to their medieval 
predecessors. Early Stuart England seems to have been well provided 
with case histories of medieval Parliamentary judicature. It is
^ E, Nicholas, Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons in 
1620 and 1621 (Oxford, 1?66), ii, appendix.
P
Spedding, op. cit., vii, pp.552-3.
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therefore necessary to look elsewhere to discover what James I*s 
Parliaments regarded as their proper authority in judicial matters. 
There are two main sources of this information - treatises written on 
the subject in the early seventeenth century, and occasional references 
in speeches delivered in Parliament at the time.
Two treatises survive - a book. Of the Judicature in Parliaments, 
and a pamphlet, 'The moderne forme of the Parliaments of England* - 
and they must be discussed in some detail. The first, probably by 
John Selden, was not published until long after it was written, and 
cannot be dated precisely.^ Hargrave, in his preface to Hale's 
The Jurisdiction of the Lords House, suggested that it was written 
while Selden was employed by the Lords in l621; if so, as Hargrave 
realised, sections dealing with the Parliamentary trials of 1624 and 
1626 must have been added later. But the whole work was certainly 
completed no later than I626.
In introducing his subject Selden set himself a formidable task.
He states that six different iypes of judicature belong to Parliament: 
judging delinquents, both for capital crimes and for misdemeanours ;
Selden* s authorship is not established beyond question though 
the probability favours this attribution: Berkowitz, op. cit.,
chapter V.
2
Ibid.. chapter V, pp.42, 44; F. Hargrave's preface to M. Hale, 
The Jurisdiction of the Lords House (London, 1796), pp.xxx-xxxi.
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reversing erroneous judgments given in Parliament; reversing 
erroneous judgments given in the King's Bench; deciding difficult 
or long delayed suits; hearing private petitions; and enforcing 
various Parliamentary privileges. Selden says that each of these 
types involves several clearly defined stages, and he implies that 
he will consider every iype in all its stages. In fact, what survives 
possibly all that he wrote - is his study of the first type, but this 
requires a book of nearly two hundred pages. As he makes each point, 
he illustrates it by reference to precedent : it is difficult to fault
him on his use of many of these and he makes no attempt to conceal his 
occasional inability to understand a particular case.^ The result 
is a manual whose author spealcs with conviction.
This is equally true of the pamphlet, 'The moderne forme of the
Parliaments of England', whose probable author was Henry Elsynge.
Elsynge became Clerk of the Parliaments in March 1621, holding the
2
appointment until 1635 and dying in I636. He was thus in an 
unrivalled position to gain an expert knowledge of Parliamentary 
procedure and the pamphlet was doubtless written during his tenure
Not surprisingly he found some difficulty with the cases of 
Alice Perrers and Sir John Mortimer; J. Selden, Of the Judicature 
in Parliaments (London, n.d.), pp.22, 59-61. For Perrers see p.30-1 
above; for Mortimer see Eezneck, op. cit., p.506. For Selden*s 
precedents see Table I.
 ^M,P. Bond, * Clerks of the Parliaments, 1509-1953*• E.H.R. 
(1958), vol. Ixxiii, no. 286, p.83. The pamphlet has been printed, 
with an introduction, by Miss C.S. Sims, in American Historical 
Review (1948), vol. liii, no. 2, pp.288-305.
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of office. Whether it preceded or followed Selden*s work is unknown, 
but the section entitled "Proceedings in Judicature" covers almost 
exactly the same ground and occasional similarities of phraseology 
suggest a degree of plagiarism. In dealing with Parliamentary judica­
ture, Elsynge is very brief, quotes few precedents and admits to no 
uncertainties. Neither work undermines the assertions of the other.
What Selden categorises as "Judgments against Delinquents" and 
what Elsynge entitles "Proceedings in Judicature" involve six distinct 
stages which both authors identify.^ These are the accusation, the 
answer of the accused, the replication by the parly accusing, the 
proofs of the witnesses, the judgment, and the execution. The form 
of the first stage, the accusation, determines much of the procedure 
in the subsequent stages. Selden says that there were four kinds of 
accusation - by the Commons, by information ex parte regis, by 
private persons, and by appeal by members of the Lords. The last 
two may be dealt with quickly: Selden recognises that the appeal was
abolished shortly after Henry IV* s accession and Elsynge states that 
it was **beyond the Law". Private persons proceed either by petitions 
or by articles in writing exhibited in Parliament, and Selden correctly 
quotes precedents, which include the private bills against Ellis in 
1376 and the petition of Cavendish against de la Pole in 1384, as
^ Selden, Of Judicature, p.8; Elsynge, op. cit., p.301.
GL
examples of this procedure.^
The first two kinds of accusation are more complex and overlap 
each other to an extent. The Commons may accuse either by making a 
complaint or by introducing an impeachment. If they impeach the suit
9
is theirs, but if they complain the suit is the King’s,*" As for the 
second kind of accusation - information ex parte regis - it appears 
that this may be based on information provided directly by the King 
or by the Commons when they "as aiy other private Person accuse any 
man unto the Lords However the information arises, the suit is
always ex parte regis,^ It may, perhaps, be questioned how far there 
is a real distinction between proceedings based on the Commons* 
complaint and proceedings based on Commons* information;^ but what 
is important is that both Selden and Elsynge plainly indicate that 
impeachment procedure is only one of two or perhaps three types of 
accusation with which the Commons might be closely associated in cases 
of Parliamentary judicature. This fact may possibly be of significance 
to an understanding of some of the Parliamentary trials of the early 
seventeenth century.
^ Selden, Of Judicature, pp.ll, 66ff; Elsynge, op. cit., pp.302,
303.
 ^Selden, Of Judicature, p,14; Elsynge, op. cit., p,302.-
^ Selden, Of Judicature, pp.33, 6I.
^ Selden is inclined to use the same precedents to illustrate 
both, and Elsynge does not make the distinction : Of Judicature, pp.
12ff, 6lff.
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According to Selden and Elsynge, the procedure in an impeachment
differed from that in a trial begun by information or complaint laid
by the Commons. Elsynge sets out the distinction clearly and
conveniently summarises procedure after the initial accusation:
If the Cornons exhibits noe Articles neither in writing nor 
by word of mouth by their Speaker at the Barr, then it is 
onely a Complaint, And in such cases, the Proceedings therein 
are left to the Lords, and they cause it to bee proceeded in 
ex parte Domini Regis, and it is not necessary "that the Cornons 
should bee further acquainted therewith, uniesse the Cornons doe 
in that Complaint require that the Proceedings bee in their 
presence, or unlesse it be for Capitall causes, for in cases 
Capitall, whosoever complainss, the Cornons are to bee 
acquainted with the cause, the Answer, and the Judgment ...
If the Cornons doe impeach the party accused that is to 
exhibits Articles, or any other Declaracion against him in 
writing, or by their Speaker, then the suyte is theirs, and 
they are to bee privy to all Proceedings against the Party 
accused. They are to have a Copie of the Answer, and may 
reply unto the same. They are to exhibits the Interrogatories 
and the names of their Wittnesses to bee examined, and produce 
such proofss as they have against him, & have Copies of the 
Examinacions. Judgment is not to bee given till they demand 
it, and then to bee done in their presence, of all which, 
there are divers ancient presidents, (l)
Selden provides two further details. Accusations ex parte regis are
exhibited by the King's attorney, and the Commons are not normally to
2
be present at the trial unless the Lords desire it. Finally, both 
authors emphasise that, if the Commons initiate proceedings the Lords
^ Elsynge, op. oit.. p.302. See also Selden, Of Judicature, pp. 
14, 109, 118-9, 124, 1^2.
 ^Selden, Of Judicature, pp.54, 1&3. He does, however, also 
seem to suggest that the Commons may be present at a trial ex parte 
regis if they demand this: p.163*
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must not be associated in the accusation, and that, conversely, in 
cases of Parliamentary judicature, the Commons have no power of 
judgment, which is solely the prerogative of the Lords.^
There is no doubt that both Selden and Elsynge were preaching 
counsels of perfection; they were writing treatises rather than legal 
reports. The cases of the l620s cannot necessarily be fitted into 
the categories which they define. For it must be remembered that 
Selden may not have written his book until 1626, while Elsynge's work 
may be a product of the 1630s - when he perhaps found himself rather 
less busy than formerly; and it is at least possible that their 
definitions acquired precision only after the cases themselves had 
been tried. Furthermore, both men were, to some extent, theorists, 
possessing an undoubtedly more profound knowledge of their subject 
than the average early-seventeenth centuiy Parliament man, to whom 
their definitions and distinctions may have seemed legalistic and 
possibly even imaginary. Of course, both were in a position to offer 
guidance and advice on procedure, though in 1621, when Elsynge became 
Clerk of the Parliaments and when Selden was employed by the Lords, 
such counsel is more likely to have been directed towards the upper 
House than to the lower. It is possible that the position changed
^ Selden, Of Judicature, pp.11, 133; Elsynge, op. cit., pp.301, 
303. The distinction drawn by Selden and Elsynge between complaints 
and impeachments has received scant acknowledgement by twentieth- 
century historians. Maude Clarke is the only exception I have 
discovered: 'The Origin of Impeachment*, loc. cit.. p.269.
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somewhat in 1624, when Selden entered the Commons for the first time.^
If we are to aim at any real understanding of the views of the
Parliament men of the early seventeenth century on the subject of
Parliamentary judicature, we can only hope to acquire it from their
speeches and from the writings of a man like Sir Edward Coke, ^ o  was
a practical politician as well as a legal expert. However, there are
difficulties. Such sources yield isolated pieces of information,
rather than a thorough exposition. This is hardly surprising: the
urgency of affairs in James I*s Parliaments scarcely encouraged the
delivery of elaborate pronouncements on theoretical subjects.
There is also a terminological problem. The precise meaning of
the term * impeachment * in the early seventeenth century is curiously
2
difficult to comprehend. There are two main reasons for this.
First, although many of the Parliamentary trials of the l620s have long 
been described as impeachments, the records themselves rarely use.the 
word, and never, until 1626, in connection with these cases. On one
D.N.B. under Selden. To judge by one of the questions put to 
Selden during his examination by the government in the summer of 1621, 
he was at least suspected of sympathising with the Commons* position 
then. He was asked, in connection with Floyd's case, whether he did 
not wish that the Commons had power of judicature in such matters. 
Whether this sympathy issued forth into advice in l621 is not known.
2 Apart from its absence from the dictionaries of the period.
The word is not listed in Sir Henry Spelman*s Agchaeologus in modum
G-lossarii ad rem antiquam posteriorem, published in l62b, nor - 
except in the special instance of * impeachment of waste* - in Dr John 
Cowell's book, The Interpreter, published in l607« Spelman's 
G-lossary claimed to deal with new meanings of words ; The Interpreter 
w^s the best known law dictionary of the day. Cowell was Regius
Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge.
of its few appearances in the records of 1621, it is used in the
Commons Joürnal to describe what the lower House had done to the
Catholic lawyer, Floyd, for slandering the King and Queen of Bohemia.
As the Commons did not charge him before the Lords, he was not,
according to the traditional definition of the process, impeached
at all.^ Nor does the term appear in Coke's writings which, as will
be shown, are disappointingly sketcl:^  on the whole subject of
Parliamentary judicature. Secondly, it is difficult to know what
meaning should be attached to the word on the occasions when it is
used. In the late sixteenth century, as in the middle ages, the
word was in general use, with the consequently rather imprecise
meaning of 'hindrance' or 'embarrassment'. Yet it also carried a
more technical meaning: both John Minsheu, in I617, and Thomas Powell,
2
in 1623, use 'impeach* as a synorym for 'accuse*; and a few years 
earlier, Shakespeare had used 'appeach* in Richard II to mean
^ CjJ. i, p.608.
2
Clarke, 'The Origin.of Impeachment*, loc. cit., p.242; J. 
Minsheu, The G-uide into Tongues (London, I617) ; T, Powell, The 
Attourneys Academy ( London, l62 3). One particular instance of the 
use of the term should be noted. In March I6IO the servant of an 
M.P., Sir James Scudamore, was arrested by a sheriff and the Commons 
who were, of course, in session took notice of the deed, and referred 
the matter to the committee for privileges. On the l6th this gave 
advice "Not to impeach the Sheriff, not knowing that he was Servant":
C.J. i, p.412.
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1 2 'denounce* or * charge*. It has already been stated that some
historians of the medieval Parliament believe that in the Parliamentary
records of 1376 it is possible to distinguish the meaning of an
accusation brought by the whole Commons:.in Parliament; and they have
found significance in the subsequent occasions when the word is avoided
as well as when it is used - an approach which may possibly have
relevance in a seventeenth-century context. Of course, it may be
unrealistic to expect to understand precisely and on every occasion
the meaning of a term so often used to describe a political conflict
between the monarch and his opponents, #ien, presumably the end was
more important than the means. Moreover, a word capable of bearing
more than one meaning is not without value to the politician.
If 'impeachment* is conspicuous by its absence from the records 
of the 1620s , the reverse is true of the term * complaint *. As will 
be shown, this word was frequently used to describe grievances which 
were brought to the Commons, as well as cases which the lower House 
presented to the Lords. The use of the word raises problems of inter­
pretation similar to those already mentioned in connection with 
'impeachment*. Apart from its general meaning, the word also refers 
to a formal accusation or charge, and in the seventeenth century was
^ Richard II. Act V, Scene 2, line 79. For other uses of the 
word in Richard II see Act I, Scene 1, lines 170 and 189.
2
See p. 14. above.
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often embodied in the phrase 'bill of complaint *.^  Of course, there
also exists the definition which Selden and Elsynge provided for the 
term, but whether the Commons used it in this precise way or in a
more general manner is a problem which is unlikely to be solved
2
conclusively.
Ho7/ever, if these terminological difficulties hinder our under­
standing of the views on Parliamentary judicature of James I*s 
Parliament men, they do not render fruitless an examination of their 
speeches and writings. The views of Sir Edward Coke provide the 
obvious starting point. Coke could dominate the Commons with his 
personality and his knowledge. Untroubled by the problems of inter­
pretation and critical analysis with which the new generation of 
antiquaries were grappling, a scholar in the late sixteenth rather 
than the early seventeenth century mould, he accepted the precedents 
with little hesitation and there we^e few who dared to contradict him 
in his use of them. Although he might misapply them and refuse to be 
put out by the lack of them or to question the reason for this lack, 
he was undoubtedly one of the chief channels through which the medieval
^ Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1888-1928), under 'complaaint* 
2
Another word which possessed two meanings, one general and the 
other technical was * grievance ' : E,R, Foster, 'The procedure of the
House of Commons against Patents and Monopolies'. In W,A. Aiken and




heritage could make itself felt in and after 1621,
When Coke wrote The Institutes of the Laws of England he included
in the fourth part, written during or after 1628, a chapter on
Parliament as a court. This has a section on judicature in which
Coke declares that the Houses both separately and together have a
power of judicature. However, this is not an introduction to a
detailed discussion, because Coke at once adds that "the handling
hereof according to the worth and weight of the matter would require
a whole Treatise of it self; and to say the truth, it is best under-
2
stood by reading the Judgments and Records, of Parliament ..." He 
then contents himself with listing precedents in a way which does very 
little to illuminate the subject. He records that, in the l620s, 
there were
divers notable judgments, at the prosecution of the Commons, 
by the Lords at the Parliaments holden 18 and 21 Jac. Regis 
against Sir Giles Mompesson, Sir John Michel, Viscount St.
Albone Lord Chancellour of England, the Earl of M. Lord 
Treasurer of England, whereby the due proceeding of 
Judicature in such cases doth appear. (3)
Coke had a library of c. 1200 volumes, particularly strong in the 
texts of English medieval historians: W.O. Has sail, ed., A Catalogue
of the Library of Sir Edward Coke (London, 1950), pp. xii, xx. Coke 
annotated many of his books but unfortunately these notes give little 
or no indication of his opinions.
2
Coke, op. cit., p.23; C.D. Bowen, The Lion and the Throne.
The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke. 1552^634 (London, 195?) > p.436.
 ^Coke, op. cit., p.23.
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But he provides no explanations or classifications, and we are left
to wonder why he used a phrase like "at the prosecution of the Commons",
which, when compared with the contemporary record, seems to exaggerate
substantially the part taken by the lower House in these cases.
This is disappointing, but rather more information can be gleaned
from two speeches Coke made early in the first session of 1621.
These are particularly important because, unlike the more random
remarks made on judicature by his colleagues in this Parliament, they
were delivered before that Parliament had progressed far in any real
exercise of its judicature, and were therefore perhaps less influenced
than they might otherwise have been by the experiences of 1621 itself.
The first speech was delivered on 28 February, during a discussion in
committee of Mompesson's offences. Coke said:
The Courte of Parliament a Courte of Counsell and a Courte of 
Pleas. When the Howses were devided. The indevisible things 
remayned with the Lords. Pleas continued in the Upper-Howse 
longe after the Stattute.
Complaints and Examincions of greevances have been 
ancient in the Howse of Commons, the matter of fact tryed 
there; they have often resorted to the Lords for Judicature.
The proceedings have beene with some varie lye. In some 
cases the Howse of Commons made Plaintiffs and Delinquents 
to answere there, somelymes the Steward of the Howse made a 
Complaint and the Cornons were made a partie, And sometymes 
the Commons would have the Connizance alone. Never anie 
that was fowned guiltie hath been able to beare out the 
8torme of the Common Forces. There hath beene noe iudgment 
in this kind since 2 H. 6. (l)
C.D. iv, pp.115-6. "2 H. 6" should presumably read "28 H. 6"
(the impeachment of Suffolk in 1450), a common enough error in the 
diaries of the early seventeenth century.
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Coke seems here to be identifying three types of procedure. In 
the first, the Commons appear to be responsible for initiating the 
hearing before tlie Lords; in the second, the Commons are associated 
with the proceedings as a party, but the "Complaint" is instituted by 
an official of some sort. In speaking of the "Steward of the Howse" 
Coke is presumably thinking either of the steward of the household 
who prosecuted Gome ni z, Weston and Perrers in 1377, or of the steward 
of England who performed the same function in 1397, though to both 
Selden and Elsynge the function of the steward, whether of England or 
of the household, is to preside rather than to prosecute, and then 
only in capital cases and not in misdemeanours.^ Coke's third "type 
of procedure is that where the Commons in certain unspecified instances 
have sole jurisdiction, without reference to the Lords.
Coke may have illustrated each type of procedure with selected
precedents, but the surviving records do no more than list a few at
the end of the speech, without classifying them. However, some days
later, on 8 March, during the preparations for presenting Mompesson
to the Lords, Coke again gave his views on judicature and the precedents
2
he used to illustrate his categories are clearly recorded. On this 
occasion, he listed four types of judicature. Proceedings might take
Pluclcnett, 'Impeachment and Attainder', loc. cit., pp.l48ff; 
Rot. Pari, iii, p.12; Harcourt, op. cit., p.347; Selden, Of 
Judicature, pp.176-7; Elsynge, op. cit., pp.303-4.
2
For Coke's precedents see Table I.
place before the King and the Lords, before the Lords alone, before 
the Lords and Commons, and before the Commons alone. Coke's 
elaboration of these categories shows that, although he was here 
looking at the subject of judicature from a slightly different angle 
and discussing four types rather than three, he is not contradicting 
his statement made a week previously.
As evidence of proceedings before the King and the Lords, Coke 
quotes the case of Suffolk in 1450. Although this has certainly been 
thought of as an impeachment, it was one in which the King's part 
was much greater than normal, and it may have been this characteristic 
which led Coke to use it as an illustration for this category.^ 
Although he provides no further explanation of this first type of 
procedure, what he understands by it becomes clearer when he turns 
to the second iype. He states that, when the King is a party, the 
Lords judge alone. They can do so either on writs of error arising 
out of judgments in the King's Bench, or in cases originating before 
them, or on complaints of the Commons. As an example of original 
jurisdiction, he quotes the case of Alic Perrers in 1377* In so 
doing, he was presumably influenced by the obscure character of this 
case: it will be remembered that the Parliament Roll refuses to state
^ C.D. ii, p.195; v, p.280; vi, p.307. It is possible that he 
also mentioned Michael de la Pole's case in 1386, though not all 
accounts are agreed on this.
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who was responsible for presenting her to the L o r d s A s  one
example of proceedings before the Lords on conplaints of the Coirmons,
Coke gives the case of Sir John Lee - the case vdiich Maude Clarke
contrasted with the impeachments of 1376 - but he also lists, under
the same heading, the cases of Lyons, Ellis, Neville, and Peach, which
2were among those very impeachments.
However, Coke does not include Latimer, the most important of the 
men impeached in 1376, in this list. He uses this case, together 
with - according to one account - the cases of Gomeniz and Weston from
1377, to illustrate his third type of judicature, the "type which
involved proceedings before the Lords and Commons. His reason for 
assigning Latimer's trial to this category is evidently Latimer's 
pardon, which states that he was judged before the Lords and Commons; 
but the Commons' part in the two trials of 1377 was far less 
substantial.^
Coke's fourth type of judicature - procedure before the Commons 
alone, requires little discussion for the present. His precedents
C.D. V, pp.32, 281; Rot. Pari, iii, p.12. See also p. 31 
above. %Vhether or not the Lords possessed an original jurisdiction 
was, of course, to be a matter of fierce argument later in the 
seventeenth centuiy.
 ^C.D. ii, pp.195-6; v, p.281; vi, p.44. For these cases see 
pp. 25, 29-30above.
^ C.D. ii, p.196; vi, p.44; Nicholas, op. cit., i, p.134.
This is Coke's interpretation of Latimer's pardon; but see Wilkinson, 
Studies, p.90, n.2. As for Gomeniz and Weston, it is interesting to 
note that Selden states that they were arraigned before the Lords 
and Common’s in full Parliament: Of Judicature, p.42.
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indicate that he is thinking largely in terms of proceedings against 
those who offended against the privileges of the House.^
These two speeches by Coke obviously contain some puzzling
features in their references to the judicial powers of the Houses.
It is not easy to understand the principles upon which Coke allocates
his precedents to their various categories, and it was Maude Clarke's
view that his use of these indicated that he did not understand the
2
"special character of procedure by impeachment". But whether or 
not this verdict is fair, Coke clearly did believe that the Commons 
might be associated with the Lords in more than one way in Parliamen­
tary judicature. On 28 February, he seems to be stating that the 
lower House might either initiate proceedings before the Lords, or 
be brought in as a party to complaints introduced by the steward; 
on 8 March, he says that judicature may be jointly exercised by the 
two Houses, or that it may be exercised by the Lords on complaints 
brought by the Commons. It is tempting to see in these distinctions 
a foreshadowing of the rigid definitions of impeachment and complaint 
set up by Selden and Elsynge; but it would be dangerous to make too 
much of this. Procedure on complaint may have meant much the same 
to all three men, for Coke does seem to use the word to describe the 
processes in which the Commons had a lesser, rather than a greater,
^ CjD. ii, p.197.
 ^Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit., p.267.
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share; but this may be accidental rather than deliberate and, as 
he does not appear ever to have used the word 'impeachment', we 
cannot be sure that he v<rould have recognised ary procedural distinction 
between impeachment and complaint. Furthermore, it would be hard 
indeed to establish real distinctions between Coke's various types of 
judicature merely on the basis of the precedents he cites : that he
genuinely believed in these distinctions, his speeches prove as 
conclusively as is ever likely to be possible, but that his precedents 
really support the existence of all his distinctions is rather more 
doubtful. However, it does seem reasonably safe to say that Coke 
understood that Parliamentary judicature - the judicature resulting 
from the co-operation of the two Houses - could manifest itself in 
two forms, in one of which the Commons were more closely, or more 
fundamentally, associated than in the other.
Whether or not other members of the Commons shared Coke's views 
on procedure in judicature, there is no means of knowing. No reports 
survive of other speeches on the same theme. The confusion in some 
of the diary accounts of Coke's second speech suggests that their 
authors found the subject unfamiliar.^ On the other hand, those 
members who were lai/yers must have had an acquaintance with this
Their confusion could, of course, have been the result of a 
poorly constructed speech, but this seems an unlikely explanation as 
Pym's account of Coke's speech is very clear. This very clarity, 
in its turn, suggests that Pym may have shared Coke's familiarity 
with the subject.
7’5
procedure, and there is no reason to suppose that Coke * s views were
untypical of his profession. But only William Halcewill, a man Yàio
shared Coke's legal background as well as his antiquarian interests,
made any comment which might be construed as being related to Coke's
theme. Towards the end of April, 1621, during proceedings against
Bennet, he said: *'I have observed when we have gone to the Lords it
hath been by impeachment, clamor or accusation".^ This remark, which
is not explained, probably raises more difficulties than it solves.
It does seem that, to Hakewill, impeachment was only one of the
methods by which the Commons could approach the Lords, but it would
indeed be useful to know vdiat Hakewill regai'ded as the procedural
characteristics of each of his three methods, especially as this is
one of the few occasions before 1626 when the word 'impeacliment'
appears in the records. Furthermore, his remark must lead us to
wonder what he would have made, or did make, of the report in the
Parliament Roll of 1376, which states that Latimer was "impeached and
2
accused by the clamour of the Commons".
Apart from his comments about procedure. Coke made another point 
in his speech of 28 Februaiy. He states that when "the Hows es were 
devided. The indevisible things remayned with the Lords", and in the
C.D. ii, p .31Zk. Another account reports this speech as follows: 
"... to send theis things to the Lords, But we not to condemn him.
3 fold grounds: 1, clamor; 2, accusation; 3, impeachment by the
Commons....": ibid., iii, p.53.
^ Rot. Pari, ii, p.324.
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following paragraph he adds that "Complaints and Examinacions of 
greevances have been ancient in the Howse of Commons, the matter of 
fact tryed there; they have often resorted to the Lords for 
Judicature."^ He is here referring to a division of function between 
the Houses whicÿi virtually compelled the Commons to depend on the 
Lords for the punishment of a man, unless his offence was against 
their own privileges. V/hat Coke was saying - before the trials of 
1621 had really got under way - was that the Commons' power was 
limited to the examination of alleged grievances and a pronouncement 
as to whether the allegation was valid. The Commons could not, for 
e:cample, punish the author of a grievance: this was the Lords' function;
and it may be noted, in passing, that it v/as the need to do this, 
rather than to persist in the ineffective condemnation of the 
grievances themselves, which was to lead to the revival of the process 
by which the Commons presented offenders to the Lords. Now, this 
limitation on the power of the Commons was to prove irksome in 1621 
during Floyd's case, but if the intemperate speeches delivered on that 
occasion are recognised as untypical of the normal mood, as they 
undoubtedly were. Coke's statement appears to have been generally 
acknowledged as correct. During the course of the trials of 1621,
Pym, Samuel Sandys and Noy all confirmed Coke's view, though ïÿm 
maintained that, in the past, the Commons had been present at the
^ C.D. iv, p.115.
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jlodgment and had influenced the terms of the punishment.^
As has already been pointed out. Coke's two speeches possess 
the great virtue of having been delivered before there had been much 
experience of Parliamentary judicature in 1621. In consequence, the 
interpretation which they place upon the medieval heritage cannot 
have been influenced by the outcome of the trials of 1621, This is 
not true of the contributions on Parliamentary judicature made by 
other members during this session, which may well have been substan­
tially influenced by the results of those trials. Nevertheless, 
despite the obvious dangers, it seems appropriate to attempt a 
summary of these views. On the other hand, opinions given in 
subsequent Parliaments are likely to have been so influenced by the 
judicial developments of the l620s that it would be unwise to include 
them in this section.
It has been suggested that the Commons of 1621 did not seriously 
quarrel with Coke's view of their dependence on the Lords in most 
cases of judicature, but it was also recognised that, except in 
matters concerning their own members and privileges, the Lords could 
not deal with public grievances unless these were presented to them 
by the Commons. The most forceful assertion of this ddctrine occurs 
during and after Floyd's condemnation by the lower House - an
^ Ibid.. ii, p.303, 512, 570; iii, p.l56; vi, p.90; Nicholas,
op. cit.. i, p.283.
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assertion of power which it proved unable to justify - so that
members* protestations may contain an element of wounded pride; but
the doctrine gained the support of men like Hakewill, lym, Sir Thomas
Roe and possibly Noy, and Hakewill produced two precedents to show
that judgments had been reversed in cases where the Commons had not
made an accusation.^ Hakewill also maintained that, on occasions
when the Lords had not pronounced judgment, the Commons had gone to
the King; while Rich asserted, very radically, that if the Lords
refused to punish those complained of, the Commons should pass judgment
2
themselves, "vAiich is our ancient course".
It seems to have been implicitly accepted in 1621 that accusa­
tions brought by the Commons had to be precise, rather than vague, 
and the consequences of the deficiencies in the first attack on 
Suffolk in 1450 certainly supported this view,^ Furthermore, Fÿm 
made the point that the Commons might jeopardise their power of 
inquisition in Parliamentaiy judicature unless they ensured that 
evidence handed to the Lords was already fully proved. An anoiymous
^ CjD. ii, pp.352, 362; iii, pp.166, 177, 288; iv, p.361; vi, 
p.141; C.J. i, pp.608, 610, 624. Sackville may have had doubts 
about the doctrine, but his position is not very clear: C.D. v, p.162.
^  C^. ii, p.371; iii, p. 178.
^ Harcourt, op. cit.. pp.383-4; Rot. Pari, v, pp.176-7; Nicholas, 
op. cit.. ii, p.83. The Lo^ds refused to order Suffolk’s imprison­
ment until the Commons made a specific accusation against him.
Selden draws attention to this aspect of the case: Of Judicature.
p.29.
79
speaker in mid-May claimed that the House had some right to select 
punishments, and Alford, Hakewill and lym on separate occasions 
declared that the Commons could demand a second judgment, if they 
were not satisfied with the first.^
One aspect of the procedure of demanding judgment caused anxieiy
in 1621. On 14 î^ay, when the Lords appeared to be talcing little
action on the Commons’ complaint against field, Hakewill complained
of the custom, which, he said, had grown up during the session, by
which the Commons waited to be invited by the Lords to demand judgment
before actually doing so. Alford, Roe and Sackville make it clear
that the result of this habit was that cases presented to the Lords
might remain there unsettled, or that the Commons mi^t never know
the details of a Lords’ judgment. Hakewill provided the remedy -
to demand judgment uninvited - and the implication is that this was
2
believed to be the ancient custom.
In general, there was probably little quarrel with the belief 
that the Commons* part in judicature was one of considerable
^ CjD. ii, pp.303, 368, 370; iii, pp.250, 264; Nicholas, 0£.
cit., i, p.228.
 ^C#D* iii, pp.249, 271; vi, p.156; Nicholas, op. cit.. ii, 
p.69. It is interesting to note that, in his definition of impeach­
ment, Elsynge says that "Judgment is not to bee given till they (i.e. 
the Commons) demand it...": Elsynge, op. cit.. p.302. In the
case of Field, it was resolved to send a message to the Lords warning 
them that the Commons proposed "in dew time" to demand judgment, 
though in fact they did not do so: C.D. iii, p.271.
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importance, and one which had, in the past, led to attacks on some 
of the most prominent men in the land. In April l621 Pym said that 
Parliament was the "great eye of the kingdom to find out offences and 
punish them", and at the end of the session he told the House that 
"We have donn greate works ... Judgment, the which hath slept theis 
500 yeears and is the greatest benifit that may be, is now revived'?^ 
Although his arithmetic was wrong, his confidence was probably 
justified. It is possible that, in the course of their searches 
among the medieval Parliament Rolls, members had come across two 
statements which helped to convince them of their own ancient worth. 
In a Commons* petition of 1377 the claim was made that it was "only 
to parliament that men may come when they are unjustly aggrieved by 
the king’s ministers", while eleven years later, in the Merciless
Parliament, the Lords declared that high crimes could be tried only
2
in Parliament, by its law and procedure.
One of the dangers inherent in making statements about the 
inheritance of the Commons of 1621 is that these can exaggerate the 
degree of certainty felt by members. Sometimes, no doubt, the House 
whistled loudly only to keep its courage up, and it is possible to
C'D. ii, p.303; iii, p.353. The figurative meaning of ’eye’ 
in the seventeenth century was the seat of intelligence or light: 
Oxford English Dictionary, under ’eye’.
^ Rot. Pari, iii. pp.23, 236; Richardeon and Sayles, op. cit., 
pp.1-2; Clarke, ’Forfeitures and Treason in 1388’, loc. cit..
p.125.
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catch glimpses of uncertainties lurking beneath its perhaps too 
confident gestures. Maude Clarke believed that the Master of the 
Wards, Lionel Cranfield, was giving expression to a widely held 
point of view when he observed, referring largely to Coke’s statement 
of 8 March on judicature :
Sorry, we (are) so uncertain in the Power of this House. - 
More puzzled this Parliament than ever before. - Told, in 
the beginning of this Parliament, we (are) an absolute 
Court: That, in some Cases, we (are) to judge alone; in
others, with the Lords; in others, the Lords alone, (l)
But his remarks may be less significant than they sound: Cranfield
seems by this time to have retreated from the rather advanced and
aggressive position he had adopted in assisting in the early stages
of the Parliamentary onslaught, and he was speaking during the anxious
days when the Commons were claiming the right to punish Floyd - a
claim which mary members quickly recognised to be untenable. This
is not of course to dery that uncertainties existed, but they were
perhaps surprisingly few. Although the Commons of 1621 may not have
had the assurance of their successors who, in Plucknett’s opinion,
framed a theory of impeachment which asserted that they were "the
grand inquest of the nation, and the whole proceeding was merely the
common law trial on indictment transferred to the larger scene of
^ CjJ. i, p.602.
2
See pp. 137, 168, below. He was also at this time (May) accused 
of having told the Lords that the Commons were not a court of record:
M. Prestwich, Cranfield. Politics and Profits under the Early Stuarts 
(Oxford, 1966), pp.316-7.
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parliament",^ nevertheless they had the confidence and knowledge to 
carry through, relatively smoothly, proceedings against men of the 
stature of Bacon.
There was clearly ample opportunity for the medieval heritage to
influence events in the early seventeenth centuiy. It was a complex
inheritance and there is evidence that Coke and his contemporaries
were aware of its variety. Coke’s influential belief that Parlia-
2
mentary powers were static and unalterable, combined with îym’s 
faith in the blessings of medieval judicature, make it likely that 
their colleagues had some realisation of the worth of their inheritance. 
How far that inheritance influenced their actions cannot be precisely 
calculated. The men vho guided the development of Parliamentary 
judicature in l621 lived in 1621, not in 1376 or 1386, but it is 
possible to believe that when they looked over their shoulders or 
studied the records, they were not doing so merely to search out 
convenient excuses for their present actions.
^ Plucknett, ’The Origin of Impeachment’, loo, cit., p.47.




This study has so far been concerned with what Selden called 
"Judgments against Delinquents", and with the antecedents of that 
Parliamentary judicature - the process involving the co-operation of 
both Houses - which decisively re-emerged in 1621. But it must be 
remembered that "Judgments against Delinquents" was only one of six 
different types of judicature which, in Selden*s view, belonged to 
Parliament. Although he did not discuss them, he listed the remaining 
five: reversing erroneous judgments given in Parliament; reversing
erroneous judgments given in the King’s Bench; deciding difficult or 
long delayed suits; hearing private petitions; and enforcin^^ various 
Parliamentary privileges.^ Now Selden was writing in about 1626, 
and although his phraseology suggests that he believed that these 
powers resided in the House? at that time, his list is not necessarily 
valid for the period preceding this. James I’s Parliaments, for 
instance, did not necessarily possess all these powers. However, 
if they possessed ary of them, it is worth asking whether such powers
^ J. Selden, Of the Judicature in Parliaments, pp.8410.
had aiy connection with the development of that iype of judicature 
which is the main concern of this study. Unlike that judicature, 
the exercise of these powers did not depend upon co-operation between 
the two Houses; the first three were the peculiar responsibility of 
the Lords, while the last two might be used by either House alone.
Such unicameral judicature might seem to have little to do with a 
judicature which depended upon the joint action of both Houses, but, 
as will be shown, there is evidence to suggest that the exercise of 
unicameral judicature assisted the re-birth of Pai'liamentary judicature. 
Moreover, while Parliamentary judicature developed, so too did certain 
aspects of unicameral judicature: in some ways, both form part of
the same story.
The Lords and Commons of the early seventeenth century possessed 
the right to apply their separate judicial powers in a number of areas, 
which gradually became more clearly defined and, in some respects, 
extended. But in the century and a half which preceded the accession 
of James I, these powers, like those of Parliamentaiy judicature, were 
little used. This was the conclusion reached, in the eighteenth 
century, by Francis Hargrave, and there is little reason to question 
his findings, which were based on an intensive study of the
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Parliamentary Journals.^ Hargrave acknowledged the existence of a 
unicameral judicature by Lords and Commons in cases of privilege, but 
apart from this he found only occasional instances of a Lords' 
jurisdiction on writs of error, arising from judgments in other
p
courts, and only one order by the Lords for a writ of scire faci&s. 
Later in his survey, Hargrave recalled another type of judicature, 
represented in the medieval records by the appointment, at the 
beginning of each Parliament, of receivers and triers of petitions.
But this judicature, too, was slumbering by the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. ^
In practice, therefore, in the early years of James I's reign, 
the separate judicature of the two Hoûses was hardly extensive. In 
and after 1621 this was to change, and attention will be paid to these 
changes in subsequent chapters, but for the moment the judicature of 
the Commons extended only to matters concerning their privileges and 
their members, while the similar powers of the Lords were augmented 
only by their jurisdiction in cases of error.^ Although these powers
F. Hargrave’s preface to M. Hale, The Jurisdiction of the Lords 
House, pp.vi-viii. This preface, provided for the eighteenth-century 
edition of Hale’s treatise, is still the most thorough work on the 
subject of the Lords’ jurisdiction; F.H. Self, ed.. Notes of the 
Debates in the House of Lords, officially taken by Robert Bowyer and 
Henry Elsing. Clerks of the Parliaments. A.D. 1621. 1625. 1628. p.x.
2




might be refined and improved in specific ways - and the Commons
clearly gained a notable victory in winning the right to determine
disputed elections - such jurisdictions did not necessarily point the
way to the revival of a procedure involving the co-operation of the
two Houses. Judicature on writs of error concerned the Lords alone,
and this was unequivocally acknowledged by Noy in 1621;^ while
matters involving members and privileges were normally settled by the
House concerned, without reference to the other. As far back as 1542
the Commons had realised that, if they were to maintain their privileges,
2
they must stand on their own feet.
Yet, largely in the name of privilege, James* first two Parlia­
ments dealt with a number of cases which exhibit some unusual features, 
and which therefore require examination. The cases were those of 
John Thornborough, Bishop of Bristol, in I6O4 , Dr John Cowell, Sir 
Stephen Proctor and Henry Spiller in I6IO, and Richard Neile, Bishop 
of Lincoln, in I614. Apart from a number of detailed procedural 
points, these cases are of interest in two ways. First, in those
^ C'D* il, p.338. Also by Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes
of the Laws of England, p.21.
2
In the case of George Ferrers, M.P. for Plymouth, who had been 
arrested for debt. The Commons first turned to the Lords for help, 
but subsequently refused the Lord Chancellor's offer of a writ on the 
ground that their serjeant's mace was sufficient warrant for Ferrers* 
release: Petyt MS 538/1, ff.lv.-4. For the dating of this case,
see H.H. Leonard, 'Ferrers' Case: a Note*. Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. 
(1969), vol. xlii, no. IO6, pp.230-4.
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concerned primarily with privilege, circumstances compelled the
Houses to act together, however unwillingly. Secondly, Lord
Chancellor Ellesmere thought that the Commons of I6IO usurped judicial
power, citing as examples their proceedings against Proctor and
Spiller,^ and there is no doubt that, although the Commons were partly
concerned with Proctor's offence against their privileges, they were
also anxious to punish him for other sins. Before these five cases
are examined, it is worth noting that when Robert Boiyer, Clerk of
the Parliaments from I6IO to 1621, worked over his own and his
predecessor's Parliamentary records, compiling reports on special
topics, three of the six were devoted to the cases of Thornborough,
2
Cowell and Proctor, There is no means of knowing why he chose to 
write up these proceedings, but he clearly regarded them as in some 
way significant.
The Bishop of Bristol offended the House of Commons because 
he had written a book in which he discussed a debate there on the
He also gave other examples, but as these suggest a different 
type of trespass, it will avoid confusion if they are considered 
separately: see pp. 123-4 , below,
 ^These reports are in Petyt MSS 538/1, ff. 147ff. (Thornborough), 
538/2, ff. 148-55 (Proctor), ff.158-65 (Cowell). The other three 
reports are of the debate in I614 on impositions, in which Bowyer 
devotes a good deal of space to the complaint against Neile, and of 
the cases of Shirley and Goodwin in I604. They are, respectively, 
in Petyt MSS 538/2, ff. 247-64v., 538/1, ff. 93-131v., ff. 182-96.
In the account of the first session of I6IO in Petyt MS 537/14 which 
differs slightly from the printed Commons Joürnal the passages relating 
to Proctor are frequently marked in the margin with a line (-) or a P.
Æsubject of the proposed union with Scotland. In his work, he had 
answered objections raised against the union, as well as made public 
what had been discussed in the Commons. In consequence, he had, in 
the opinion of the lower House, increased the risk of dissension in 
the kingdom and dishonoured both Houses. Two proposals for action 
were advanced: that he should be summoned to the Bar of the Commons,
as was usual in cases of privilege; or that the House should go to 
the King, who had presumably authorised the publication of the book.
But because the Bishop was a member of the Lords, the Commons 
appointed a committee of eleven members to draw up a message about 
the book and their grievance for despatch to the upper House. On 
receiving the message, the Lords asked for time to read the book.
They replied on 30 May, proposing a conference in three days' time 
"at the Outward Chamber, near the Parliament Presence", in the mean­
time calling before them two men. Field and Chard, whom they examined 
and charged with offences in connection with their printing of the 
Bishop's book.^ The Commons next appointed a committee of fifty or 
more members, charged with the task of examining the book and preparing 
for the forthcoming conference. Sir Henry Hobart was appointed to 
open the Commons' statement, described as the "Complaint of the House", 
to the committee of twenty-four nominated by the Lords. Having
^ Petyt MS 538/1, ff. 148-149v; LjJ. ii, pp.306 , 308, 309; Ç&J. 
i, pp.226-8; J. Spedding, The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon. 
iii, p.208.
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heard the objections raised by the lower House, the peers excused
themselves from discussion to report to their House which, on 5 June,
decided that the Commons could best be satisfied by a voluntary
acknowledgement from the Bishop of his error. This, together with
an apology, was eventually extracted from Thornborough, who insisted
that he had acted in ignorance and without malice, having intended
only to show his support for the projected union.^ On 9 June, at a
further conference, Salisbury reported the Bishop's submission,
declared that the Lords had rebuked him, and stated that only his
rank and position had deterred them from greater severity. Several
members of the Commons reacted unfavourably to Bacon's report of these
proceedings: demands were made that the Bishop should either submit
in person to the Commons or that his written submission should be
2
examined and incorporated in the records of the House. After a 
further reference to the committee these rather extravagant demands 
were eventually reduced, and on 21 June a group of members, headed 
by Sir Francis Hastings, was sent to the Lords with a temperately 
worded message. Wishing to be more fully satisfied, the Commons 
asked for a copy of the account which they presumed the Lords had 
compiled of the Bishop's acknowledgement of his error, so that they
^ LjJ. ii, p.314; CjJ. i, pp.230-2.
^ LjJ. ii, p.315; Çsl. i, PP.234, 236; Spedding, op. cit.. iii,
pp.208-10. The speakers in this angry debate were Sir Thomas
Ridgeway, Sir John Holies, Sir Herbert Crofts, Sir Robert Wingfield,
Mr Secretary Herbert.
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might incorporate it in their own proceedings.^
At this point the record begins to fail. The Lords replied
to the Commons* request by proposing a conference for 30 June. This
meeting certainly took place, but what transpired we hardly know.
The Commons Journal has only the slightest mention of Hastings*
report; it contains words which may indicate that the Lords had
2
handed over the Bishop's submission, but we cannot be sure. In any 
case it perhaps hardly matters. The struggle between the Houses had 
ended in a draw: the Commons had jostled the Lords into rebuking
one of their own members at the insistence of the lower House; but 
in doing so the Lords had preserved their dignity and protected the 
Bishop from the worst excesses of the Commons' anger.
This case was concerned purely with a matter of privilege, but 
because the Bishop was a member of the Lords and the issue was raised 
by the Commons, the two Houses were forced into some kind of 
collaboration in order to settle the matter. This involved them in 
a joint committee meeting, a practice which vas to assist in the 
successful revival of Parliamentary judicature in the l620s; and 
the Lords had to acknowledge the Commons* initiative in the case by 
making arrangements to satisfy them on its outcome.
In addition, by preparing their case in committees rather than
^ UJ. ii, p.325; C^J. i, p.244. 
^ LjJ. ii, p.332; i, p.251.
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at meetings of the whole House, the Commons were making use of a 
procedure which was to serve them well in the l620s. This procedure 
had been increasingly used in the last years of Elizabeth's reign, 
and by 1621 it had reached considerable maturity. In the l620s, when 
the use of committees by the Commons materially assisted the develop­
ment of Parliamentary judicature, the House was employing an established 
procedure which, apart from minor modifications, does not seem to have 
required much further development in those years: there is, in the
field of Parliamentary judicature, little difference between the 
powers exercised by committees in 1621 and in 1626. In the earlier 
years of James' reign important developments did occur in the use of 
committees in connection with judicature, and these will be noted, 
but our knowledge of them is limited by the sparse nature of the 
material surviving on the Commons of these years compared with the 
period from 1621 onwards.^
In between the case of the Bishop of Bristol and those of l6lO
an abortive attempt was made to create a special type of judicature
to deal with the authors of the Gunpowder Plot. It appears that
Sir Robert Wingfield and others wanted to petition the King to permit
the trial in Parliament of those involved, so that punishments in 
excess of those provided by the law mi^t be imposed. The mind
J.E. Neale, The Elizabethan House of Commons (London, 1954), 
p. 377; W. Note stein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House of 
Commons (London,.1962), pp.43-4.
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boggles at what might have been devised, but the proposal came to
nothing, though after the trial and execution of the conspirators a
bill of attainder was passed.^
The cases of Cowell and Proctor began at virtually the same
moment, in the last days of February I6IO, but that of the latter
was much the more protracted. Cowell's book. The Interpreter, a
law dictionary, had been published at Cambridge in I607 and the row
which broke out shortly after the beginning of the Parliamentary
session of I6IO, derived from its definitions of the words 'Subsidy',
'King', 'PsLTliament', and 'Prerogative*. Cowell had emphasised the
King's absolute power, thereby damaging, in the Commons* view, the
2
authority of Parliament. In origin, therefore, the case was similar 
to that of the Bishop of Bristol; but although it developed along 
much the same lines, the Commons' approach was both more sophisticated 
and more determined, and Cowell was not let off as lightly as the 
Bishop.
^ ii, pp.366, 367, 570, 399, 401, 404-6, 435, 445; ç^J. i,
pp.293, 303, 3O8; L.B. Osborn, The Life. Letters and Writings of 
John Hoskvns 1366-1638 (New Haven, 1937), p.24; D.H. Willson, ed.,
The Parliamentgiry Diary of Robert Bower. I606-I607 (Minneapolis,
1931), p. 7. On 9 November, I605, James himself, in a speech to 
Parliament, said that he might airrange for the trial of the conspira­
tors in Parliament: Lansdowne MS 513, ff. 10-10v. The version of
the speech given in this manuscript differs from that in the Lords 
Joürnal which makes no mention of this proposal: L.J. ii, pp.357-9.
 ^S.a. Poster, ed., Prooeedings in Parliament. I6IO. i, pp.l8, 25. 
In 1604, the Bishop of Bristol had offended -üie Commons rather than the 
whole Parliament, though the Commons claimed that he had dishonoured 
both Houses; see p.87, above.
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The complaint against Cowell was introduced into the Commons on
23 February, probably by Hoskyns; it was at once referred to the
committee of grievances, a committee of the vhole House, which appears
for the first time in I6IO. This committee was destined to perform
a function discharged, in Elizabeth's reign, by the Secretaries and
other councillors, and was to have a vital share in the preparation of
cases presented by the Commons to the Lords in the l620s.^ Even at
this stage it was already very busy touting for and investigating
complaints. The committee read the book but, in order to investigate
it more closely, set up a sub-committee. This sub-committee reported
presumably that there was a case to answer because on the 24th it was
asked to consider a charge. At the same time, the House discussed
procedure ; there must have been a proposal for unilateral action by
the Commons alone, because Francis Bacon objected to this on the
ground that Cowell's views were not merely the concern of the lower
House, but of the King and the whole body of Parliament. He then
proposed that the Commons should "have Conjunction with the Lords, for
2
the Punishment of this Man" and the sub-committee was asked to
^ Note stein, op. cit., pp. 32, 40 n.l. The first committee of the 
whole House appeared in about l607: ibid., p. 37.
2
S.B. Chrimes has suggested that Bacon made this proposal to 
ensure that any attack on Cowell would be by both Houses, supported by 
the King, rather than by the Commons alone with its implications of 
challenge to the King and his prerogative: 'The Constitutional Ideas
of Dr John Cowell'. E.H.R. (1949), vol. Ixiv, no. 253, p.468.
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consider how this could best be arranged.^ On the 27th it recommended 
to the House that a message be drawn up and sent to the Lords, pointing 
out the dangerous nature of Cowell's book and asking for their 
participation in examining it and punishing its author. To this the 
House agreed and a delegation of forty members presented the message 
to the Lords.
Because the Commons chose to act in this way, it might at first 
sight seem as though they were abandoning their own unicameral 
jurisdiction in the case. As the issue was one of privilege and as 
Cowell, unlike Thornborough, was not a member of the Lords, the 
Commons might well have determined to deal with him themselves.
Indeed, eleven years later, the Recorder reminded the Commons of
2
Cowell and said that "we might have iudged him owr selves". But 
Bacon had made the really telling point: Cowell had offended against
the privileges of Parliament and not merely of the Commons. A few 
days later, the Lord Treasurer confirmed this view: the case concerned
all parts of Parliament - King, Lords and Commons - and was sufficiently 
unusual for him to propose a search of the precedents.^ Yet if the
C.J. i, pp.399-400; Spedding, op. cit.. iv, p.l6l. Beaulieu in 
a letter of 1 March to Trumbull, appears to be the only source for a 
story that the Commons had petitioned the King for permission to 
proceed against Cowell. He says that if the King grants it the 
Commons will, it is thought, punish him severely: E. Saiyer, ed.
Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. 
James I. Collected (chiefly) from the Orignal Papers of the Rifht 
Honourable Sir Ralph Winwood (London. 1725;» iii, P.125.
^ CjD. iii, p.207.
^ Poster, Parliament. I6IO. i, pp.186, 189.
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reasons which now persuaded the Commons to join with the Lords 
differed from those which dictated their decision in I604, the result 
was the same. The lower House was once again associating with the 
peers and venturing into unfamiliar territory in defence of Parlia­
mentary privilege.
The receipt by the Lords of the Commons* message gave rise to 
some debate. The Archbishop of Canterbury, embarrassed by the fact 
that The Interpreter had been dedicated to him, criticised the Commons 
for wasting time and neglecting the King's business, and for using 
the opportunity to air their prejudices against the civil and 
ecclesiastical law. The Lord Privy Seal and Lord Knollys suggested 
that the Lords should be prepared to hear what the Commons had to say 
but that they should avoid entering into argument with them. Saye 
wanted the request dealt with sympathetically, while Salisbury warned 
the House not to forget the King's interest in a matter of this kind 
but commended the Commons' desire as reasonable. He said that if the 
Commons would exhibit the cause of offence the Lords would examine and, 
if need be, punish.^ At the end of the debate the Lords agreed to 
hear the Commons* complaints and on 2 March the meeting:^  of committees 
took place. In a cordial atmosphere Martin explained idiich parts 
of the book the Commons found objectionable and the meeting ended
^ Ibid.. i, pp.18-19, 180; CjJ. i, p.400; Peiyt MS 538/2, f.lélv.
^ L.J. ii, p.560; Poster, Parliament. l6lO. i, pp.19, 23, 181, 
183-4*
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with the Lords stating that they could make no reply until they had 
consulted their House. There, three days later, the Lord Chancellor 
declared that three courses of action were open to the Lords; they 
could join with the Commons as requested, in which case decisions 
about procedure would be needed; they could refuse to join, in which 
case the Commons would expect an explanation; or they could hold a 
second meeting with the lower House to consider what to do next.
The Lord Treasurer helped the House to make up its mind. He again 
said that he approved of what the Commons had done but he felt unable 
to agree to punish Cowell for a book written "out of parliament and 
not touching any particular member, without knowing whether there have 
been like precedents". He therefore proposed that the clerk be 
ordered to search for precedents and that the Commons be asked for 
another conference.^
This conference was in fact used to announce that the King had 
intervened in the case. Salisbury told the Commons* committee that 
James rejected the views expressed in the book and would have prevented 
its publication if he had known of it. He now intended to have all 
copies suppressed.^
This virtually ended the matter as far as Parliament was concerned. 
In an audience on the 21st the King reiterated his intention and four
^ Foster, Parliament I6IO. i, pp.25, 27, 186; L.J. ii, p.56l.
^ Foster, Parliament I6IO. i, pp.29-31*
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days later the proclamation calling in the book was published. The
Commons were apparently satisfied because, in sending thanks to James,
they abandoned the usual procedure of using the Speaker as their
messenger and appointed a delegation led by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.^ But in reality this solution was a compromise, if some
of the letter-writers of the time are to be believed. Parliament
had abandoned the chase out of respect for the King's wish that Cowell
should not be harassed further; but James had been compelled to place
him under house arrest because he had been unable to justify some of
2
his definitions when the King had examined him. The House of Lords 
may or may not have been on the verge of collaborating with the 
Commons when the King intervened, but James had not been able to 
exercise complete control over the situation and the measures taken 
against Cowell and his book would doubtless not have been adopted
^ Foster, Parliament. I6IO, i, p.45; C.S.P» Dorn. 1603-10. p.594. 
The change in customary procedure is specifically noted in Foster, ii,
p.363.
 ^Winwood, op. cit.. iii, p.131, gives Beaulieu's letter of 15 
March explaining Parliament's attitude. Two days earlier Edmondes 
had reported to Trumbull that James* first reaction to the book had 
merely been one of disapproval but that he had been persuaded to 
examine Cowell a second time. From this had stemmed Cowell's 
committal to the house of an alderman until he could make answer: 
Winwood, iii, p.137; Poster, Parliament. I6IQ. i, p.l89n; H.M.C.
Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire (London,
1924-40), ii, p.262. Cowell remained under arrest for at least the
next six weeks; on 30 April Bancroft asked Salisbury for his release: 
C.S.P. Dorn. 1603-10. p.605. It should, however, be noted that 
Professor Chrimes regarded the decision over Cowell as largely a victory 
for the Grown and prerogative power: op. cit.. pp.471-3.
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but for the proceedings in Parliament. Furthermore, the circumstances 
of the case had compelled the Houses to associate with each other in 
Cowell's prosecution, and had forced them to devise procedures to 
combat an assault on the privileges of Parliament, rather than to deal 
with the more normal infringements of the privileges of one chamber 
or the other. Furthermore, such joint action was valuable prepara­
tion for the years ahead, when the Houses dealt with cases concerning 
the public interest rather than their privileges. Indeed, it seems 
possible to observe a progression from the lesser to the greater - 
from a defence of the privileges of one House to a defence of the 
privileges of both Houses, with a concern for the public interest as 
the third stage.
When Ellesmere wrote his Observations on James' first Parliament, 
he drew attention to the willingness of the Commons in the fourth 
session to usurp judicial power. In particular, he protested that 
they "did ... convent before them Sir Stephen Proctor, knight, and 
Henry Spiller, esq., upon private information and suggestions. A 
case of rare example, and if it be drawn to a precedent may have a 
dangerous consequence".^ In and after 1621 it became common practice
Foster, Parliament. I6IO. i, p.280. Ellesmere does not elaborate 
and we therefore do not know his precise objections. As both Proctor 
and Spiller were minor servants of the King and therefore supposed to 
be immune from Commons' examination or punishment, he may have been 
objecting on these grounds. But he does not mention that the two men 
were the King's servants - and James did not make this point when he 
reprimanded the Commons for their dealings with Proctor, In fact.
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for the Commons to "convent" men before them, but at this date such 
procedure was normally associated with issues of privilege. In 
Proctor's case, no question of privilege arose until the hearing was 
already in progress; while in Spiller's case, this issue probably 
did not appear at all. The proceedings against both men seem to 
indicate that Ellesmere's strictures were justified.
In the course of their dealings with Proctor, the Commons 
doubtless widened their procedural experience. In addition, by 
acting against a man whom James claimed was his servant, they were 
venturing on to unfamiliar territory and taking an important, if on 
this occasion largely unsuccessful, step towards the position they 
were to establish in the l620s. Moreover, the case enabled them to 
test the strength of purpose of the Lords, as Cowell's had done.
Proctor had been employed in executing the penal laws and in 
collecting the resulting fines. Of course, maiy members regarded 
this as a most wortly occupation, but there is no doubt that they also 
believed that the laws were being insufficiently enforced. Moreover, 
Proctor's appointment had adversely affected the power and profits of 
the justices of the peace, maiy of whom sat in the Commons, The case 
against Proctor should perhaps be seen in this context, though his
the implication of Ellesmere's remarks is that he was quarrelling with 
the methods of the Commons rather than with the category of person 
attacked, though the two cannot be completely separated from each 
other and, probably, both worried him.
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offence was more specific.^
In the course of his duties Proctor had discovered the existence
of a number of abuses, including what would now be called a protection
racket. Although he reported his findings and proposed remedies, he
also proved unable to resist the temptations of his office and his sins
provided the lower House with exactly the material it was looking for
in the early weeks of the session of I6IO. On 24 February the
Commons heard a complaint against Proctor - we do not know from whom -
and would doubtless have punished him rapidly had not the King inter-
2
vened and imprisoned him. Instead, they seem to have referred the 
matter to their committee of grievances for, on 8 March, Sir Edwin 
Sandys reported that in the committee's view the commission under which 
Proctor had acted was grievous, and had been obtained from the King by 
deceit. The position of the Commons at this point seems to bear some 
resemblance to that of their successors eleven years later. In 1621, 
having condemned various patents in a manner which resembled their 
predecessors* treatment of Proctor's commission, the Commons had to 
decide how to punish the patentees. On that occasion, they resolved 
to go to the Lords. However, the Commons of I6IO chose to "convent”
^ C. Roberts, The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart 
England (Cambridge, 1966), pp.12-13*
o
Spedding, op. cit.. iv, pp.96, 104; Foster, Parliament. I6IO, 
ii, p.33* For the view that the Commons, if left alone, would have 
proceeded against Proctor, see Beaulieu's letter to Trumbull of 1 
March: Winwood, op. cit.. iii, p.125.
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Proctor before their own House. But they were faced with the
difficulty that Proctor, as the King's prisoner, was beyond their
reach: they therefore resolved to petition the King to release him
to them for censure. At the same time a member. Sir John Mallory,
who appears to have been the author of the whole attack on Proctor,
declared himself ready to present detailed evidence in the case.^
The House was thus firmly embarked on proceedings against the man,
and not merely against his commission. Whether the Commons of I6IO
really had jurisdiction over the latter is perhaps a moot point: no
theoretical justification is to be found in the records, but in 1621
action against patents was vindicated on the ground that grievances
2
were the special province of representatives of the realm. But ther^ 
is little doubt that in I6IO they had no right to deal as they did with 
Proctor himself, as Ellesmere pointed out.
The King assented to the Commons* petition to release Proctor to 
them for censure, and the House arranged for its committee of grievances 
to conduct the investigation, thereby delegating to it important powers 
which were to be used mai%r times in the future. Little is heard of 
this examination in the records of the next fortnight, though on 21
^ CjjJ. i, p.407, Clayton Roberts says that Mallory was engaged in 
a personal feud with Proctor: op. cit.. p.11.
2
E.R. Foster, 'The procedure of the House of Commons against 
Patents and Monopolies'. Conflict in Stuart England, p.75.
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March the committee heard Proctor and his accusers face to face; on 
the same day, in an address to both Houses, James professed that he 
had been ignorant of Proctor's abuses until they had told him of them, 
but stated that he was now willing to see them reformed.^ At the 
beginning of April the Commons adjourned for a fortnight, but after 
Easter the examination continued, and reached a climax in the early 
part of May. On the 2nd Proctor was brought from the Gatehouse, where 
he lay as the King's prisoner, and at the Bar of the Commons was 
committed as their prisoner to the custody of the serjeant. A week 
later, after fairly intensive preparations, he was brought once more 
to the Bar where he was charged by the Speaker. He used the occasion 
to deliver an attack upon his chief accuser. Sir John Mallory, thus 
introducing the question of privilege, and he seems to have denied at 
leqst some of the charges, though, unfortunately the record at this 
point is very sketchy. The proceedings certainly included a discussion 
of possible punishments, but Proctor appears to have remained in the
Serjeant's care. On 10 May he petitioned the Commons for a trial and
2
on the 12th they debated their next step. They were now faced not 
only with the original charges against him, but also with the breach 
of privilege resulting from his speech against Mallory. They debated
^ C.J. i, pp.408, 412, 415; Foster, Parliament. I6IO. i, p.48;
ii,pp.63, 361.
 ^C.J. i, pp.423-8; Foster, Parliament. I610. ii, pp.76, 366, 368.
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whether they might fine him and whether for the "abuses offered to 
the commonwealth" they ought not to ask the King to commit him, but 
the only conclusion they seem to have reached was that for his attack 
on Mallory they were entitled to commit him either to the ser jeant or 
to the Tower. ^ They arranged to resume their discussion on the 14th 
but on that day a second intervention by the King brought matters to 
a head. Through the Chancellor of the Exchequer James complained that 
the Commons had exceeded the authority he had bestowed upon them; he 
had given them licence to censure Proctor; they had exceeded this by 
committing the King's prisoner to the custody of their ser jeant.
James instructed them in what he considered to be the correct procedure: 
they should censure Proctor and then return him to the custody of the 
King, who would take cognisance of the Commons' censure and deliver 
him once more to the House. It could then proceed against him either 
by bill or by petition and the King would eventually deal with the one
C.J.i, p.428; Foster, Parliament. l6lQ. ii, p.368. It may 
well have been in this debate that Moore made the speech that S.R. 
Gardiner printed on pp. 124-5 of Parliamentary Debates in 1610 (London, 
1862: Camden Society, no. Ixxxi). Although Gardiner could not date 
the speech, it presumably occurred between 9 May (when charges against 
Proctor were read in the Commons) and 15 May (vdien a committee was 
appointed to fVame a bill against him), for Moore proposed drawing 
up a bill to enumerate his offences and attainting him of praemunire. 
As precedents he gave the case of Peach and the attainder of Hugh 
Despenser.
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or the other in a suitable manner
Before considering the debate which followed this message it is 
perhaps worth speculating upon the motives for James* intervention. 
Ostensibly he was objecting to what the Commons had done twelve days 
previously but if this explanation is to be accepted it is then 
necessary to account for his very slow reaction. It seems more likely 
that the King had become increasingly alarmed at the growing boldness 
of the Commons in dealing with one of his servants and that he used 
this excuse to divert them in a more harmless direction. To propose 
to the Commons procedure by bill or petition was to do just this.
Both methods involved securing the King’s consent. Moreover, it is 
possible that, by suggesting to the Commons that they should draw up 
a bill, James was proposing something very like the course they should 
have adopted in the first place, if an order of 1621 is any guide:
"... if a particular Man desire that his Grief should be heard and 
remedied in this House (i.e. the Commons) ... he must prefer a Bill
f
Foster, Parliament. I6IO, ii, p.374. It has recently been stated 
(Roberts, op. cit. . p.l3y that the Commons had the right to employ procedure 
by bill.:: to djeal with infringements of the law, and procedure by 
petition to secure the redress of grievances that were merely onerous 
and not unlawful. However, this statement can be challenged. In 
1614, a committee considering impositions recommended to the Commons 
that they should proceed "first by bill to the lords and for fear itt 
might be thear stopped as itt was the last parliament that therfore we 
should put up our petition to the king to, as desiring rather itt 
should dy att his maiesties feet then in the hands of ill nurses";
Bodleian MS Eng. Hist. C. 286 p.67. This proposal tends to blur 
this distinction between bills and petitions, and indicates that the 
House might employ both methods simultaneously.
10§.
to that Purpose into the House".^ This order is, of course, not 
contemporary with Proctor's case, but it is a reference to the procedure, 
well established since the middle ages, by which petitions presented
to the Commons were translated into private bills designed to remedy
2
the complaint. If, as seems likely, James was proposing the adoption 
of this procedure, he was really telling them to revert to a time- 
honoured practice - a practice which could probably have coped quite 
well with Mallory' s original complaint against Proctor.
At any rate, James' intervention in the case worked, in a way 
rarely to be repeated, as the debate on his message showed. Proctor 
was returned to the Gatehouse where the King had originally imprisoned 
him and, for the moment, even escaped the censure which James had 
authorised. Furthermore, the House acknowledged that he was no longer 
in its hands. It then resolved to petition the King to release him a 
second time for censure and execution of judgment, and it seems to 
have been very ready, though no decision was taken, to fall in with 
James' proposal of procedure by bill to deal with Proctor's abuses of 
his commission. On the 15th the King agreed to release his prisoner 
to the Commons, but explicitly told the House that it could not
E, Nicholas, Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons in 
1620 and 1621. i, p.75* This was, of course, to be altered by the 
judicial developments of l621.
2
T, Erskine May, A Treatise on the Law. Privileges. Proceedings 
and Usages of Parliament. p.609r" Relf, op. oit.. p.xix.
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punish the misdemeanours against the state. Immediately after 
receiving this answer the Commons set up a committee^ to frame a bill 
and then debated how they should punish Proctor for his speech against 
Mallory. They dismissed a proposal that he should be required to 
submit personally to Malloiy, on the ground that he had committed 
conteizpt of the whole House; and they concluded this phase of the case
by resolving to censure him for the contempt and imprison him in the
2
Tower.
On June 6 the Commons received the bill from their committee, and 
during the next month passed it through all its stages. They refused 
the petition of Proctor for counsel to plead for him on that part of 
the bill dealing directly with the abuses in the exercise of his 
commission, but they agreed that he should have legal advice for the 
section which concerned the sale of his lands, from vhich it was 
intended to repay his creditors and those he had wronged. Private 
bill procedure required that the supporters and opponents of the bill 
should be heard: though the record at this stage is scanty, there is
evidence that some such hearings took place. On 5 July the House of
Mallory was not a member, so that even if the Commons were 
reverting to correct procedure by having a bill framed, Mallory, as 
the person accusing,was apparently not being required to undertake 
the work.
 ^C.J. i, p.if28; Foster, Parliament. l6lO. ii, pp.374-5*
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Lords entered the case for the first time when it received the bill
from the Commons.^
The bill is to be found in the House of Lords records under the
date on which it was received from the Commons, It begins by
reciting Proctor's offences and says that having been
... openly converted and heard at large in parliament,
(he) was censured to be most faulty and deserving to 
be punished in some other degree than such as by 
ordinary course of justice could be laid upon him, the 
offences being so exorbitant.
Among its subsequent clauses it cancels his patents and commissions,
disqualifies him from office, degrades him from kni^thood, makes
provision for the payment of his debts and debars him from the presence
of the King, Queen and heir apparent.
Having failed to influence the Commons, Proctor now turned his
attention to the House of Lords. On the day of the bill's second
reading he petitioned the peers to hear him with his coünsel and drew
their attention to the Commons* rejection of this request. The Lords
then debated the reasons for the Commons' refusal, decided to accede
^ Pe-tyt MS 537/14, t. 97t; ÇgJ. i, pp.436, 440 , 442-3; LjJ.ü, 
p.635; Foster, Parliament. 1610. ii, pp.149, 381. Private bills have 
long been recognised as judicial or semi-judicial in character.
Parties appeared by counsel and witnesses were examined; Erskine Way, 
op. cit.. p.609; A.F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament (London,
1920) , p. 118; C.H. Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and its 
Supremacy (New Haven, 1910), pp,222-4; Foster, 'Patents and Monopdlies', 
loc. cit., pp.75, 84 n.95.
2 It is printed by Foster, Parliament. I6IO. ii, pp.412-4.
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to Proctor's petition, and appointed 17 Juty for hestring him and
"those that could object against him",^ On that day, Proctor and 
his counsel were duty heard at the Bar, though what they said we do 
not know. The bill was certainty read out and Mallory and his 
supporters were present to put their case, but matters cannot have 
progressed veiy far when the Lords interrupted proceedings.
Explaining that they had insufficient time for the case, they referred 
the whole question, including the bill, to a committee which was appointed 
to meet on the following day. One wonders - with little hope that the 
issue can be resolved - whether this was an excuse, designed to with­
draw the weaknesses in the Commons' case from the glare of publicity 
and to make the proceedings more palatable to the King who was on that
veapy day being petitioned by both Houses to allow his servants to be
2
arrested and sued as freely as other men. For having examiné the 
bill in the presence of the parties the committee reported that Proctor
3
had committed no offence which would justify passing it. However,
Foster, Parliament. l6lO. i, pp. 137-8; L.J. ii, p.644. In 
the debate on the petition Lord Saye showed most sympathy for the 
Commons' point of view, but he declared himself in favour of hearing 
Proctor.
 ^Foster, Parliament. I6l0, i, p.146; L.J. ii, p.647; Roberts, 
op. cit.. p.l. There is a "Breviate of the Bill and Answer" in 
S.P. Dorn. 14/54, ff. 63-64v. The answers are merely brief rejections 
and denials of the charges and there is no indication idien they were 
made.
 ^It was doubtless influenced in reaching this conclusion, by the 
character of the witnesses against Proctor; Roberts, op. cit.. p.11; 
Lansdowne MS 167, f.27v.
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this conclusion failed to commend itself to a group of peers, of 
whom Salisbury was the most prominent. Some members wondered whether 
evidence had been suppressed and felt that the Commons would not have 
passed the bill without justification. Presumably as a compromise, 
it was decided to ask the Commons for a conference, but although this 
was held the Commons had previously resolved to withhold their reasons 
for passing the bill. At the last minute, the lower House did produce 
supplementary evidence against Proctor, but the peers were unconvinced 
and the bill failed to secure their approval. In consequence, as the 
session ended, the only consolation available to the Commons and their 
sympathisers in the Lords was the exemption of Proctor from the scope 
of the general pardon which was then being proclaimed.^
The proceedings against Proctor were obviously unusual in certain 
respects. The early attempts of tiie Commons to deal with the case 
implied claims to a judicature they did not possess, and, if private
C.J. i, pp.452-4; L.J. ii, pp.650-1, 655, 657; Foster, 
Parliament. I6IO ± pp.156-8, I65-6; ii, pp.287, 386; Petyt MS 538/2, 
ff.i5iv.-i52. clayton Roberts expresses surprise at the persistence 
of the Commons in pressing the charges after their failure before the 
Lards* committee on the l8th. In explanation of this persistence he 
suggests three highly sohpisticated reasons, based upon the nature of 
Proctor's activities and the threat these implied to the position of 
J.P.s, and upon the desire of the Commons to proceed against royal 
officials on common fame: Roberts, op. cit., p.12. The third reason
seems to be much more relevant to the situation in I614 (see pp.ll^ff., 
below) and the explanation here to be much simpler - that the Commons 
persisted because the Lords encouraged them to do so, by rejecting 
their own committee's conclusion and by asking the lower House for a 
conference.
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bill procedure was subsequently followed, it did not start in the 
orthodox way. The substantial part taken initially by the Commons 
dictated their interest in the subsequent proceedings, and the Lords* 
refusal to pass the bill was a rebuff to them as well as to Mallory, 
who can probably be regarded as the bill's sponsor. The bill itself 
was concerned with punishing the man, rather than with remedying the 
situation he had exploited: in effect, as Clayton Roberts has pointed
out, it was a bill of attainder, though the description is not used 
in the records of the case.^
The failure of the bill doubtless influenced members' views on 
the effectiveness of this procedure. The King had successfully 
protected his servant, hardly losing the initiative in the case, and 
even if the bill had passed the Lords, James could still have refused 
his consent. If Ellesmere's comments on the Commons* aspirations are 
correct, this procedure was unlikely to assist the development of 
their judicial powers, however respectably medieval its ancestry. It 
is interesting to notice that in Febmiary 1621 Coke was objecting to
Roberts, op. oit.. p.13 n.2. Although, as he points out, it was 
never called this it is interesting to note the precedent for attainder 
given by Moore (p. 103 n. 1 , above). The process of attainder was 
presumably fairly well understood from what followed the trial and 
execution of the Gunpowder Plot conspirators (p. 91 above) though in 
the case of Proctor (as in that of Strafford) the bill was resorted 
to when other means of punishment had failed.
Bills of attainder are, of course, a variety of private bill.
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private bill procedure;^ perhaps the case of Proctor helped to
eliminate from the Commons' repertoire one process bequeathed to them
2
by their ancestors.
Ellesmere also drew attention to the case of Heniy Spiller as 
another example of usurpation of judicial authority by the lower House. ^ 
The case began in much the same way: a private petition on behalf of 
one Felton was presented to the House of Commons by Sir Francis 
Hastings, one of the knights of the shire from Somerset. It alleged 
that Spiller, a clerk of the Exchequer, had used his position to 
protect recusants from fines. The House referred the matter to the 
committee of grievances, making arrangements for both parties to be 
heard, together with counsel. But Felton proved unable to substan­
tiate his charges and, as a false accuser, was imprisoned in the Fleet.^
ReIf points out Coke's dislike of the method: op. cit.. p.xix.
He objected to it because too often those sponsoring the bill were 
not well enou^ known to the Commons: Nicholas, op. cit.. i, p.89.
Even if his real objection was that it gave the Commons inadequate 
scope, he could hardly say so.
2
It seems to have had few supporters as a possible alternative to 
the exercise of Parliamentary judicature in 1621, but it may be 
relevant to note that it was suggested as a way of resolving the 
Commons' difficulties over Floyd (see p. 189 , below). In this case, 
perhaps an ineffective procedure was better than none at all.
 ^Foster, Parliament. l6lQ. i, p.280.
^ The committee's opinion was that Spiller was a knave, but a 
crafty one: ibid.. ii, p.131.
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So far, the House seems to have been following correct private bill
procedure, and with the failure of Felton's petition the matter should,
presumably, have ended.^ Yet, a fortnight later, early in July I6IO,
Hastings made an attempt to have the House re-examine the matter. Not
surprisingty, this gave rise to a debate concerning the extent of the
Commons' authority; but although it was resolved to resume the
examination little came of this and doubtless the failure of the case
against Proctor played its part in causing the collapse of proceedings 
2
against Spiller.
The attack on Spiller demonstrates the Commons' determination to 
press forward proceedings on their own responsibility, and it seems 
probable that it was this feature of the case which particularly 
worried Ellesmere. Yet in the end they failed, as they had failed 
against Proctor. The circumstances were different, but the two cases 
appear to highlight weaknesses which were fundamentally similar.
The Commons could not justify the powers on which they were depending.
^ One manuscript has, at this point, "... the matter laid to sleep"; 
ibid.. ii, p.131.
 ^Foster, Parliament. I6IO. ii, pp.128-31, 377-8; R.F. Williams, 
ed., The Court and Times of James the First, i, p.lié; C.J. i, pp.
435, 437, 440, 446-8; Lansdowne MS 486, ff. 148-148v; Spedding, 
op. cit.. iv, p.47n; Roberts, op. cit., pp.11-12, 14. There is 
evidence that Spiller's behaviour continued to cause anger after I6IO.
In 1614 a complaint against him was presented to the Council, while 
in 1621 the Commons grumbled about him and in l626 resolved to present 
him to the King as a recusant; C.S.P. Dorn. I6II-I8 . p.239; Nicholas, 
op. cit., i, pp.143-4; C.J. i, p.838. I am grateful to Mr Conrad 
Russell for this last reference.
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and legitimate procedures were inadequate to secure the desired 
results. On their own authority, they could not punish men who were 
not members and who had not violated their privileges, whether or not 
they were the King's servants. It was to be their successors in l621 
who found a way out of the impasse with the aid of an upper House which
was prepared to co-operate and thus to assist the revival of Parlia­
mentary judicature. On the other hand, in addition to the wisdom 
produced by disillusionment, the case against Spiller provided a further 
opportunity to test the inviolability of rpyal servants, and it 
revitalised the medieval concept of punishment of false accusers - a 
notion which may partly underlie the penalty inflicted on Davenport 
in 1621 for his accusation against Field.^
As the fourth session of James' long Parliament drew to its close
negotiations over the Great Contract became increasingly difficult, 
and in the fifth session, in the autumn of lélO, broke down altogether 
amid considerable acrimony. James declared himself tired of Parlia­
ment's insolence, but during the next three y^ars he did little to 
remove the underlying grievances which in part explained Parliament's 
attitude. Mien therefore the assembly which was to become known as 
the Addled Parliament met in l6l4, reasons existed for criticism of the 
government which the row over the undertakers aggravated. This
^ See below,pp.209-10.
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tension should be remembered vdien one considers the case of Bishop 
Neile, who was known to be a member of the hi^-church party. This 
case was confined to matters of privilege, but the Commons were 
noticeably more belligerent than previously and the hearings led to 
the raising of two issues which were to be of significance in the l620s.
Impositions were a subject which raised great passion in I614 and 
it was in connection with these that Neile uttered the intemperate 
remarks which caused the Commons to turn on him in fury. By the 
middle of May a committee of the lower House had reported that 
impositions not authorised by Parliament were illegal, and it recommended 
that the Commons should confer with the Lords on idiat was clearly an 
issue of fundamental importance.^ The request was duly sent to the 
Lords who debated it on 21 May, first as a House and then as a committee. 
Opening the debate the Bishop spoke against the proposed conference 
on the ground that those who had taken the oaths of allegiance and 
supremacy had sworn to uphold the privileges of the Crown, one of 
which the conference would be questioning. However, the committee
^ T.L. Moir, The Addled Parliament of l6l4 (Oxford, 1958), pp.110, 
112. In the previous month the Commons had begun to take action 
against patentees holding a glass monopoly and a monopoly in trade 
with France. They ordered the patentees to appear before them with 
their patents, and prepared for a committee to examine these. The 
cases of Lyons and Peach were quoted as precedents for proceeding 
against monopolists and as Clayton Roberts points out the Commons 
might well have embarked on the path they took in 1621. However, 
nothing seems to have come of these preliminary investigations, partly 
because the House became much occupied with impositions: Roberts,
op. cit.. p.21; C.J. i, pp.469-70, 472, 475.
decided that the House should meet the Commons to listen to their
point of view but not to discuss it with them. Yet when this was
reported to the House on the following Monday, the 23rd, the decision
was altered: the Lord Chancellor repeated a suggestion he had made
on the previous Saturday, that the House should first consult the
judges upon the legality of impositions. Neile emphatically supported
this proposal and it was adopted, but in the course of his speech he
said that if the Lords met the Commons the latter would probably
deliver "vndewtyfull and seditious speches vnfitte for us to heare".^
Consulting the judges proved to be a fruitless exercise because, throu^
Chief Justice Coke, they excused themselves from giving an opinion.
Moreover, implicit in Coke's speech was the conviction that the Lords
should hear the Commons. On the 24th the peers therefore had to
discuss the proposed meeting once more. For the third time Neile
spoke against it and finally, on the 26th, the Lords replied to the
2
Commons* request, turning it down.
^ H.M.C. Report on the Manuscripts of the late Reginald Rawdon 
Hastings (London. 1928-47). iv. pp.249-53; Moir. op. cit.. pp.1Î8-9; 
C.S.P. Ven. 1613-15. p.133; Lansdowne MS 513, ff. 146-150v.
^ H.M.C. Hastings, iv, pp.256-65; Spedding, op. cit., v, p.58; 
Moir, op. cit. , pp.120-2; Petyt MS 537/8, ff. 285v,-286 (which here 
is either part of, or a copy of, Bowyer's last scribbled book for 
1614: cf. f. 285 and Foster, Parliament. I6IO. i, p.xxiv). Some of
the speakers in these debates are of interest in the li^t of the 
development in the Lords of a party sympathetic to the Commons. 
Ghandos, De la Warr, Dorset, Kpyvett, North, Rich, St 3ohn, Saye, 
Sheffield, Southampton, and Spencer spoke in favour of hearing the 
Commons. Thoy were opposed by the Loitl Chancellor, tbe Lord Chamber- 
lain, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of Bath, Durham, St 
Asaph, and Winchester, and by Howard de Walden, Knollys, Nottingham, 
Worcester, Zouch, and rather lukewarmly by Pembroke. Of this second
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By this time reports had already reached the Commons of* the 
Bishop's speeches and the reaction which stemmed from these was to 
occupy a great deal of their time right up to the dissolution early 
in June. They began with a lengthy debate on 25 May, opened by Sir 
Mervyn Audley and Sir Robert Phelips, who were jointly responsible for 
reporting the offensive speeches and naming the Bishop as their author. 
The Commons then found themselves face to face with a difficulty which 
was to haunt them during the coming days: Neile's speeches were not
to be found in the Lords* official Journal, so that their knowledge 
of them derived merely from rumour, or common fame, not a satisfactory 
basis for a reasoned complaint. Indeed - though this never came to 
the surface - the fact that the Bishop *s words were reported to the 
Commons at all was a breach of the Lords* privileges.^ However, the 
more hot-headed members contributed to the debate in a manner 
uninhibited by the nature of their information. Hoskyns indulged 
in a typically violent outburst and another member, possibly Thomas 
Crew, speculated on the very different treatment that would have been
group, all but Howard de Walden and the four bishops were privy 
councillors. In the division on the 23rd almost all the privy 
councillors and bishops supported the proposal to consult the judges.
^ C'J" p.496; Moir, op. cit.. p.123; Williams, op. cit., i,
p.313. Spedding, op. cit.. v, p.62, makes the point about the breach 
of the Lords* privileges. He considers that the Lords showed great 
restraint, but what were the Commons to do? They had been refused 
a conference, a very unusual development as Spedding himself points 
out (p.57). The Lords had taken five days to reply to their message 
and reports of the Bishop *s words were not confined to Parliament.
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meted out to one of their members for an attack on the Lords. In 
his view the Lords should have considered handing Neile over to the 
Commons. On the other hand Sir Dudl^ Digges and Edward Alford 
advised caution, the latter suggesting a search of the precedents for 
guidance about the best course of procedure. Finally, after a 
discussion of the relative merits of an approach to the Lords or to 
the King, the House set up a select committee to consider the Bishop's 
words and the basis of the Commons* case, and to advise on procedure.^ 
The following day, with Hakewill as its spokesman, the committee 
reported that, as the woj?ds were spoken in the Lords, common fame was 
"certain Ground enough" for considering Neile * s remarks. It had 
discussed three courses of procedure; to ask the Lords to confirm 
the accuracy of the rumours ; to complain to them of the wrong and to 
ask them for redress; and to go to the King for redress. By a 
narrow majority it had resolved on the third course, but the argument 
that had taken place in the committee was renewed in the House when 
Sir Edwin Sandys, one of the committee members, spoke against the 
recommendation. He argued that it would create a dangerous breach 
with the Lords and mi^t establish a precedent enabling the King 
to punish a member of one House on the complaint of the other. Digges 
supported him, suggesting that without the consent of the Lords, of 
whom there was no reason to despair, Neile would not be punished
^ C.J. i, pp.496-8.
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sufficiently. He added that if the Commons did not receive satisfac­
tion from the Lords, then they should go to the King. These arguments, 
indicative of some procedural maturity, convinced the majority of 
members and eventually Hakewill changed his mind and agreed. Roe 
volunteered the encouraging, though inaccurate, information that the 
upper House had sent Latimer to the Commons for punishment, and the 
House then set up a small committee to frame the message to be sent 
to the Lords. It also resolved to transact no further business until 
an answer had been received from the Lords.^ This last decision 
produced a protest from the King, but such was the mood of the House 
that his message was virtually ignored.
The draft of the message to the Lords was presented for approval 
on the 27th and, after a dispute over part of its wording, a revised 
version was despatched next day. It reveals the accuracy of the 
Commons* information and makes no attendit to hide the weWoiess of their 
position. It expresses astonishment that aiyone could have miscon­
strued their first message by putting a sinister interpretation on it.
It goes on to record in some detail what "by public and constant Fame"
Ibid., pp.498-9 ; H.M.C. Report on the Manuscripts of His Grace 
the Duke of Portland (London, 1891-193%), 1%, P.133; C.D. vii. p.646; 
Notestein, op. cit.. p.46, presumably referring to this episode, says 
that the Commons ignored Sandys'advice. This is clearly incorrect, 
though Sandys* earlier arguments seem to have been less convincing 
than his later ones: Moir, op. cit.. p.125.
2
Moir, OP. cit.. pp.127-9.
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the Bishop is reported to have said, and it concludes by asking the 
Lords to take notice of this scandal and to join with the Commons to 
determine how they may be given satisfaction. It adds that the 
Commons will undertake no further business until they receive a reply.^ 
The Lords* first reaction seems to have been complete silence, but 
then, having told the Common's* messenger that they would reply as soon
as possible, they began to debate their answer. Some of the Privy
2
Councillors who had previously opposed consultation with the Commons 
now came out against Neile, but Ellesmere, the Lord Chancellor, 
maintained that the Commons must either set down Neile * s words or 
that some member of the Lords must charge the Bishop with the words, 
if the House were to proceed against him. But, he told them, "your 
Lopp^ are Judges, and their fore cannot be his accusers, and by lawe
^ Ibid.. p.126; Ç4J. i, PP.499-5OO; LjJ. ii, p.709. Petyt MS 
537/18, ff.49-49V. appears to be a copy of the exact message which 
Sir Edward Hoby delivered to the Lords. It is similar to the 
message printed in the Lords Journal but has greater emphasis and 
numerous minor alterations in wording. It also suggests (f.49?) 
that the Conmions claimed that, in them, the King, the Lords and the 
whole kingdom had been wronged.
In the margin it contains instructions to the messenger: by the
first paragraph; "The Introduction Arbitraiy att yo Discretion - 
upon this ground" ; by the second (main) paragraph: "For this the
body wee tye you p^^cicely to the words and soe to the End of this 
direction witbout other conclusion".
 ^Knollys, Worcester, and, to some extent, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. Knollys said that as Neile *s words had been spoken in 
the Lords there was more evidence of the matter than that provided 
by common fame: H.M.C. Hastings, iv, pp.268-70.
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their must be a partie accusinge".^ This was a point of some 
significance, and one of the advantages of impeachment, at least in 
Its fulty developed form, was that it avoided the difficulty by making 
the Commons accusers. Yet even as early as 1621 the problem had 
evidently ceased to be insuperable: the Lords asked their own
committees to draw up the accusation against Bacon, and this was done.^ 
The Lords* reply to the Commons was framed by Ellesmere and the 
Archbishop of Canterbuiy, and delivered to the Commons by their own 
messenger. Sir Edward Hoby, on the 30th, Predictably, it declared 
that the Commons* complaint was grounded upon insufficient proof, 
but it promised tliat if the lower House would state exactly what words 
were spoken and show how they were to be proved the Lords would give 
Tull justice. In delivering this message Hoby also reported that 
Neile had spoken to him privately, derying some of his remarks and 
saying that others had been misconstrued. Neither of these messages 
satisfied the Commons, but Edwin Sandys persuaded them to persevere
Ibid.. p.271* This point may have been in Saville*s mind on 
25 May when he tried to persuade the Commons to go to the King rather 
than to the Lords; "If we go to the Lords, this to make the Lords 
Accusers": C.J. i, p.497.
2
However, Selden confirms Ellesmere's point: "the Lords who
are only judges may neither accuse any to themselves..." In addition, 
Selden and Elsynge both make the somewhat different point that, when 
the Commons accuse, "the Lords are not to ioyne therein...": Selden,
Of Judicature. pp.11-12; H. Elsynge, *The moderne forme of the 
Parliaments of England *, American Historical Review (1948), vol. liii, 
no. 2, p.301.
121
with the Lords rather than turn to the King.^ They therefore 
appointed another committee to frame their reply. This largely 
reiterated the previous message, but recognised that common fame 
would not have been acceptable as a basis for proof in ary ordinary 
court of justice, though claiming that it was sufficient to induce the 
Lords to consider the matter. It virtualty challenged the peers to 
say whether or not the words had been spoken.
The determination of the Commons led to another lengthy debate in
the Lords, in n^ich very few speakers still supported Neile. The
result was that he solemnly protested that he had meant no harm to
either House, but it was only with reluctance that he was later induced
to add that he would accept any punishment the Lords might impose upon
him. The Lords then told the Commons that Neile had stated that he
meant no disrespect to the lower House and that he was deeply
disturbed that his words had been strained further than he ever intended,
This message concluded by saying that the Lords were satisfied with
Neile*s reply but that had they not been he would have received severe
punishment; it warned the Commons, however, that in future common
fame alone would not be a justifiable ground for accusation against
2
a member of the Lords.
^ H.M.C. Hastings, iv, p.272; L.J. ii, pp.710-11; O^J. i, pp. 
301-2; C.D. vii. p.o48. Sandys proposed that the Commons should 
send the Lords "for Accusation, the Words in writing".
^ H.M.C. Hastings, iv, pp.274-7; h i * pp.712-3; C^J. i,
p.502.
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Despite this warning, the Lords had made an important concession 
by accepting the accusation against Neile. The Commons had had to 
base their case upo© common fame because they could obtain no definite 
proof that Neile had spoken as they alleged. But although their 
position was a weak one, as the Lords told them and as they doubtless 
recognised, this did not nullify their accusation. Perhaps the 
similarity between the concept of common fame and the medieval notion 
of an accusation based on notoriety helped them. At apy rate, when 
in 1626 the Commons encountered similar difficulties in a ccusing 
Buckingham, they again resorted to common fame, although the cool 
reception which they had encountered in I614 was used by Buckingham’s 
supporters as an argument against the course vhich the House adopted.
As for Neile*s case, the Commons were deeply dissatisfied with 
the Lordôw* reply. In normal circumstances, this would almost certainly 
have provided the basis for an acceptable compromise, but the Commons 
were by now almost ungovernable. They held another debate in which 
they were bitterly critical of the Lords and ended by appointing the 
inevitable select committee. But this was to be their last act in 
the drama because the King, exasperated beyond measure by the character 
of the session, stepped in to threaten the dissolution idiich rapidly 
followed on 7 June.^ Thus, proceedings against Neile were abruptly
^ C^D. vii, pp.649-50; C*J. i, p.504; H.M.C. Portland, ix, p. 
155; Moir, op. cit.. pp.l36, 145. After the dissolution a number of 
the leaders of the Commons* opposition were punished: Hoshyns was
among those inçrisoned in the Tower, and Edwin Sandys, Digges, Owen, 
Crew, Hakewill and others had their notes burnt; Williams, op. cit..
i, pp.322, 325.
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ended, but it is perhaps questionable whether the Conmions would have 
achieved more if the session had lasted longer. Handicapped by 
the fact that Neile * s offences were contained in his speeches, whereas 
those of Thornborough and Cowell were embalmed in their writings, the 
Commons received as much, if not more, satisfaction from Neile than 
from the other two men. They had sustained an insecurely based 
accusation and had compelled the Lords to listen to them, even though 
the power to punish remained firmly in the hands of others, as it had 
done previously.
The cases which have been discussed all exhibit some novel or 
unusual features, and several of them provide evidence of attempts 
by the Commons to extend the scope and nature of their judicature.
All of them were conducted within Parliament, and were not concerned 
with the judicature of other courts. But when Ellesmere wrote about 
the first session of I6IO and of the irregularities in the proceedings 
against Proctor and Spiller, he also complained that the Commons had 
interfered in the jurisdiction of the Courts of Admiralty and Chancery, 
They had passed a bill to allow an appeal from a sentence given in 
the Admiralty Court, although the Privy Council had examined the case 
and decided that an appeal was not justified. They had examined "in 
point of equity and conscience divers decrees made in the Chancery", 
and they had granted injunctions to stay suits being prosecuted there 
and in other courts. They had approved a bill attacking a point in
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law upon which a judgment had been based.^
Ellesmere illustrates some of his assertions by naming the cases 
in which the interference occurred. Unfortunately, in almost every 
instance, diaries and official records add only minor details to the 
account given by Ellesmere. However, they do provide factual 
confirmation of his accusations of trespass. To what extent the 
Commons were successful in their poaching is difficult to say.
Certainly the result was not always what they intended; for instance, 
the bill to permit the appeal against the Admiralty Court’s sentence 
failed to pass the Lords.^ But perhaps this is not the most
important consideration. What is more significant is that the Commons* 
endeavours to extend their jurisdictional powers inside Parliament 
were running parallel with similar attempts to expand their jurisdiction 
outside Parliament. As a part of the story of the development of 
Parliamentary judicature, the latter may be less important than the 
former, but as an indication of the assertiveness of the Commons on
^ Foster, Parliament, I6IO. i, pp.280-1.
^ There is one exception. There is a full account in the Lords 
Journal of Lord Abergavenny’s case, which settled a dispute with 
Lady Le Despenser over the precedency of the two baronages and the 
sale of some lands. From the entries in the Commons Journal it 
appears that the Commons were only required to pass a bill sent to 
them by the Lords: L.J. ii, pp.613, 615, 618, 622-3, 625-8; £^J*
i, pp.446-7, 449-51.
^ Foster, Parliament. I6IO. i. 280 n.ll. It had its f:^st reading 
by the peers only three days before the prorogation ; L# J# H ,  P* 653$
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which the development of that judicature in part depended, such 
attempts are equally revealing.
In the Parliaments of the l620s, only occasional reference was 
made to the cases which have been discussed, althou^ they were not 
totally ignored. This was no doubt partly because the actions were 
not very successful, Iii.addition, the types of judicature which were 
being exercised shortly before 1621 were not necessarily of great 
relevamce to the Parliamentary judicature re-introduced then. To 
find close parallels with idiat they were trying to do. Coke and his 
associates had to look back to the middle ages# But this is not to 
say that nothing could be learnt from more recent experience. The 
Commons had discovered something of the reaction of the Lords and of 
James to their more extravagant claims, and may have learnt, in spite 
of disappointments, that they could skate on thin ice with reasonable 
safely, provided that they pressed forward with sufficient determina­
tion, They had compelled the Lords to get used to the idea of 
collaborating with them in the realm of judicature. They had had 
some indication of üie weaknesses of procedure by bill, and their 
63q)erience with Proctor may have reminded them that they lacked power 
to punish non-members except idien their privileges had been infringed.
^ Cowell: C.D. xii, p.207; Proctor: ibid.. iv, p.77j vi, p.
353; Keile; i, p.84-7.
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They had also developed the use of committees to carry out detailed 
work, to conduct examinations, and to advise on procedure. Insofar 
as these cases helped to define the opportunities and limitations of 
the existing judicature, they may also have contributed to the 
noticeable smoothness and ease with which Parliamentary judicature 
was revived in l621.
If the Commons in James* first two Parliaments did gain the type 
of experience suggested, the means for its transmission to their 
successors was not lacking. Membership did not change completely 
from one Parliament to the next. Men like Robert Phelips, Hake will, 
Edwin Sandys and Digges, who were among the leaders in 1621, had sat 
in either or both of these earlier Parliaments. Coke was in attendance 
on the Lords before he entered the Commons in 1621. Sir Robert 
Cotton was already searching for precedents in l6lO as he was so often 
to do later.^ There warn to be no shortage of either antiquarian 
knowledge or more recent experience in the l620s.
^ C.J. i, p.422. In l6l4, while ill at Cambridge, he sent the
key of his study to enable several of the Commons* critics of imposi­
tions to search for records "for the benefit of the Common wealthe". 
The following day, 21 May, one of them. Sir Roger Owen, challenged 




The Parliament of 1621
In the story of judicature in Parliament, the trials and hearings 
before the Commons and Lords of 1621 have long held an important 
place. In the eighteenth century Francis Hargrave drew attention to 
the increase in Parliament's judicial business, both civil and criminal, 
in that year.^ Undoubtedly, part of the explanation of this activity 
lies in the political circumstances of the time, vhich gave rise to 
much dissatisfaction, though this is not to say that politics dictated 
these judicial developments. The presence in the Commons of Sir 
Edward Coke is another part of the answer, and much of the progress 
made in 1621 was due to his guidance. But whatever the explanation, 
pride of place in this development must go to the revival of Parlia­
mentary judicature - the procedure commonly named impeachment. Yet 
although this is the best known and probably the most important aspect 
of the development, it is not the only one, nor did it occur in 
isolation: there was also an expansion of the unicameral judicature




In the Commons this took various forms. First, the House
evolved an efficient procedure for dealing with grievances.
Petitions presented to the House led to enquiries conducted in
accordance with a procedure evolved from that used for private bills.
This procedure has been carefully examined by Mrs Foster, but it will
be necessary at a later stage to summarise her findings because the
first case of Parliamentary judicature stemmed directly from the
Commons* investigation into grievances.^ Secondly, the Commons of
1621 attempted without success to establish a jurisdiction of their
own over non-members who had not violated their privileges. This
endeavour appears most stpongly in the case of Floyd, but it is perhaps
not entirely absent in the early stages of the proceedings against
Michell. Had the attempt prospered, the effects on the evolution of
Parliamentaiy judicature would almost certainly have been profound,
and it must therefore be contrasted with that evolution. Thirdly,
as in 1610, there are signs that the Commons were prepared to intervene
2
in the jurisdiction of other courts. However, the future of this
E.R. Foster, "The procedure of the House of Commons against 
Patents and Monopolies*. Conflict in Stuart England, pp.59-85, 
especially p.78.
2
Two cases may be mentioned. In March l621, the Commons 
adjudicated in a jurisdictional dispute between the Courts of Chancery 
and Wards. The case emerged from their enquiries into abuses in 
courts of justice. Lawyers pleaded at the Bar on behalf of each 
Court: the Commons decided that both had been at fault: E. Nicholas,
Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons in 1620 and 1621, i,
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type of judicature lay more with the Lords than with the Commons, 
and the activities of the latter in this respect in 1621 appear to 
have no connection with the development of Parliamentary judicature*
This Parliament also saw an extension of the unicameral judicature 
of the Lords.^ In the course of the first session, the peers 
employed an original civil jurisdiction on petitions presented to 
them by private citizens, which, before the end of the Parliament, 
seemed about to widen into an appellate jurisdiction - a development 
which did, in due course, take place. These private petitions, like 
those previously mentioned which complained of grievances, were often 
first addressed to the Commons, but as they normally asked for 
judicial remedy, the Commons did not regard them - as they did 
grievances - as falling within their special province, and through 
their committee of grievances, may have taken the initiative in
pp.178-83* The second case, which has something of the flavour of an 
appeal, arose from a Chancery decree awarding Sir George Marshall 1,000 
marks in conclusion of a long-standing dispute with Sir William Pope. 
Pope asked the Commons to reverse this decree and a committee pronounced 
it grievous. The two men were then ordered to plead their causes 
before the committee of grievances. After this hearing, members 
debated the next step. Some favoured an approach to the Lords in 
order to secure a reversal of the decree but this procedure was not 
followed, doubtless because the King intervened to give the Commons 
permission to judge the case themselves. The House concluded the 
case by ordering the removal of the decree from the Chancery files:
C.D. iii, pp.2, 111, 116; iv, pp.270, 285; v, pp.106-7; vi, p.
467; Nicholas, op. cit.. i, p.366.
^ F.H. Relf, ed., Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords. 
officially taken by Robert Bowyer and Henry Elsing, Clerks of the 
Parliaments. A.D. 1621. 1^25. lfe8 . pp.ix-xxxii. especially pp. 
xviii ff.
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redirecting the petitioners to the peers. The stages by which the 
Lords assumed responsibility for adjudicating on such petitions have 
been analysed by Miss Relf, who has found similarities in the origins 
of both this jurisdiction and Parliamentary judicature. She has 
argued that the Lords undertook judicature on petition at the urging 
of a small group of members of both Houses, because the Commons 
possessed no means - apai't from private bill procedure, which Coke 
disliked - of dealing with the large number of private petitions being 
received.^ She has also poigted out that Coke gave much the same 
reason - the insufficient power of the Commons - for the recommenda­
tion to transmit Mompesson to the Lords, the decision which led to the
2
revival of Parliamentary judicature. Miss Relf concludes that it 
was "in keeping with the move made by Coke in Mompesson*s case that ... 
the commons should call upon the lords to answer petitions by 
judicial procedure": in order to increase the Lords* confidence in
their ability to deal with Mompesson, Coke had stressed their power
Relf, op. cit., p.xLx; Foster, "Patents and Monopolies", loc. 
cit., pp.62, 78. For Coke*s hostility to private bill procedure, 
seepp.llO-iiabove. Since the reign of Henry W  there had been a 
"tendency to address petitions to the Commons to gain their mediation"; 
Relf, pp.xix-xx.
2
Relf, op. cit.. p.xiii. The Commons were ham-strung in 
dealing with both civil and criminal cases because they could not 
hear evidence on oath.
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to judge alone. It therefore appears that Parliamentary judicature 
and the Lords* judicature on petition shared a common origin, at any 
rate in one respect, in the Commons* realisation of the limitations 
upon their own power. But despite this the two procedures developed 
very differently. Although the first petitions may have been re­
directed by the Commons to the Lords, the upper House rapidly acquired 
the habit of receiving petitions direct from their sponsors. The 
Commons took no part in this judicature, which remained firmly 
unicameral, and was, of course, fundamentally civil, idiile Parliamen­
tary judicature in the seventeenth century was basically criminal.
It therefore seems that this extension of the Lords’ judicature is 
procedurally separate from the development of Parliamentary judicature. 
That development grew much more from the Commons* procedure for 
dealing with grievances, and from their unsuccessful attempt to punish 
men who were outside their customary jurisdiction.
Relf, op. cit., p.xix. The power of the Lords to judge alone 
formed the second of the four types of judicature listed by Coke in 
his speech of 8 March, 1621, Miss Relf comments that, in asserting 
that such a procedure existed, "Coke had gone beyond aiything justified 
by medieval precedent": p.xv. It will be remembered that when he
discussed this judicature. Coke specifically stated that cases could 
originate before the Lords: see p. 71 , above,
2
Relf, op. cit.. pp. xi, xxff. The procedure embodied a 
committee for petitions. There is little doubt that this came to 
be "recognised as performing the function which was once performed by 
the tryers" of petitions: ibid., p.xxvii and p.85 , above. The
Lords* records of 1628 contain the first sign of conflict between 
the old procedure by private bill and the new procedure by petition: 
ibid., p.xxviii.
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A considerable part of the Commons* energies in the first, and 
main, session of the 1621 Parliament was absorbed in the investigation 
of grievances. Two months before the first meeting, the shrewder 
political observers had been urging the King to remove some of the 
more obvious grievances in order to forestall criticism, but little 
was done.^ Moreover, the Government’s supporters faced an additional 
handicap. Investigations into grievances inevitably cast shadows 
over important people and were to lead on to several trials of major 
significance, but James was not a King who was easily persuaded to 
dery his subjects the opportunity to complete a serious enquiry into 
the alleged errors of individuals, however eminent these men might 
be. The very fairmindedness of the King prevented him from 
seriously interfering with investigations which were, ultimately, to 
weaken the whole monarchical position.
Although the Commons seem to have been determined to leave no 
complaint uninvestigated, regardless of how trivial it might appear 
to be, they concentrated on patents, monopolies, and grants of 
dispensation from the penal laws, as the major grievances. Such 
abuses were widespread, and it was the Commons* work on the first two 
which provided the basis for the revival of Parliamentary judicature 
in 1621. To deal with patents and monopolies the Commons evolved a 
fairly stereotyped procedure. The complaint might originate from
^ C.S.P. Ven. 1619-21. p.479.
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any source, from privy councillor to private citizen. The committee 
or sub-committee charged with the task of detailed investigation 
summoned before it the patentee and his opponents, together with 
witnesses and documents on both sides. Either party might seek 
permission to appear with or by counsel, while refusal to obey a 
summons was treated as contempt. Both sides were entitled to a 
hearing, though defendants were not allowed written copies of the 
charges. The chairman of the committee probably led the questioning 
but members were firee to intervene; evidence was not given on oath - 
though this possibility caused a good deal of discussion in both 1621 
and 1624 - but the House compensated for its impotence in this respect 
by being prepared to punish witnesses who lied. The committee acted 
as a fact-finding body, but it also heard discussion of these facts 
and considered the effects of the grant’s existence. When it had 
completed its investigations, it pronounced judgment on the patent 
or monopoly and reported this to the House. In every case of which 
records remain the Commons confirmed the report of their committee. 
After the patent had been formally condemned, the House might proceed 
either by passing a special bill to deal with it, or by including it 
in a general petition to the King at the end of the session; and in 
1624 an attempt was made to deal with the whole problem of such grants 
by passing the Statute of Monopolies.^
^ Foster, "Patents and Monopolies", loc. cit.. pp.66, 67, 69, 72,
76-8, 81 n.44.
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Ivirs Foster has emphasised the essentially legal nature of these 
enquiries into patents and monopolies. "The Commons had, in fact, 
evolved out of the old private Bill procedure a method of investiga­
tion and of passing judgment very like a court procedure."^ But 
although the judicial or semi-judicial processes employed to deal 
with private bills might lend an air of respectability to these 
investigations, the House had effectively extended its jurisdiction. 
"Patents and monopolies could not be construed as offences against 
the House. For their jurisdiction in this field the Commons relied
on the idea that grievances were the special province of the
2
representatives of the realm." It may be noted in passing that 
this concept was to prove useful to the Commons in the slightly 
different context of Parliamentauy judicature.
The procedure which has been described was no doubt effective 
in dealing with the patents and monopolies themselves: often enough
the grant was cancelled. But although the voiding of a grant might 
damage the livelihood of its holder, the machinery did not extend to 
the punishment of the patentee or monopolist. The Commons did have 
some debate on how to punish patentees, but only those who happened 
also to be members of the House were actually punished.^ Moreover,
^ PP*74-5.
^ Ibid., p.75.
 ^Ibid.. p.84 n.98. They were sequestered or expelled from the 
House.
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even if a patentee came within this category, the House might decide 
that the punishments which it could inflict were inadequate. It 
was to cope with precisely this situation in its proceedings against 
Mompesson that the Commons of l621 turned to the Lords, and thereby 
revived Parliamentary judicature. It is now necessary to consider 
the development of that judicature as revealed by this case and its 
successors.
On 6 February, 1621, the Commons, on a motion of Alford and 
Sackville, arranged for the reference of grievances to a committee 
appointed for the purpose of considering them. This was one of four 
committees of the whole House which were set up with various functions 
at different times in 1621. These and their sub-committees were to 
carry out much of the detailed work connected with the cases of 
Parliamentary judicature, using powers already largely established in 
previous Parliaments.^ There were two levels at which the committee 
of grievances and those with the narrower purpose of investigating 
trade and courts of justice could operate. In the first place, they 
could concern themselves with the more superficial aspects of the 
allegations brought before them, earnestly calling to account the 
rather unimportant men who had been responsible for the day-to-day
^ C.D* iv, p.19; W. Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative 
by the House of Commons. p.37.
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enforcement of the patents which were alleged to be grievous. This 
level of activity was unlikely to bring down upon their heads any 
significant anger from the King, but equally it was unlikely to be 
of ary lasting benefit to the community. The alternative course 
open to the committees was to strike at the real heart of the matter 
in the hope of producing a lasting cure; but this would involve 
identifying and examining the referees - the men, often the most 
prominent in the kingdom, responsible for advising the King on the 
legality and suitability of tlie patent under consideration. To 
avoid impairing the deeply held doctrine that the King could do no 
wrong^ involved fixing responsibility for the poor state of affairs 
upon these advisers, but as the King had appointed them he was likely 
to disapprove strongly of suggestions that they were really inadequate. 
Nevertheless, certain members of the Commons were prepared to take 
this risk and Sackville suggested that while the committee was 
examining the patent for the sole manufacture of gold and silver
Just how deep was the belief in this doctrine is one of the 
greatest problems of the 1620s. Adherence to it undoubtedly had 
its uses in dealing with unpopular ministers. Raleigh had discussed 
some of its implications in The Prerogative of Parliaments in England 
(London, 1657), p.99. See also C. Roberts, The Growth of Responsible 
Government in Stuart England, pp.4-7, 35, 41, 59, 69, 74, 75.
2
Although James was quick to shift responsibility from himself 
to the referees, an attack on them was fundamentally an attack on the 
legality of the King's grants: Foster, "Patents and Monopolies",
loc. cit.. pp.71-2.
137
thread it should try to find out who had acted as referees in 
granting the patent "that so his Majesty may be cleared, and the 
Saddle set on the right Horse". Nine days later the Master of the 
Wards, Lionel Cranfield, urged the Commons, meeting as a committee 
of the whole House, to a course of action which would clearly identify 
the source of the errors in the patents. He said that as the King 
always referred projected patents it would not dishonour him to call
to account those that had abused him.^ How strong was the wish to
2
deal directly with the referees it is difficult to say but the 
investigating committees and the Commons adopted a compromise position 
between the two extremes of behaviour open to them.
During the last two weeks of February the committee for grievances 
met very frequently and on the 19th Mompesson’s patent for the 
licensing of inns was first discussed. The declared intention of 
this patent was to regulate the management of inns by granting
C.D. iv, pp.20, 38-9; C.J. i, p.511. It is interesting to 
note that this speech gained the approval of John Chamberlain: N.E.
McClure, ed., The Letters of John Chamberlain (Philadelphia, 1939), 
ii, p.345. At the end of February, Chamberlain was taking a 
pessimistic view of the Commons* chances of success against the 
referees whom he considered "such as are like to be out of their 
reach". He also observed that the House had "so maiy hares on foote 
at once that they hinder one anoÜier" : McClure, ii, p.347.
2
Unrestrained comments were certainly made, as, for example, in 
the hostile diary, Rawlinson MS B 151. This states categorically 
that mapy great men were doers in the patents and should be questioned 
for such an abuse of the commonwealth for if they had not certified 
the fitness of the patents the King would not have granted them.
C.D. vi, p.377.
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licences so that good behaviour might be assured in those licensed, 
and that unlicensed inns might be closed down. Fees were charged 
for licenses and punishi^ents inflicted upon offenders. Mompesson 
had made use of his patent to enrich himself, causing much hardship.^ 
The committee, with Sir Edward Coke as its chairman, ordered Mompesson 
and his fellow patentees to produce the documents connected with the 
patent, and on the 20th the patent was read to the committee.
Coke stated clearly that as the King had granted it only after taking 
advice he was free of all blame. In the ensuing debate strong 
criticisms of the patent were made and Mompesson declared that if it 
were shown to be evil he was ready to be the first to suppress it. 
After hearing Coke’s report on the 21st the Commons ordered the 
sequestration of Mompesson from his place in the House while the case 
was being dealt with, though he was commanded to be available every 
day - a jurisdiction which it was, of course, entitled to exercise
D.C. Spielman, ’Impeadiments and the Parliamentary Opposition 
in England, I62I-164I* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University 
of Wisconsin, 1959), p.23 and n. 8. For example, Bath had had 
six inns, apparently sufficient to satisfy the needs of the populace, 
but Mompesson had gradually increased the number to twenty:
E. Nicholas, op. cit.. i, p.66. Among the later evidence against 
Mompesson was an allegation that he had issued more than 3500 writs 
of quo warranto against inn-keepers, bringing only two of them to 
issue. He had also declared at least a hundred outlawries: C.D.
V, pp.488-9.
2
The patent had been granted to Mompesson, Gyles Bridges and 
James Thurborne: C.D. iv, p.84* According to Wentworth’s account
the committee had first to obtain the approval of the House before 
making this order, but this is not confirmed by other diarists:
C.D. ii, p.106; V, p.476.
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over its own members. At the same time an attempt was made by 
Seymour to have the House consider the possible fault of the referees 
in this patent and Sir Thomas Wentworth, looking ahead one stage, 
proposed that enquiries be made to discover what laws existed by which 
patentees could be punished.^
While witnesses were being examined and evidence collected in 
Mompesson*s case, the Commons and their committee for grievances dealt 
with another patent, that concerning recognisances for alehouses.
This patent operated on similar lines to that for inns and infringed 
one of the powers of the justices of the peace. The chief target 
for the Commons* attack was Sir Francis Michell, who was not an M.P.
As commissioner for enforcement of the patent, he had not only 
profited directly from it but received a steady income of £40 a year 
from Newgate prison on condition that he made use of its services for 
his prisoners. On 21 February Michell admitted to being a dealer 
in the patent and the committee extended its authority by judging the 
patent to be a grievance both in grant and execution, a sentence 
confirmed by the House next day. Its appetite whetted, the conmittee 
continued its investigations and Michell, apparently thoroughly alarmed 
and privately advised by some of his inquisitors, resolved to
C.D. ii, p.109. Mompesson was a member for the borough of Great 
Bedwin, Wiltshire: Members of Parliament (London, 1878-9), part i:
Parliaments of England 1213-1702, p.454. The referees of his patent 
were Bacon, Crooke, Nicolls, Winch, and Finch for law; Bacon,
Suffolk, Winwood, Lake and Finch for conveniency : Nicholas, op. cit.,
i, pp,103-4.
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petition the House,^ The petition was read on the 23rd, just before
Coke was due to make a further report from the committee. In it
Michell denied having had ary part in the creation of the patent, which
he said had been approved by some of the most learned men in the
kingdom, and claimed that he had merely endeavoured to execute the
King’s grant to the best of his ability. Angered by what it regarded
as the offensive wording of this petition and its author’s attempt
to take refuge in the prerogative, the House held a debate which was
far from being coolly judicial. It did, however, heed the warnings
of Glanville not to over-reach itself and it ignored the irrelevant
2
precedents for punishment produced by Hakewill, Without giving any 
specific reason, it declared Michell unworthy to be a J.P. or to hold 
ary future commission and sentenced him to imprisonment in the Tower 
during pleasure. Michell’s attempt to reply at once was refused and 
Coke told him that he could say what he had to say when he made his 
expected submission.^
It is not easy to be sure whether the Commons were justified in
^ C.S.P. Dorn. 1619-23, p.225; C^D. iv, p.89; vii, pp.499-502.
2
Hakewill gave two precedents: a mayor of Westminster who, in 
13 Elizabeth, accepted a bribe from a burgess to return him to 
Parliament; and an M.P., Arthur Hall, who wrote an attack on the 
House and its proceedings: C.D. ii, p.131. For Hall see J.E. Neale,
Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 1559-1381 (London, 1958), pp.407 ff.
^ C.D. ii, p.132. Michell*s sentence perhaps bears some 
similarity to the medieval notion of conviction by notoriety.
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punishing Michell in this way. Within a few weeks the Lords were
hearing that the Commons had committed him for contempt, and Michell’s
action could certainly be construed in this way. But this does not
seem to be the only reason for the Commons* sentence. The entry in
their Book of Orders for 23 February says that he was imprisoned "for
his maiy misdemeanours in and aboute the procureing and execucion of
the pattent concerning the forfeitures of the Recognizances of Ale
howses Keepers . Moreover, in rejecting Hakewill*s precedents,
Phelips pointed out that they were concerned with offences against the
2
House whereas Michell had offended against the country. Perhaps the 
Commons had extended their existing jurisdiction in a direction 
difficult to justify, but for the moment the case rested.
Within a few days the Commons were possibly regretting the 
hastiness of their action over Michell as the need emerged to justify 
a rather different course of procedure in dealing with Mompesson.
But their quick success had the effect of increasing their boldness 
so that when, on the 24th, Mompesson hoped to curry favour by a 
submission which promised the discovery of "some things which shalbe 
for the publick good", his petition was rejected and he was ordered
^ I'J* iii, p.63; C.D. vi, p.%3; J.P. Keiyon, ed., The Stuart 
Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), p.93; Harleian MS 158, f. 239.
2
C.D. ii, p.131. See also the full debate on the report from 
the committee of grievances; C.D. ii, pp.127-33.
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to appear before the committee the following Monday, At the same 
time further attempts were made by Seymour and Cranfield to have 
enquiries widened to include examination of referees, and Coke 
suggested that this become standard practice.^ Cranfield's suggestion, 
which related specifically to the Mompesson case, was agreed to and 
men must have felt that a small encroachment had been made upon the 
entrenched position of the Villiers family: Mompesson was a relation
by marriage to Buckingham; Christopher Villiers was involved in the 
alehouse patent; and within the next few weeks Buckingham himself
was to protest his innocence to the Lords and to declare that he would
2
not protect his brothers against legitimate censure.
When Mompesson was questioned by the committee for grievances 
on 26 February he was asked about a number of other patents he was 
thought to have held. Of these, the two most important were the
^ CjD. ii, p.134; iv, p.99.
2
Arthur Wilson, who was strongly anti-Stuart, said that "All the 
world knew that Montpesson was Buckingham’s creature". Quoted in 
J. Nichols, ed., Progresses, Processions and Magnificent Festivities 
of King games the First, his Royal Consort, Family, and Court, 
collected from Original Manuscripts, Scarce Pamphlets, Corporation 
Records, Parochial Registers, etc. etc. (London, 1828;, iv, p.é60, 
n.3. Mompesson and Sir Edward Villiers had married Catherine and 
Barbara, the daughters of Sir John St John of lydiard Tregoze:
D. Mathew, James I (London, 196?), p.291n. There is a letter of 
January l6l8 in which Buckingham asks for Bacon’s help in furthering 
the alehouse patent referred to him, because it concerns Patrick 
Maull and Christopher Villiers. Bacon agreed provided that the 
grant was not one of the grievances put down in Parliament: C.D.
vii, p.312.
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patent for the manufacture of gold and silver thread^ and the patent 
for the investigation of the concealment of wards’ lands. He did 
his best to minimise his share, both administrative and financial, 
in both, but when the following day the committee reported to the 
whole House Pym made much of the patent for the concealment of lands 
and Coke compared Mompesson to Empson, whose fate he mentioned.
Up to this point the method of dealing with Mompesson had closely 
resembled that employed against Michell, but a new pattern now
3
emerges. Instead of condemning him and passing sentence the Commons 
this time proceed much more circumspectly, despite the fact that, 
unlike Michell, Mompesson was a member of the House. There are 
several possible reasons for this. First, Mompesson had not enraged 
the Commons with excuses to the same extent as Michell so that there 
was little justification for proceeding against him summarily. 
Secondly, there was doubt as to the degree of punishment that the
Sir Edward Villiers had invested money in this patent. No 
separate charge was preferred against him to the Lords, but he was 
eventually cleared by them in the aftermath of their investigations 
into Mompesson’s offences: C.D. ii, pp.412, 426; iii, pp.131-4.
2
C.D. iv, p. 107. It is interesting that Fÿm’s careful determina­
tion appears even at this early stage in this, the first Parliament 
in which he sat. In the course of his speech he outlined the three 
stages of justice to which a guilty man was liable - inquisition of 
the fact, judgment, execution of judgment - and said that only in 
the third is there room for mercy: C.D. iv, p. 110. Speakers subse­
quently made much of the similarity of the names of Mompesson and 
Empson.
^ His patent, like Michell’s, had been condemned by the committee: 
C.J. i, p.530; CgD. ii, p.l45.
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Commons could inflict upon him. Coke pointed out that they could
do no more than punish him for an indignity to the House and send
him to the Tower, but the suggestion implicit in the mention of
Empson was that imprisonment was too good for him.^ Again, doubts
had been raised about the legality of the Commons* action against 
2
Michell; and finally, the House might understandably have been 
worried about the nature of the King’s reaction to a repetition of 
its earlier proceedings but on this occasion with a more important 
victim. Some of those considerations may have lain behind Sackville ’ s 
suggestion, made before Coke spoke again, that the Commons should 
collaborate with the Lords in Mompesson’s punishment. This proposal 
met some opposition, but the House did agree to a suggestion of Sir 
Edwin Sandys that a search be made of the records in the Tower to 
determine the extent of the Commons’ powers.^ By the moment, later 
in the day, when Coke rose to speak again, there were therefore 
several reasons to persuade him to leave the choice of action as open
^ Relf, op. cit.. p.xiii.
2
C.D. vi, p.431. Michell, writing afterwards to vindicate
himself, discussed it in terms which Floyd’s case later made familiar: 
"I conceived that howse had no power of Judicature, and I being no 
member of the howse that they could not comitt me". He also drew 
attention to what he obviously believed to be procedural innovations: 
as he had not made a confessiog, he had expected the Commons, before 
censuring him, to require evidence from at least two witnesses. He 
had also assumed that he would be given an opportunity to speak before 
judgment was pronounced against him: Harleian MS 158, f.229.
3 C.D. ii, p.146; iv, p.111.
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as possible. His speech made a deliberate distinction between the 
cases of Michell and Mompesson. He defended the Commons* punishment 
of Michell on the grounds that Michell, although having committed his 
offence while Parliament was not in session, had defended his action 
before the Commons after this had been condemned. He had thus 
offended the House and had been punished for so doing.^ Mompesson 
had not done this and the Commons must therefore consider what power
they possessed independently of the Lords. He accordingly proposed
2
a search for precedents. When Coke had finished speaking a committee 
of twelve was appointed, on Pym’s suggestion, to examine the particu­
lars of Mompesson*8 offences, and two of its members, Noy and 
Hakewill, were sent to the Tower to carry out the search, "to show 
how far, and for what offences, the power of this House doth extend 
to punish delinquents against the State as well as those who offend 
against this House".^ Seymour once again raised the question of
C.D. vi, pp.14-15. If, as suggested above (p. 141 ), this was 
not the whole reason for Michell*s punishment, it may be that it was 
at this moment that the Commons began their withdrawal to a more 
defensible position: S.R. Gardiner, The History of England from the
Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1^03-42 (London, 
189^-1901), iv, pp.43-4. See also Kenyon, op. cit., p.93#
2 The suggestion appears to have originated with Sir Robert 
Phelips but Coke gave it firmer support than Gardiner suggested:
C.D. iv, p.Ill; V, P.26O; vi, pp.14-15. Cf. Gardiner, op. cit., 
iv, pp.43-4.
^ C&D. ii, p.146; Nicholas, op. cit.. p.l03. It will be 
remembered (see p. 14Iabove) that Phelips had asserted that Michell’s 
offence was against the country, not merely the House.
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examining the referees and received the support of Cranfield.
Mompesson then made a confession in which he named the referees and 
was, apparently, placed on his honour to remain at home until reiguired 
again.
The following day Noy and Hakevdll reported to the committee about 
their seai'ch in the Tower. We do not know exactly what they said, but 
it seems probable that they stated that the House lacked power to 
punish ary except those v;ho offended it. The present grievance was, 
of course, harmful to the interests of the community, not merely to 
those of the House; and the committee concluded that Monpesson had 
been the author of "no Offence against our particular House, or any 
Member of it, but a general Grievance". Coke then addressed the 
committee on the subject of the Commons* powers. In this speech, 
already analysed in some detail,^ he drev/ a distinction between the 
matters of fact, which were tried in the Commons, and the judicature 
for which the House had "often resorted to the Lords". He said that 
sometimes the Commons had merely presented the case to the Lords, some­
times they had been made a party to it, and sometimes they had had sole 
cognisance of it. As a result of the committee’s work Coke proposed 
to the House that the Commons, in accordance with the precedents.
^ See pp.69-7^ above. This was the first of Coke’s two speeches 
on the subject of judicature.
^ C.D* iv, pp.115-6; Nicholas, op. cit., i, p.109.
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should address themselves to the Lords.^ The House agreed to this 
and handed Mompesson over to the serjeant for safe keeping.
The decision to go to the Lords was obviously of crucial importance:
without it, Mompesson and those who came after him would probably
have emerged virtually unscathed from the enquiries of 1621. A
number of considerations seem to have brought about this decision.
First of all, as the committee had concluded, the House alone simply
did not have jurisdiction in this type of case. There existed neither
recent experience, historical fact, nor pious legend to disprove this
finding. Secondly, Coke said that the records indicated that "on a
great and general Grievance we are to join with the Lords for the
punishing of the Offenders", while a few days later he told the Lords
2
that the case concerned them as well as the Commons. Coke, of course, 
produced precedents to support the proposal to join with the Lords, 
but the accounts of his speech give only the briefest indication of 
what he said on this aspect of the matter, Indeed, it is possible 
that he said very little: perhaps the power to go to the Lords was
sufficiently well known and needed little proof. However, he did 
claim that relevant evidence survived from the time of Edward I to 
that of Henry VI, but the Commons Journal suggests that he made only
^ CjD. ii, pp.148-9; iv, p.llé.
 ^Nicholas, op. cit.. i, p.108; C.D. ii, p.158. On 1 March, 
Hakewill reported that, in the committee’s view, the case should have 
a full hearing by both houses: Nicholas, i, p.112.
148
a passing reference to what might, presumably, have been his richest 
quarry: "In Ed. Ill time (a most happy Time) ad judicata Parliament.
It is probable that another reason why the Commons decided to approach 
the Lords was that they believed that the peers were willing and able 
to act in the matter. Yet it is difficult to be certain of this. 
Contacts between a few members in both Houses certainly seem to have 
developed as the session progressed, but it is hardly possible to say 
at what stage they became really useful.'" On the other hand, on 3 
March Coke did tell the Lords that they had power to punish Mompesson 
and he was to dwell on the same theme in his speech on the four types 
of judicature less than a week later. ^ It does not seem unreasonable 
to conclude that the Commons resolved to join with the Lords because
C.J. i, p.531; Nicholas, i, op. cit.. pp.108-9. Curiously, if
the accounts summarise fairly. Coke gave most attention to the case of
Speaker Thorpe in 32 Henry VI. Thorpe had apparently been imprisoned 
at the instance of the Duke of York, and the Lords had confirmed the 
sentence. The Commons complained to the Lords that they had been
deprived of their Speaker, but the judges, whom the Lords consulted,
said that his offence was too great for Parliamentary privilege to 
protect him. The Commons therefore had to choose another Speaker. 
Coke’s comment on the case is "... this was done by our joining with 
the Lords": Nicholas, i, p.109; Rot. Pari, v, pp.239-40.
 ^Keif, op. cit.. p. XX. When Coke told the Commons that they
must address themselves to the Lords, he also said that he was glad
that relations within the House, with the Lords, and with the King 
were happy. One wonders how far this was wishful thinking or whether 
he already had reason to believe that the Lords would give the Commons 
a fair hearing. If he had, this confidence was not shared by Rich 
who, to reserve the liberty of the Commons, proposed that if the
Lords would not join with them the Commons should punish Mompesson
themselves: C.D. ii, p.148; iv, p.ll6.
5 C.D. ii, p. 158.
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they believed that the peers possessed the power which they realised 
they themselves lacked.
The vital decision to go to the Lords was taken on 28 February, 
but the first fruitful contact between the Houses, at which the Commons 
asked for a conference, did not take place until 3 March. There is 
some evidence that this delay was, at least in part, the result of an 
intrigue involving the Court. On 1 March Bacon wrote to the King 
in reply to a letter which he had received from James on the previous 
day. Bacon’s reply makes it clear that the King had warned him of 
the Commons* intention to go to the Lords about Mompesson. Because 
of this warning Bacon had met the Prince and the Lord Treasurer shortly 
after 7 a.m. that morning, such an hour being chosen to avoid notice. 
The meeting had decided that the Commons should be told that time 
would be required to prepare an answer so that the proposed conference 
might be more fruitful. According to Bacon’s letter messengers 
appeared from the Commons on 1 March (presumably to ask for the prelim­
inary meeting) but "as good luck was" Bacon had just adjourned the 
Lords to 3 March. The motion of adjournment had been proposed, in 
all innocence, by the Archbishop of Canterbury, but Bacon had done 
nothing to hinder its adoption. Bacon adds gleefully that many lords 
would have liked an immediate recall but that was not possible. If 
therefore it was the government’s intention to manufacture a delay 
this had come about quite legitimately, without the need to resort
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to the rather transparent excuse devised at the early morning meeting.^ 
However, no hint of discomfiture appears in the arrangements made 
by the Commons during the three days after 28 February. On 1 March 
the House agreed that Coke, the privy councillors, the committee 
responsible for collecting the evidence, and anyone else who so wished, 
should be sent to the Lords on 3 March to request them to join "with 
us after the fashion of former tymes" to punish Mompesson. The 
following day instructions were given to the delegation: care was
to be exercised over the presentation and content of the message; 
subservient language - "words of dutie" - was not to be used because 
both Houses were counsellors in Parliament; Coke was to deliver the 
message orally although he had it written down; Mompesson was to be 
described as having dishonoured the King and state. At the same time 
evidence against Mompesson was still being collected and the committee
J. Spedding, The Letters and the Life of ïYancis Bacon, vii, 
pp.189-90. One is still left wondering what the government hoped to 
gain. Such a delay would certainly not stop the Commons in their 
tracks but it is perhaps not wholly without significance that Mompesson 
escaped on 3 March, only minutes before he was due to appear before 
the Commons again. If the delay was to enable him to make prepara­
tions for his escape he left matters dangerously late. Perhaps, like 
Strafford in l6ifl, he could not believe that his protectors would 
permit the situation to deteriorate so disastrously. He certainly 
hoped that Buckingham would be able to obtain details in writing of 
the charges against him: G.D. v, p#22; vi, p.28; S.R. Gardiner, ed.,
Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords, officially taken by Henry 
Elsing. Clerk of tlie Parliaments. ÀD. 1^21 (London, 1870^ ; Camden 
Society no. ciii), p.150. It has been suggested that Bacon was also 
behind the disruption of the Commons* proceedings on 8 March: D.H.
Willson, The Privy Councillors in the House of Commons. 1604-29 
(Minneapolis, 1940), p.15In.
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was examining the patent of gold and silver thread.^
This steady development was interrupted by the news of Mompesson*s 
escape from the serjeant’s supervision. When, therefore, the 
Commons* representatives met the Lords to request a conference Coke 
also asked for their help in apprehending Mompesson. Coke gained 
the Lords* assent to both requests, telling them that the conference 
was a method hallowed by precedent and that they had an interest and 
power in the redress. The conference was arranged for the following 
Monday, the Lords exhibiting considerable pleasure at the notion.^
Coke undertook to arrange matters to cause least trouble to the Lords 
and returned, with his associates, to report to the lower House. The 
Commons then expelled Mompesson from his seat in the House ani 
arranged for the examination of two further sources of evidence,
Michell and the ex-Attorney General Yelverton, both of whom were
^ CjD. V, pp.17, 19, 266, 268; vi, pp.25-6.
2
He escaped through the window of his wife *s closet and fled to 
the Continent. Arthur Wilson says that this was with Buckingham*s 
connivance: Nichols, op. cit.. iv, p.660 n.3* Camden says that
Buckingham forsook him at this time: The Annals of Mr William Camden
in the Reign of King James I. In J. Hughes and W. Kennett, eds.,
A Complete History of England; with the Lives of all the Kings and 
Queens thereof (London. 170^). ii, P.^5^.
 ^The Prince was "verie forward** against Mompesson. Was this 
genuine? Buckingham also protested his innocence in dealings with 
Mompesson, blaming the referees who misled him; C.D. v, pp.22, 270. 
Although Monday was 5 March, the conference did not take place until 
the 8th.
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imprisoned in the Tower. ^
The examination of Yelverton bore interesting fruit. He was in
the Tower as a result of revelations by Buckingham of illegalities in
2
his conduct as Attorney General. He had been one of the referees 
when the patent of gold and silver thread was established and he was 
now to be questioned about his part in imprisoning people whose 
attitude to that patent had offended Mompesson. Yelverton provided 
evidence of unjust imprisonment, implicating Buclcingham*s brother, 
Edward, but excluding the favourite himself, and claimed that he had 
passed the patent against his better judgment because of fear and 
threats.^ The report of these revelations to the Commons led Sir 
Henry Vane to renew the proposal to examine the referees. He made it 
clear that he did not believe that the Commons could punish the great 
but that his suggestion would enable the Commons to examine matters so 
that "the King may have his dew honor". The House referred his motion 
for consideration by the committee examining Yelverton.^
The examination was to be conducted by Coke, Cranfield, Phelips, 
and Sackville: R.F. Williams, ed., The Court and Times of James the
First, ii, p.233.
^ Nichols, op. cit.. ii, p.703.
 ^He claimed that at the insistence of Edward Villiers, ^ o  had 
invested £4000 in the venture. Bacon had imposed sentences of 
imprisonment. This situation encouraged Mompesson and Michell to 
break into men's houses and seize their properly : Nicholas, op. cit..
i, pp.138-9; C.D. vi, p.311.
^ CjD. vi, p.51; CjJ. i, p.539.
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On the same day, 5 March, Hakewill reported the advice given
by the committee on the procedure to be followed in the forthcoming
conference with the Lords. The matter was to be discussed under
six heads and each of these was to be the responsibility of one man.
After debate the House accepted this advice and the speakers were
agreed to.^ Cranfield warned the House that the conference should
2
be asked to consider only what was both important and proved.
By this time the peers had begun to take an active interest in 
the case and both Houses were concerned with the accumulation of yet 
more evidence. Bacon reported to the Lords on 5 March the search 
and seizure of papers concerned with the thread patent found in the 
office used J>y the patentees and in the houses of Mompesson and Michell, 
and shortly afterwards the House granted a Commons* request to hand 
over either this or similar evidence to them. On the 7th the Commons 
had a full debate on the patents and eventually pronounced them
The heads were: introduction, abuses of inns and hostelries,
gold and silver thread patent, concealments, aggravation of these, 
precedents for the course taken; C.D. ii, pp.163-4. Those chosen 
were, respectively, Digges, Crew, Heneage Finch, Hakewill, Edwin 
Sandy8, Coke. was to assist with concealments: ibid.. ii,
pp.170-1.
2
E.R. Foster points out that by insisting that charges sent to 
the Lords be fully proved and that judgment be based on the charges 
presented, the Commons "were raising their role from mere informers 
to partakers in the act of judicature itself": 'Patents and Monopolies',
loc. cit.. pp.73# 83 n.l02.
 ^The Lords Journal has a blank in place of the name of another 
whose house was searched: L.J. iii, p.3&. No one seems to have
suggested that these activities of the Lords might compromise their 
position as judges.
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illegal in inception, grant, progress and execution.^
The House had now reached the eve of the conference which 
represented its real hope of scoring a decisive victory over the mono­
polists and even of reducing some of the arrogant self-assurance of 
the men who lurked in the shadows behind them. Nevertheless, the 
prospect did not look too unhealthy to one of these very men. Writing 
to Buckingham on the day before the conference Bacon said that he did 
not expect it to be troublesome over the matter of referees. Cranfield 
was not intending to meddle in this and most members of the Commons 
seemed to agree with him. Bacon's only source of anxiety was Coke and
he told Buckingham that he believed that a warning would silence him,
2
though it would have to come from no one but the King. One wonders 
whether Cranfield, previously one of the most determined advocates of 
boldness in dealing with the referees, had already received a warning.^
C.D. ii, pp.174-6. The way was therefore clear for naming the 
referees. The debate was perhaps fuller than the government's critics 
intended. Spielman believes that the courtiers* resistance success­
fully prevented a full rehearsal of the following day's conference.
If so this may help to explain the confusion on the 8th: Spielman,
op. cit., p.31.
2
Spedding, op. cit.. vii, pp.191-2.
 ^On 2 March he had addressed the House on the limits of its power. 
He said that it had no power to determine the jurisdiction of the 
courts: this belonged to the King. The Commons could enquire and
complain but only the King could reform, Alford disagreed with him, 
saying that the jurisdiction of courts wi^ s to be limited by Parliament: 
C.D. V, p.20, Cranfield*s attacking methods seem also to have been 
used against him. Locke wrote to Carleton on 3 March that he had 
admitted to abuses in his court - but had claimed that these were much
more numerous in Chanceiy; C.S.P.Dom. 1619-23. p.231. If he did
receive such a warning its effect quickly wore off (see below) but 
Cranfield harboured a deep re seniment towards Bacon and took pride
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Bacon's optiinism was, at first at least, justified. The Commons
met the Lords on 8 March in the Painted Chamber and the presentation
of the evidence took place as planned. Coke closed the conference
with his long speech on the fom:' types of judicature exercised in
Parliament. He stressed the right of the Lords to judge ?/ithout the
King, undoubtedly to convince them that they were justified in trying
Mompesson.^ But not one of the speeches mentioned the referees. VtTien,
on the following day, the Commons held a post mortem on the conference,
great anger was exhibited at this omission and the speakers did their
2
best to excuse themselves. Cranfield returned to his normal theme,
in the part he played in his ruin: C.D. Bowen, Francis Bacon (London, 
1963), p . 12|_6; M. Prestwich, Cranfield. Politics and Profits under 
the Early Stuarts, p.287. Such warnings were not unknown in Î621:
both Sandys were threatened by Cranfield and Sir Dudley Digges was 
probably warned by the Court: D.H. Willson, Privy Councillors, p. 158.
^ Relf, op. cit. , xiv-xv. For an analysis of Coke's speech, see 
pp.70-74 above. Miss Relf considers that Coke's advocacy of the Lords'
power to judge alone exceeded "arything justified by medieval precedent". 
However, he may not have exaggerated as greatly as she suggests: most
(but not all) of his precedents in support of this judicature are taken 
from the Good Parliament of 1376, when, with Edward III senile and the 
Black Prince dying, the judicature v/as, for all practical purposes, 
vested in the Lords alone.
2
It seems impossible to know exactly wliy this omission occurred.
The committee dealing with Mompesson*s case may or may not have 
recommended that the referees be mentioned, though if it did Bacon's 
optimism is surprising (but it may not, perhaps, have reached its 
decision until after Bacon's letter to Buckingham was written). In 
the feverish and incomplete preparations in the Commons on the 8th, 
just before the conference, Mallory proposed that the referees be 
named, but the Speaker either did not hear or did not want to hear, 
and, according to all but one account, he adjourned the House without 
putting the question. Because of this the Commons* speakers could 
justly claim that they had received no authority to mention the
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maintaining that if the referees were not involved all the blame for 
the grant would fall upon the King, and the House agreed to request 
another conference with the Lords at which the omission might be 
repaired.^
Coke carried this request to the Lords who consented to a further
conference to be held on 10 March and the Commons arranged for their
speakers to be sent back to the Lords then "with theyre lesson
punctually set downe to them what to say". James at this point seems
to have made two further attempts to divert the danger implicit in
this decision. He asked the Commons to postpone the conference because
it would delay discussion of the subsidy, and received an assurance
2
that this would not happen. He also addressed the Lords before the 
conference on 10 March, apparently in an attempt to impose his 
guidance upon the forthcoming developments. He spoke of the procedure
referees whose names they did not officially know. It is, however, 
clear from the indignation aroused that many members had expected the 
subject to be raised and in a letter to Mead, on 9 March, his anon­
ymous correspondent actually aaid that the Lords and Commons had met 
the previous day to consider the punishment of monopolists and 
referees. Camden said that the Commons complained that the members 
sent to the Lords "acted deceitfully, and prevaricated": Camden,
op. cit., p.636; C,D. ii, P.I7I; V, p.282; Williams, op, cit., ii,
p.233.
^ C,D, ii, p,202; C,J, i, p.547; Nicholas, op, cit.. i, p,137. 
On 10 March Chamberlain wrote to Carleton that the Commons were not 
willing to spare the referees "be they never so great", A comparison 
with his opinion only eleven days previously (see p.l37 n.l above) 
provides an interesting yardstick of the Commons' achievement in this 
vital matter: McClure, op, cit,. ii, p,330,
2 McClure, op. cit.. ii, pp.330-2; C.D, ii, p.203.
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in cases of the Mompesson type, stating that the Commons should act 
as accusers and the Lords as judges. "The accusers are to lead, but 
it must either be confessed or proved by witnesses. Accusers are 
good informers but bad judges. The clamor must be well proved other­
wise it is a Caluffiie."^  James also commented upon the use of 
precedents. These were valuable but he had warned Coke to use only 
those arising in the reigns of good Kings, not weak ones. He tried 
to draw the sting from Yelverton*s accusations by describing him as 
a rash attorney whom he had been compelled to dismiss, and, as a logical 
extension, he defended Buckingham. However, he encouraged the Lords 
to proceed with the matter of Mompesson - giving him a fair trial and
not accepting the Commons* legal opinions too uncritically - but not
2
to spend too much time on him. The King also showed that he was not 
prepared to protect Bacon or Mandeville, whom the Commons were shortly 
afterwards to name as referees; but he did distinguish between 
punishment of persons and examination of the legality of patents.
Relf, op. cit., p.14. Attention must be drawn to James* 
reference to "clamor". Is he thinking in the same terms as Hakewill 
who, a few weeks later, was to remark: "I have observed when we have 
gone to the Lords it hath been by impeachment, clamor or accusation"? 
(See p. 75- above).
2
He said that the Lords, unlike the Commons, were a court of 
record and could act as such. There was no need to search precedents 
to prove this.
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saying that the latter must be left to the judges.^ If the speech 
was an attempt to seize control of the situation and divide the Lords 
from the Commons it was not vexy successful: it contained too many
subtle changes of emphasis and revealed weaknesses of attitude that 
was to make the concessions derived ffom it lasting. The King had
made a speech which he would not have chosen to make had not the
2
pressures upon him and his favourite, Buckingham, been mounting.
The first consequence of the King's speech was that Bacon and 
Mandeville, clearly thoroughly alarmed by the King's lack of support 
for them, made grovelling and submissive speeches at the conference 
of the two Houses. To speak in this way in their own defence was 
against the orders of the House and the Lords later expressed their 
irritation by censuring both men.^ The Houses then made arrangements
Relf, op. cit.. p.14. E. de Villiers, ed., 'The Hastings Journal 
of the Parliament of 1621'. Camden Miscellany, vol. xx (London, 1953: 
Camden 3rd Series, V;ol. Ixxxiii) , pp.viii-ix. In a letter to
Carleton on 12 March Locke said that the King had thrown all blame 
on the referees: C.S.P. Pom. 1619-23, p.234.
2
M s s  Relf, op. cit.. p.xv, believes that James' speech shows 
that he disliked the ^ole proceeding on which the two Houses were 
engaged, but that he could find no grounds for objection although, as 
one of the diarists points out, Mompesson was a servant of the King:
C.D. V, p.35. Lady de Villiers, op. cit.. p.ix, however, sees the 
speech as winning for the King a tactical victory, and says that James 
believed that, if the trials were conducted on the lines he had laid 
down, the Crown had nothing to fear from the revived judicial power,
 ^de Villiers, op. cit,, pp.29-30; L.J. iii, p.42. Southampton 
and Wallden led the attack on Bacon and Mandeville: ff. 7-8 of Braye 
MS 11 which is Elsynge's first draft of the Lords Journal for the 
period 12-27 March, 1621. Mandeville tried to clear himself on the 
patent for alehouses "which was not by us (the Commons) spoken of".
As a result the Commons resolved to examine it and Noy was put in 
charge of reporting on it: C.D, iv, p,146; vi, p.54,
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for another conference, the Lords choosing twenty-four of their
number who, with the Prince, were to meet fifty members of the Commons.^
From 13 March until the Lords' sentencing of Mompesson on the
26th the two Houses met in frequent conference. Assured of the King's
encouragement the meetings made solid progress. The Commons acceded
to the Lords' request to present their evidence in writing provided
2
that this did not become a precedent. Buckingham acknowledged his 
mistakes but asked that these be excused on the ground of his youth 
and inexperience. He declared that if his brothers were found guilty 
he would be the first to condemn them.^ But the Villiers family was 
still too entrenched and the Commons were not prepared to jeopardise 
their chances of success against Mompesson by a reckless chase after 
Buckingham's brothers. Perhaps for the same reason, vhen Coke
C.D. ii, p.209. Curiously, the Lords Journal lists twenty-five 
membeps of this committee, apart from Charles: L.J. iii, p.42.
Elsynge's first draft journal for 12 March records a proposal that a 
committee of the Lords should be appointed to examine the Commons' 
evidence so that "the worlde (might know) whether the blame thereof 
(i.e. for the grievances) ought to be lay#d on the Referees of the 
sayd graunts, or uppon them whoe unduly (as yt is reported) executed 
the same". This account which was written by Elsynge on the first 
day he presided at the Table, was rejected by the Lords' sub-committee, 
and in his next draft - which he calls his first draft - this proposal 
is omitted as it is in the final Journal; Braye MS 11, ff. 1-13;
Braye MS 69, ff. 2-2v (the rejected draft); L.J. iii, p.42.
 ^Coke said that in all conferences between the Lords and Commons, 
business had always been transacted orally: Nicholas, op. cit., i,
p.167.
^ C.D. ii, pp.212, 227.
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handed the Commons* written evidence to the Lords on 15 March he made 
little mention of the referees,^ He compared Mompesson with Empson 
and Dudley, to the detriment of Mompesson, and asked the Lords for 
condign punishment. His report ended, he received the congratulations 
of both Prince Charles and the Commons. The Lords then appointed 
three committees to examine Mompesson*s patents, one each for inns, 
gold and silver thread, and concealments, and arranged that these 
should examine witnesses on oath because their evidence before the 
Commons had not been sworn. As some of these witnesses were members 
of the Commons, and others its prisoners, the lower House at first 
found the Lords* intention unpalatable: if the evidence they had
collected required confirmation on oath this reduced their status.^
Ibid., ii, pp.227ff; vi, p.66. But their names were handed
to the Lords, contrary to what Gardiner said: itoid. . ii, p.230; vi,
p.66; Gardiner, History, iv, pp.53-5. Gardiner believed that the 
Commons* change of attitude was due to the King’s conversion to 
support for their proceedings under the influence of Williams, Dean 
of Westminster. But was this the main reason for the change? The 
referees, as referees, had always looked fairly secure and since the 
uncovering the day before of another type of evidence - of corruption • 
against Bacon there was perhaps less reason for the continuation of 
the rather forlorn hunt (see p.169 below). Furthermore, if the bill 
against monopolies, which was then under discussion in the Commons, 
went through, there was less cause to worry about referees as such.
Two days earlier Buckingham had ridiculed those who doubted 
Coke: C.D. vi, p.381.
 ^I^. iii, pp.46-7; C.D. vi, p.70. That this mi^t lead to an 
awkward situation was shown later when Davenport made accusations 
against Field which he was unprepared to repeat, on oath, before the 
Lords. Chamberlain said that there was a suspicion that the matter 
of witnesses was being used to break the amity between the Houses; 
McClure, op. cit.. ii, p.355.
I6l
Brooke maintained that the Commons acted as a grand jury for the whole
commonwealth, and that it was therefore improper to require oaths of
members. Coke objected to the Lords* request on the ground that,
as judges of fact, members should not be sworn as witnesses. Hakewill
suggested unsuccessfully that precedents be examined; and the debate
meandered along in a fashion which revealed how uncertain the House
was of its position.^ Eventually, it was persuaded to consent to
the attendance of witnesses at the Lords by a calmly practical speech
from Sir Edwin Sandys:
The Question before us was of the Pattents and the Projects, 
which we have adjudged to be greivances both in the originall 
and in the execution. The Question before the Lords is of 
the punishment, which may reache to life, and God forbid 
they showld proceede 'upon an implicite faith of the 
examinacions taken by us without oathe. (2)
Sandys also challenged Brooke's point about the grand jury, pointing
out that it was well known that a grand jury's verdict did not lead
to condemnation without further trial. Eventually, a compromise was
reached: witnesses who were members said that they were prepared to
take the oath as private individuals so that no order of the Commons
was required on this issue. In consequence, the argument about the
Commons' jurisdiction died down for the time being, and a few days
later in a message of appreciation to the Lords for their concern in
^ L.J. iii, p.48; C.D. iv, p.162; v, p.303; vi, p.70; CjJ. 
i, pp.557-8.
^ C.D. iv, p.163.
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examining grievances the lower House specifically thanked them for
"giving the Oath unto the Examinants, which they cannot do".^
However, this was neither the first nor the last time that this
issue was debated. Bound up as it was with the question whether or
not the Commons were a court of record, the power to administer an
oath was central to any discussion of the jurisdiction of the House.
The right was vigorously claimed and as vigorously denied. In I6IO
a committee had been appointed to consider whether the Commons possessed
the right. In the middle of February l621 Coke had explained why
the House could not administer an oath - "because Nothing should be
brought before them but that which is Notorious and knowne"; and in
the debate just discussed Gianviile gave another explanation: as the
House was the representative body of the realm it was "not to be
presumed to be ignorant of the affaires of the countrie". Later in
the session, after the Floyd affair, Samuel Sandys claimed that the
House might administer an oath in examining matters which were within
its cognisance; and in I624 Edwin Sandys repeated this but
acknowledged that there was an unresolved doubt about the existence
of such power in areas where the Commons lacked the right to give a 
2
final judgment. That the right to use an oath was for so long a
^ I^. iii, p.61.
2
Foster, 'Patents and Monopolies', loc. cit.. pp.82-3 n.63;
C.D. V, p.46; vi, P.43O; Nicholas, op. cit.. ii, p.49; E.R.Foster, 
Proceedings in Parliament. I6IQ. ii, p.36l.
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matter of debate is a measure both of the Commons* growing judicial 
authority and of their frustration.
To return to Mompesson. Once the question of re-examination 
of witnesses had been settled the Lords* committees were able to 
proceed with their work and by 22 March the Commons* accusations 
against Mompesson were declared sufficiently proved for the peers to 
sentence him. They reserved the right to deal, after the Easter 
recess, with Michell and the patentees for gold and silver thread, but 
hurried on arrangements for completing the Mompesson case so that the 
extent of Parliament's justice might become known.^ The Lords
appointed a committee to survey the precedents of "Judicature, Accusa­
tions, and Judgments", and this almost certaindy took the expert
2
opinion of John Selden who was employed by the House at this time.
L.J. iii, p.63. Michell was associated with Mompesson in the 
thread patent, as well as being commissioner for enforcing the patent 
for recognisances of alehouses, so that if the case against him were 
to be kept alive the examination of the thread patent had to remain 
open. In fact, all these investigations continued after the recess, 
bringing under scrutiny the activities of men like Fowle and Geldard, 
agents and associates of Michell and Mompesson. Fowle was examined 
by the Lords on a complaint which the peers said had been transmitted 
to them by the Commons ; but there seems to be no evidence that the 
Commons had resolved on this or that they had sent Fowle himself to 
the Lords - as the peers also claimed: L.J. iii, pp.63, 65, 91, 92,
123; Gardiner, Debates, 1621. p.24.
L.J. iii, p.65. The committee reported on the day it was
appointed, presenting the Lords with a list of precedents. This
named Sir John Maltravers, Borges de Bayons, John Deverill, Thomas
Gurney and William Ogle (from 1330), Sir John Lee (1368), and William
Latimer and Richard lyons (1376); and a note in the manuscript
indicates that other cases were also reported; Braye BS 11, f. 105.
The cases from 1330 illustrate action by the Lords on capital offences. 
The Commons evidently took no part in these cases, "vdiich, interestingly.
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On 26 March the King addressed the Lords, giving his consent to the
sentencing of Mompesson. The House then debated the punishment and
considered the precedents now presented to it. Empson*s indictment
was read but Charles carried the peers with him when he said that the
precedent was irrelevant: Empson had been indicted for treason and
his trial had been before commissioners in the country, not the Lords.
Mandeville, the Lord Treasurer, then proved that none of the actions
of which Mompesson stood accused was more than a misdemeanour and he
proposed a punishment which the House debated and then adopted.^
Meanwhile the Commons had been discussing their own part in the
punishment of Mompesson, citing precedents to show whether they merely
had a right to be present, or to be present and to demand judgment,
or even to insist on an increase in a sentence vhich they found 
2
inadequate. When the summons came to them to attend in the House 
of Lords they demanded judgment through the Speaker.^ Mompesson was
appeal’ here in exactly the same order as they do in Selden*s work. The 
Priviledges of the Baronage of England, which was composed at this time,
^ Relf, op. cit., pp.42ff.
The precedents were all drawn from 1376: Neville, Peach,
Latimer. According to HalceTd.ll the Commons had demanded an increase 
in Latimer's punishment: C.D. ii, p.268; iv, p.200; v, p.323;
Nicholas, op. cit., i, p.228. I have found no evidence that the
Commons formally demanded judgment or that they asked for an increase 
in Latimer's sentence, although they were, of course, active in all 
three cases.
 ^Chamberlain felt that the Commons were present merely to give 
their assent and were summoned purely out of courtesy; McClure,
op. cit., ii, p.357.
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sentenced to fine and outlawry. He was excluded from office,
banished from the King's presence, his Court and the law courts, and
exempted from apy general pardon. He was degraded from knighthood
and was to suffer life imprisonment when found.^ To mark the day
it was proposed not only that sermons should be preached at each
anniversary, but that brass statues should be raised to the King and
Prince. Part of the following day was spent in mutual congratulation 
2
and thanks. The King approved the sentence and used the opportunity 
provided by an address from the Commons to ask for an increased 
subsidy. Earlier Coke had grumbled that the patent of concealments 
had not been judged, but in the goodwill and satisfaction of the royal
Selden claimed that, by the precedents, the procedure adopted 
was faulty. As Mompesson had fled proclamations should have been 
sent out that he must appear on a certain day, or a (specified) 
judgment would be given against him. He gave precedents for this 
and suggested that the failure to do so stemmed from the long disuse 
of the judicature of Parliament; Of the Judicature in Parliaments, 
pp.90-1, 95# The procedure of issuing a proclamation was followed 
during the impeachment of Sir Thomas Mortimer in 1397.
An interesting sidelight on the novelty of the proceedings 
against Mompesson is provided by Elsynge who was clearly worried 
about how these should be entered in the Lords Journal. He had 
only recently become Clerk of the Parliaments: House of Lords Main
Papers, 4-27 April, 1621, f. 22.
Gardiner saw the sentence on Mompesson as an indirect censure 
on James. Buckingham's action in excusing himself from attendance 
at the sentencing perhaps ^ends support to this view: Gardiner,
History, iv, p.84; L.J. iii, p.71. Charles had protested against
degrading Mompesson, maintaining that only the King might impose this
punishment: Relf, op. cit., p.45.
 ^Self, op, cit.. p.49; CjJ, i, p.576. Brooke and Montagu in
the Commons thought that the Lords had been thanked sufficiently.
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audience the House made no mention of this and members adjourned 
happily for the Easter recess. Three days later the King, by 
proclamation, cancelled the patents of thread, inns and alehouses.^
The trial of Mompesson marked the revival of Parliamentary 
judicature. Although this process had lain unused for so mary years, 
its resurrection was achieved with remarkably little difficulty. 
Mompesson was probably a very suitable victim - neither so important 
that the proceedings would suffer from undue interference, nor so 
unimportant that they would pass unnoticed. Subsequent trials, both 
in 1621 and later, would exhibit significant procedural changes, but 
the trial of Mompesson had established a precedent which did not have 
the disadvantage of being two and a half centuries old.
When Selden wrote about this case in his treatise Of the Judicature
in Parliaments he said "The Commons accused and impeached by word of
Mouth Sir Giles Mompesson...", but later he indicates that the
2
proceedings were conducted ex parte regis. Now it will be remembered 
that, when both Selden and Elsynge drew a distinction between 
impeachment and complaint, they said that in cases of the first the 
suit belonged to the Commons and in the second to the King.^ Selden
^ C.D. iv, p.207; C.S.P. Dorn. 1619-23. p.241.
p
Selden, Of Judicature, pp.30, 63.
^ See pp. 61-2; above. According to Selden, the suit also 
belonged to the King in cases where the Commons presented information.
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therefore seems to have had some difficulty in classifying Mompesson* s 
case, which does not fit easily into either of his categories, and 
as will be seen he faced similar problems with Middlesex. Unfortun­
ately, the records of 1621 are of no help in classifying the first 
case of Parliamentary judicature - or indeed any other. Coke's two 
speeches on judicature appear to testify to the existence of more than 
one method of association between the Commons and Lords, but there is 
no evidence that he ever stated which method was used to deal with 
the cases in which he played such an important part. The veiy full 
records of this Parliament contain no indication that any member ever 
said that Mompesson was being impeached; Coke and Hakewill both refer 
to the Commons' complaints against him, but whether they were using 
the word in its general or technical sense seems impossible to say.^ 
For the moment, therefore, it will probably be as well to resist 
the temptation to classify this case, especially as it is at least 
possible that members, concerned with results rather than careful
C.J. 1, p.576; C.D. ii, p.188. Hakewill began his speech to 
the Lords at the conference on 8 March with the words: "There is
another complaint against Sir Giles Mompesson ...": C.D. ii, p.188.
On 26 March, Coke supported the view that the Commons were entitled 
to demand judgment from the Lords and said "... where the Commons 
complain to the Lords, they judge it; and the Commons present":
C.J. i, p.576; Nicholas, op. cit., i, p.229c
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distinctions, would have been unable or unwilling to do so them­
selves. Nevertheless, we can at least think twice before assuming 
that this case marked the revival of impeachment.
By the time that Mompesson's punishment was pronounced the 
Commons had become deeply involved in the pursuit of a veiy important 
victim. Francis Bacon was not only Lord Chancellor and, as such, 
identified with the enemies of the common law; he was also one of 
the King's close advisers, a friend of Buckingham, and the owner of 
an intellect which repelled as many as it attracted. \Yhen the 
Parliament of 1621 opened he seemed completely out of the reach of 
his enemies and the sniping at the referees had brought him little 
nearer their grasp. The means which led to Bacon's ruin was the 
Commons' committee appointed to investigate abuses in courts of justice, 
On 8 February Cranfield had proposed the creation of such a committee
but although this was done it speedily lapsed until he proposed its
2
revival on 12 March. On this occasion his brainchild proved to be
A statement of Cotton's provides another type of warning: "To
infer, that because the Lords pronounced the sentence, the point of 
Judgment should be only theirs, were as absurd, as to conclude that 
no authority was left in aiy other Commissioner of Oyer and Terminer, 
than in the person of that man solely that speaketh the Sentence":
R. Cotton, Cottoni Posthuma; Divers Choice Pieces of that Renowned 
Antiquary Sir Robert Cotton (London, 1^5l), p.352*
^ C.D. ii, pp.22, 44; vi, p.55. He had suggested investigations 
into the administering of justice on 5 February.
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tougher and the world into which it was born better equipped to
sustain it. Animosity tov/ards Bacon had been growing and on 14
March the answer to the prayers of those who wanted to destroy the
referee appeared in the form of evidence of corruption in the judge.^
This very soon showed itself to be a more hopeful line of attack.
The first evidence came from Christopher Aubrey and Edward Egerton
who claimed that, in the hope of speeding up Chancery suits in which
they were involved, they had given Sir George Hastings and Sir Robert
Yonge, two of Bacon's servants and both members of the Commons, sums
2
of money intended for Bacon. Egerton had also entered into an 
arrangement with Dr Theophilus Field, once Bacon's chaplain, now 
Bishop of Llandaff and a friend of Buckingham, and with Randolph 
Davenport, one of Bacon's Chancery officials. The plan was that 
Field was to persuade Buckingham to write a letter to Bacon to ask
On 25 February Mead had written "It is said, that there are mary 
bills ready to be put up against my lord chancellor", and there is a 
hint that the real reason for Sackville *s removal from reporting the 
proceedings in the committee for courts of justice was his refusal 
to report complaints received against Bacon: Williams, op. cit.. ii,
p.232; C.D. V, p.258. But for Sackville see Prestwich, op. cit.. 
pp.292-4 . Mrs. Prestwich states that Bacon and Sackville were 
relentless enemies throughout 1621 but she also points out Sackville's 
ability to change sides rapidly.
If Cranfield did not foresee what the Ôommittee might uncover 
his motions were remarkably well favoured.
 ^C.D. ii, pp.224-5; iv, p. 155. Edward Egerton*s dispute was 
with a distant relative, Roland Egerton, over land left by the will 
of Sir John Egerton, Roland's father. Roland had obtained letters 
of administration from Sir John Bennet, another of the men presented 
by the Commons to the Lords in l621: L.J. iii, pp.56-7.
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him to hurry along Egerton*s suit. Field was to receive £6^00 
when Egerton received his decree. This sum was to be divided but 
Egerton did not know the names of the other participants. As a 
guarantee of his good faith Egerton immediately entered into a 
recognisance for £10,000 with Field. Both of Egerton*s schemes 
failed because Bacon gave an adverse decision and because Davenport, 
acting for Field, was unable to persuade either Buckingham or the 
King to intervene with Bacon. The committee arranged to collect 
further evidence and refused the request of Meautys, Bacon's secretary, 
for copies of the petitions against his master and of the letter, 
written by Field, which had been read to the committee.^ When Phelips 
reported to the House on 15 March he suggested that the evidence should 
eventually be sent to the Lords.
On the 16th the committee gathered further information from 
Hastings and Yonge. They described how they had told Bacon that they 
had admitted to handing him presents, and how he had replied that he 
would have to deny this. Hastings also maintained that Bacon had 
tried to divert Aubrey from handing in his petition by promising him 
a favourable decision which he had subsequently not delivered. When 
this evidence was reported some members found it too good to be true
^ C.D. ii, pp.225-6; iv, pp.156, l6l; vii, pp.578-9; L^J. iii, 
pp.53-7. Field's letter wqs described as most "dishonest in corrup­
tion": C.D. V, p.298.
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and questioned the reliability of the v/itnesses.^ In at te np ting 
to restore üieir confidence Coke argued that "you will make bribery 
to be unpunished, if he that carrieth the bribe shall not be a 
witness". The use - for the first time in this case - of the word 
bribery perhaps had its influence in persuading the Commons to accept 
their committee's recommendation that all the evidence be sent to the 
Lords.^
The committee gave three reasons for its suggestion: there were
precedents to support it, from the time of their ancestors; as a 
peer Bacon could not be dealt with by the Commons5 and the lower 
House, lacking the power to administer an oath, had no v/ay of 
discovering the truth. In the ensuing debate the Secretary suggested 
that the evidence should be shown to the King as well as to the peers, 
but most members were more concerned to discuss the manner of the 
reference to the Lords. Should the Commons simply refer petitioners 
to the upper House, or should tliey present the evidence themselves?
Hovf far should they repeat their actions in Mompesson* s case? Mir 
Recorder Pinch objected to the presentation of evidence on the ground 
that this would resemble an accusation, while Noy believed that the
C.D. ii, pp.237ff; v, pp.4-0, 44. Hastings had at first stated 
that he had hidden the purpose of the gift from Bacon. His subsequent 
evidence suggested the reverse.
 ^C.D. ii, p.242. For a discussion of Coke's apparently 
unwarranted use of this word see Spielman, op. cit., pp.39-40. Was 
its use quite unwarranted in view of Hastings' testimony about Bacon's 
reaction to Aubrey's petition?
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Commons were obliged to take the matter to the Lords but advised
his fellow members "not to deliver it as a thing certayne, as wee did
in Sir Gyles Mompessons case But as an Informacion.,.** Eventually,
as so often, it was Coke's proposal which was adopted. He urged the
House to lay the evidence before the Lords and to search for the
precedents which he believed to exist. He received the support of
the Secretary on the grounds that this would be the fairest course
for Bacon's sake and the House resolved to present the evidence orally
but without attaching to it any accusation. The temperature of the
debate had been a good deal lower than when the House had dealt with
2
Mompesson, and the decision on procedure significantly different. 
Bacon's peerage as well as the Commons* lack of jurisdiction had 
persuaded them to go to the Lords.
On the 19th the Commons requested a conference with the Lords
and replied to a message from the King about procedure. James
C.D. iv, p. 167. It may be recalled that Selden lists three ways 
in which the Commons might be associated in a case: by impeachment,
by complaint, or by information. In the last two, according to 
Selden, proceedings were conducted ex parte regis: see pp.60-62
above. According to Nicholas' account, Noy said that the Commons 
could not claim to have "found this (the evidence against Bacon) 
as a Truth, but that there is such a Clamour amongst us; and that 
we should desire their Lordships so to take this unto them, as that 
they will not exclude us": Nicholas, op. cit.. i, p.l85.
^ CjD. ii, pp.237ff; iv, pp.lôéff; i, pp.$60-1. The
Commons ignored the embittered speech of Neville who suggested that 
Bacon should have to give evidence on oath because he had denied to 
the Lords their privilege of answering in the Chancery on their 
honour; C.D. ii, p.240.
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suggested that a commission of six lords and twelve members of the 
Commons, chosen by the Houses, should examine the evidence against 
Bacon and then hand it to him for judgment. The Commons, disliking 
the proposed interference and its inherent dangers to Parliamentary 
jurisdiction, returned a cautious answer that they could make no reply
until the Lords had received the proposal, and resolved to continue
1 2 as already planned. The King never sent his message to the Lords:
another attempt at royal adjudication had failed. The conference 
took place and Phelips spoke on behalf of the Commons.^ The Lords 
agreed to examine witnesses and during the next few days, while the 
Commons' committees continued to collect evidence against Bacon to 
present to the Lords, the peers obtained the lower House's consent to 
the appearance before them and examination on oath of Yonge and 
Hastings. The Commons handed over the Bishop of Llandaff's correspon­
dence, and the Lords, to cope with the volume of evidence, appointed 
three small committees for which they drew up a list of questions to
^ C.D. ii, pp.244-3.
2
But the feeling of the Lords seems to have been against the 
proposal: ibid., vi, p.383.
^ He "made a Declaration of the Complaints against my Lord 
Chancellor and the Bishop of Llandaff". He had earlier been sent 
to ask for the conference "towching the Informacions against" Bacon 
and the Bishop! C.D. iv, p.171.
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be asked of the witnesses.^
As the evidence against him accumulated, Bacon himself attempted
to ward off at least the worst of the blow. He wrote submissively
to the Lords, and though this had no effect the House did consent to
give him notes of the general objections against him. However, he
suffered from the absence of genuine support in the Lords and even
the illness - real enough - to which he succumbed at this time caused 
2
suspicion. He also made attempts to find out where the Court stood, 
using Buckingham as his intermediary, but the only favour the King 
was prepared at this moment to show his Lord Chancellor was to ask the 
Lords to ensure that "the witnesses against him were sufficient". 
Perhaps by now the King considered the issue lost in the face of the 
Lords* determination: they had recently arranged for the protection
of their witnesses and for the continuation of the examination during 
the Easter recess; and as Parliament adjourned on 27 March political
Ibid., ii, p.246; iv, p.174; L.J. iii, p.éO; de Villiers, 
op. cit.. pp.31-2. The committees were headed by Arundel, Huntingdon 
and Southampton. A similar number of committees had been used in 
Mompesson*s case.
^ Relf, op. cit.. p.52. But Chamberlain, on 24 March, reported 
that many lords visited him each day, Buckingham being the most 
frequent visitor. However, he also said that his letter was meant 
only to gain time until the heat of the prosecution had passed: 
McClure, op. cit.. ii, p.336; C.S.P. Dorn. l6l9-23, p.240,
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observers reported little of comfort to James or Bacon.^
When the Houses reassembled on 17 April the question was not 
so much whether the Lords would pass judgment upon Bacon as how the 
last stages were to be dealt with. A mass of evidence had been heard 
by the Lords* committees during the recess: this was now reported
by the three chairmen and on 19 April they were asked to draw up a 
charge - work which in the previous case had been undertaken by the 
Commons. To accomplish it the committees amalgamated. These 
developments caused a breakdown in the defence which Bacon seems to 
have been preparing. He had drawn up a list of precedents which 
might have helped him and he could almost certainly have used at least 
one of these - that of Chief Justice Thorpe in 1331 - with effect.^
He had also seen the King and worked out a plan which would have 
involved an admission of guilt where this was unavoidable but a
Cabala, Mysteries of State, in Letters of the great Ministers 
of K. Jame8 and K. Charles (London, 1^34). pp.10-11; J.O. Halliwell, 
ed., The Autobio^aphy and Correspondence of Sir Simonds D*Ewes. Bart., 
during the reigns of James I. and Charles I (London. 1843) , i , p. 179; 
Williams, op. cit.,ii, p.243; L.J. iil, pp.67, 74. Lando reported 
that many of those nearest to the King wished that Parliament had 
never been summoned. The only sign - and this proved abortive - of 
any change in Parliamentary sympathies is Chamberlain* s remark that 
Coke * 8 popularity had declined and that his choice of precedents had 
become careless: C.S.P. Ven. l6l9-21, p.6l8* McClure, op. cit..
ii, p.338. In fact, James seems to have encouraged the Lords in their 
proceedings against Bacon: Williams, op. cit., ii, p.243; C.D. vii,
pp.390-1.
2
Thorpe had been found guilty of taking bribes and the prosecu­
tion had been based partly on his oath of office which placed heavy 
restrictions on receiving presents. Bacon’s oath of office was less
rigid in this respect: Spedding, op. cit., vii, pp.232-4.
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protestation of innocence whenever he could make a clear answer.
He had asked the King for help in obtaining a copy of the charges, 
which though not yet drawn up were clearly about to be made. The 
King, however, had merely referred his request to the Lords. Now, 
faced by a growing volume of evidence and burdened with continuing 
ill-health, he submitted to the Lords and threw himself on their 
mercy.^ He admitted the correctness of the accusations - which he 
had not seen - and hoped that loss of office would be sufficient 
punishment.
Doubtless astonished at the totality of Bacon’s submission, 
the Lords sat in silence for some time after the reading of his letter. 
They then debated two issues. They first decided that the submission 
was not a sufficient basis for a censure and that an examination of 
Bacon himself was required. This gave rise to a debate upon the 
conduct of the examination. The Lord Chamberlain suggested that the 
charges be sent to Bacon as a mark of his importance ; Lord 8aye argued 
that both de la Pole and Yelverton had attended the Lords to answer 
in person and that Bacon should do so. But eventually the House 
decided that the charges, though not the proofs, should be sent.
This was done and the following day the Lords asked Bacon whether he
L.J. iii, pp.73) 80; Spedding, op. cit., vii, pp.232-4, 240, 
242-3; de Villiers, op. cit., p.32; Cardiner, History, iv, pp.87-8; 
J. Rushworth, Historical Collections (London, 1639-1701;, i, pp.29-30. 
In his plan he had intended to do this only where he was forced to 
admit guilt: de Villiers, op. cit.. p.32.
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would, be making a confession or a defence. He replied that he would 
be confessing and was given five days in which to do so.^ He made 
his confession in writing on 30 April, by which time he had recovered 
his previous poise. He admitted most of the charges but denied a few 
and explained his actions in some cases. The House next required the 
document to be acknowledged as his own by Bacon and sent a delegation 
to him for this purpose. They also asked the King to sequester the 
Great Seal, which was done, and on 3 May sentenced Bacon in his absence. 
The sentence was debated in committee, precedents were quoted but 
little used, and the only real disagreement was over the question of 
degrading him from his peerage. When the House resumed and the 
questions were put by the Lord Chief Justice this proposal was defeated, 
but Bacon was sentenced to fine and imprisonment, exclusion from 
Parliament, Court and office. Only Buckingham voted against the 
punishments. The peers then sent a message to the Commons inviting 
them to come to demand judgment. That afternoon, "at the prayer and 
demand of the Commons by their Speaker", this was pronounced by the 
Lord Chief Justice. He said that "the Lords had duly considered of
^ Gardiner, Debates l621, pp.13, 20-21; Spedding, op. cit.. vii, 
pp. 248, 230.
2
The Lords did not examine Bacon’s replies in detail and, in 
pronouncing him guilty, made no distinction between the charges to 
which he had confessed and those which he had denied. Mompesson’s 
offences received rather more detailed examination before the Lords 
decided on his punishment: Relf, op. cit., pp.40ff; Spedding, op.
cit., vii, pp.263ff.
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the complaints presented by the Commons against the ... late Lord 
Chancellor, and have found him guilty ..." He then read out the 
Lords* sentence.^
Bacon was convicted as a taker of bribes, whatever the force of 
the deeper political reasons which spurred on the attack. Of 
corruption he was, in Parliament’s view, just as guilty as was Mompesson 
of creating grievances. But, unlike Mompes son, he had broken the law: 
the Commons had to vote Mompesson’s activities grievous, thus in effect 
creating an offence; but Bacon confessed to an offence. The two 
trials also differed in that in the case of Mompesson the Commons, by 
framing an accusation, brought it closer to completion than in that of 
Bacon where the drawing up of the accusation and the collection of much 
of the evidence wan the work of the Lords. If the Commons’ approach 
to Bacon’s case was more diffident than its bitter attack on Mompesson 
this can be explained by the difference in status of the two men and 
the early difficulty over the matter of the referees. But once the 
means for an attack on Bacon had been discovered this was pressed 
forward with determination equal to that shown in the earlier trial.
For Coke, the condemnation of Bacon must have represented a 
considerable personal triumph, yet the case receives no more than a
L'J. ill, pp.101, 102, 106; Gardiner, Debates 1621. pp.6l-4; 
C.D. ii, pp.341-2; v, p.138; C.J. i, p.606. The proposal, by Saye, 
to degrade Bacon was lost by only two votes, according to Chamberlain. 
The margin seems surprisingly small: McClure, op. cit.. ii, p.371,
The fine of £40,000 was remitted; the imprisonment very short.
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passing mention in his writings. To which of his categories of 
judicature he would have assigned it is unknown. The Commons had 
accepted that Bacon’s peerage compelled them to approach the Lords; 
and, although the position changes after 1621, the Commons’ part in 
proceedings at this time against members of the Lords was not very 
substantial. Noy’s speech in March, when he recommended that the 
Commons should merely lay information b efore the Lords, epitomised 
the tentative approach of the lower House. Furthermore, Noy was 
evidently anxious to avoid ary danger that such a course might termin­
ate the Commons* connection with the case, because he adds that, 
notwithstanding his proposal, "we will not desert (the case), but 
desire that we may repaire to their Lordshipps againe for Judgment".^
If a choice must be made between the various categories of judicature 
described by Coke in 1621 and, probably rather later, by Selden and
Elsynge, it can hardly be suggested that Bacon’s case fits into one
2
which lays much emphasis on the Commons’ share in the procedure.
The condemnation of Sir Henry Yelverton which followed shortly 
after Bacon’s fall bears more similarity to the fate of Cranfield in 
1624 than to the trial of the Lord Chancellor. Yelverton was the 
victim of his own stupidity and of the hatred of the King and Buckingham.
^ iv, p.167.
p
Selden merely describes Bacon as having been "accused" by the 
Commons: Of Judicature, p.31.
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James openly told the Lords that he expected a judgment against 
Yelverton, and his part in obtaining this was plain. If further 
evidence is needed of the lack of a court plot against Bacon it is 
provided by the sight of the royal activity against Yelverton. Unlike 
the attitudes of Bacon, those of Yelverton elicited sympathy from the 
more independent members of the Lords and yet the King did not hesitate 
to enter the lists against him. If James had been anxious to destroy 
Bacon an open attack would have been quite in order.^
Yelverton had already fallen foul of the court before the 
Parliament of 1621 opened. Early in the reign he had opposed the 
King’s Scottish policies, but in January I6IO he had expiated this 
offence and in I616 had been made Attorney General. Causing further 
offence he had been accused in the Star Chamber by Buckingham of 
illegal practices. He lost his job and was imprisoned in the Tower 
where in l621 he was awaiting his opportunity for revenge against the 
favourite. This came early in March, during the Commons* investigation
It is possible that, unknown to James, Buckingham was intriguing 
against Bacon and Mrs Bowen leans towards the view that the Duke "had 
consented to this impeachment from the first". Her source is a hint 
by Clarendon. Against this opinion must be set Buckingham’s solitary 
vote against Bacon’s punishment. He may have been protecting himself 
but, as James had hardly rushed to Bacon’s defence, there seems little 
reason for Buckingham to have gone to such lengths to disguise his 
hostility to the Chancellor, if such existed: Bowen, op. cit.. p.152.
See also Spielraan, op. cit.. pp.55-6 and n.60; C. Roberts, op. cit., 
pp.23-4. A line in a probably contemporary poem on Bacon’s fall 
should, however, be noted; "Perhaps the game of Buck, (no name), 
hath vilified the Bore": Rawlinson MS B. I5I, f.l02v.
 ^McClure, op. cit., ii, p.335; Nichols, op. cit., ii, p.703.
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of patents, when the committee sent to the Tower hea3*d from Yelverton
that his consent to what he maintained were bad patents had been
extracted from him by threats.^ On 9 March members were told that
Yelverton, among others, had signed a warrant dormant to permit search,
arrest and seizure of goods in connection with the thread patent.
The House agreed, without giving a reason, to send this piece of
evidence to the Lords, telling them that, in the Commons’ opinion,
it was against the lawy There does not seem to have been ary vote
to send Yelverton himself to the Lords, but on 18 April he was
summoned before the peers to answer the Commons’ charge that he was
responsible for imprisoning merchants who had offended against the
patent. The Lords appear to have been responsible for adding another
charge - that Yelverton had perpetrated abuses in issuing writs of
quo warranto in connection with the inns* patent. Well before this
the King had weakened his position in the case by formally handing
2
Yelverton over to the Lords to deal with, but now, angered by 
Yelverton’s defence that he had actually tried to safeguard the King’s
See p. 152 above. Yelverton was being questioned about the 
patent for gold and silver thread for which he had been one of the 
referees; C.D. ii, pp.164-6.
2
As Yelverton had been sentenced to imprisonment by the Star 
Chamber, the King’s action was presumably necessary if the Lords were 
to avoid the difficulties which had faced the Commons over Proctor.
It will be remeittbered that James protested when Proctor, who was his 
prisoner, was committed to the custody of the Commons’ serjeant for 
an offence against their privileges: see p.103 above.
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profit - and suffered imprisonment for doing so - by attempting to
control the number and the evils of patents, he announced to the Lords
that he regarded such a defence as a personal insult. Furthermore,
he strongly objected to Yelverton*s being put to answer the second
charge which he regarded as outside the scope of the investigations
vhich he had authorised the Lords to conduct. For the moment,
however, he made no attempt to take control of idie prosecution and
simply asked the Lords to punish Yelverton.^
The storm broke in eaimest on 30 April. Yelverton was required
to explain his defence. He described the threats he had received of
loss of office if he did not support the patents and, in a dramatic
outburst identifying the author of the menaces as Buckingham, warned
him: "If my Lord of Buckingham had but read the Articles exhibited in
this place against Hugh Spencer and had known the danger of placing
and displacing officers about a King he would not have pursued me
with such bitterness". After considerable interruption Yelverton
was permitted to continue and finished by asserting that he w^s ready
2
to prove all that he had said.
C.D. iv, pp.139-40; V, p.71; L.J. iii, pp. 77, 82; Rushworth, 
op. cit., i, pp.31ff. James was shown evidence that few of the writs 
of quo warranto issued by Yelverton had been completed according to 
due process of lavf: L.J. iii, p.96. It seems to have been the
inclusion of this second charge and the nature of Yelverton*s defence, 
rather than, as Gardiner suggested, the Lords* readiness to allow 
his remarks to pass unchecked, which annoyed the King; L.J. iii, 
pp.81-2; Gardiner, History, iv, p.111.
2 L.J. iii, p.121; Gardiner, Debates l621, pp.43-9.
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A critical moment had arrived in the development of Parliamentary
judicature. Yelverton was making a much wider defence than the charge
brought by the Commons required, yet he was before the House of Lords
as a result of that charge. What happened next might well be vital
to the continuance of this judicature. For the first time in the
investigation of monopolies Buckingham’s name, so long hinted at,
had been explicitly mentioned. Hints could be ignored by the Court;
this could not. Furthermore, if Buckingham could be likened to
Despenser James could be compared with Edward II, so that by extension
Yelverton*s attack on the favourite cast a shadow across the monarch.^
The government was faced vrLth tragedy: it could not win. If the
King took the examination into his own hands he would raise a storm
of protest and would be confronted with his own abandonment of
jurisdiction on 27 March; if he allowed the Lords to proceed with
the full investigation which was essential to disprove Yelverton*s
charges, this would involve the questioning of Buckin^am and an
uncomfortably close and perhaps unprecedented examination of the
2
government’s activities.
In the event, the King’s only success was against Yelverton him­
self, but this was sufficiently conspicuous to hide, to some extent, 
the gain to the Lords. Moreover, the Lords had to proceed cautiously
^ de Villiers, op. cit. , p.x.
o
D ’Ewes, op. cit., i, p.186.
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for fear of losing their advantage in an outburst of royal anger.
When, therefore, on 2 May the King told the Lords that, v/hile they 
might deal with Yelverton*s onslaught on Buckingham, he alone must 
judge the attack on his honour, the House debated how far the royal 
honour had been impugned but decided on a tactful procedure. On 
6 May, with the Archbishop of Canterbury as spokesman, the whole 
House presented itself before the King at Whitehall. Begging to be 
allowed to continue with the case the Lords assured him that he would 
thereby show his trust in their readiness to do him justice. Their 
remarks upon the infringement their liberties were suffering as a 
result of the King’s intentions caused James to comment upon the 
consequences of an acquittal of Yelverton and on the stand they were 
taking upon reason and precedent, a stand which he disliked.^ However 
he promised them an answer the following afternoon and when this came 
it returned the case entirely to the Lords.
Despite their procedural victory the Lords were virtually obliged, 
because of the King’s attitude to the case, to find Yelverton guilty. 
Even some days elapsed before the matter was finally settled. 
Yelverton’s account was shown to be partly false, yet on the 12th, 
although the peers were prepared to vote that he had offended against 
the King’s honour, they declared that they might reverse their
Gardiner, Debates l621, pp.54-60; de Villiers, op. cit., pp. 
32-3. James said that they would be judging the King, adding that 
those who did this might depose him. He would never give them this 
right: de Villiers, p.33.
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decision if he were able to defend himself successfully. In fact, 
Yelverton*Ê defence two days later was very disappointing. He 
retracted his charges against Buckingham and was censured unanimously. 
A sentence of fine, imprisonment and public submission was fixed and, 
on the 16th, formally pronounced. The Commons were not called to 
hear it, although their complaint was one of the reasons given for 
the punishment.^ Perhaps earlier procedure was not followed because 
the Commons had apparently never formally transmitted Yelverton to 
the Lords.
Yelverton was sentenced by the Lords partly to preserve the
privileges which had so nearly been snatched from them. There is
considerable evidence to show that they acted reluctantly; they do
not appear to have been unanimous over the sige of the fine, and the
Lord Treasurer proposed that the share of it due to Buckingham be
remitted; throughout there seems to have been general sympathy for
Yelverton and probably a belief that, although he had failed to prove
it, there was something in what he had originally said against 
2
Buckingham. The case had tested to a greater extent than previously 
the relative strengths of Court and Lords, and although the King had.
^ L^J. iii, pp.114-5, 119, 121-5. The Commons heard of the 
sentence the same day: C.D. ii, p.373.
 ^ Gardiner, Debates l621, pp.85-90; C.S.P. Ven. 1621-3, p.55. 
The case did not ruin Yelverton. He was reconciled to Buckingham 
who forgave him his share of the fine, and he was later made a judge : 
Rushworth, op. cit., i, p.34; L.J. iii, p.125.
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on this occasion, successfully averted an attack on Buckingham this 
had been achieved more by luck than judgment.^ Parliamentary judica­
ture had been strengthened and Parliament * s control over it confirmed. 
When, in 1626, a serious attempt was made to use it against Buckingham 
the monarch would have to resort to rather more desperate evasive 
action. On the other hand, the Commons* part in the case, especially 
in its later stages, was fairly small, despite the fact that Yelverton 
did not enjoy the protection provided by membership of the Lords; and 
neither Coke nor Leiden thought the case worth mentioning in their 
discussions of judicature.
While the Lords had been debating with the King over Yelverton* s 
case the Commons had become involved in a similar and equally 
significant controversy arising out of their sentencing of Edward 
Floyd. This produced disagreement within the House and argument with 
both James and the Lords, leading to a definition of the Commons* part 
in judicature which was of great importance. Floyd in many ways 
provided the Commons with their Rubicon, as Yelverton had the Lords, 
but the lower House proved less successful in crossing it than were 
the peers. They failed to extend their own judicature, as they had 
similarly failed in I6IO; and the case reminded them of the very 
limitations on their power which had compelled them to turn to the
Nevertheless Buckingham was probably strengthened by his escape. 
He had been found "Parliament proofe" which, reported Chamberlain, 
was "no small comfort to him": McClure, op. cit., ii, p.374.
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Lords earlier in 1621.
Edward Floyd was a Catholic lawyer who, by order of the Council, 
was a prisoner in the Fleet. Ear*ly in January 1621 he had slander­
ously insulted the King and Queen of Bohemia and although this was 
reported to the Warden of the Fleet it was not until the examination 
of the latter, late in April, that Floyd’s words became public.^
The Commons reacted violently: on the 28th Floyd was ordered to appear
before them on the following Monday. He denied having made the 
remarks and the Commons ordered the examination of witnesses and a 
search of his possessions in the Temple and at the Fleet. In a 
poorly attended afternoon session, from which both Coke and Noy were 
absent, argument started over the best course of procedure: some
members wanted to refer the case to the King; others suggested
collaboration with the Lords; but finally the House decided to
2
proceed to punishment itself. If there were no precedent the
The Warden was accused of maltreating his prisoners and charging 
them high fees. Although he evidently did not receive a full hearing 
by the Commons, they resolved to send him to the Lords; but they do 
not appear to have done so. Shortly before the prorogation in June, 
some of the Warden’s prisoners, who had also petitioned the Commons, 
addressed a complaint against him to the Lords. He must have been 
bailed during the summer, because he answered to his bail at the start 
of the second session in November, but nothing further seems to have 
happened : C.D. iii, pp.273-5; iv, p.405; L.J. iii, pp.157-8, I63,
174.
2
Those such as Digges who advocated co-operation with the Lords 
were chiefly, of course, the moderates, but it was also suggested 
that the Commons alone were not able to inflict a sufficiently harsh 
punishment. On the other hand, some members evidently resented the 
handing over of offenders to the Lords, and in deciding as it did the
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Commons would make one, rather than let the case slip out of their 
hands. With great zeal the House fixed on a punishment and arranged 
for it to be carried out on the following morning, 2 May.^
Before this could be done, however, the King intervened, ordering 
a stay of execution. He asked the House a number of questions: 
whether it was a court of record with judicature on matters unconcerned 
with its privileges, its members or the public grievances of the 
kingdom; whether - if this right existed - it should inflict punish­
ment on a person who protested his innocence without first taking 
evidence on oath; whether it could punish a non-member for an offence 
not committed during a Parliamentary session; and whether the House 
would not have been better advised to ask his pleasure before dealing 
with his prisoner - a question reminiscent of a criticism James had 
made of the Commons* proceedings against Proctor, The King also laid 
before the Commons an ordinance made during the first year of the 
reign of Henry IV: in this the House had abandoned all power of
House followed the advice of Sir George Moore, Strangways and Seymour, 
During the debate of 27 February on Mompesson’s case, Moore had 
supported action independent of the Lords, if such were within the 
power of the Commons: Nicholas, op. cit., i, pp.370-4; C.D. ii,
p.146; iv, p.278; Relf, op. cit. . pp.xv-xvi. It may have been the
rather different issues at stake in the case, which was somewhat more
general and political in nature than others in 1621, that persuaded 
the Commons that they had the right to act alone,
^ Williams, op. cit., ii, p.252; C.D. iv, pp.278, 281-2; v,
pp. 126ff; Nicholas, op. cit., i, pp.371, 373, 374.
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judicature and judgment, both then and in the future. James 
concluded his onslaught by thanking the House for its tenderness 
towards his famity, promising to confirm what had been done if it 
were shown to be legal
The King’s position was an effective one and the ensuing debate 
showed the extent to which his challenge had thrown the House into 
confusion. There was an uneasy feeling that their privileges were 
under attack; disquiet was increased by the realisation of the 
difficulty of defending them in this instance. Noy questioned the
Commons’ claim to the power they had assumed, and supported the King’s
2
right to suspend judgments, quoting precedents for this. In his 
view the Lords should have dealt with the case. Alford wanted a 
royal pardon for Floyd "since our Ship hath touched on a Rock".
Digges and others wanted the King petitioned to confirm the sentence; 
Montagu and Moore suggested that a bill be passed to do this, but 
Crew objected on the ground that to strengthen théir sentence in this 
way detracted from it. Poole proposed a search of the precedents
Nicholas, op. cit., ii, p.2; C.D. iii, pp.l%ff ; iv, pp.290-1; 
V, pp. 131-2. James did not normally have precedents readily avail­
able. Perhaps he obtained unaccustomed help at this moment.
^ CjD. ii, pp.337-40; iv, pp,291ff. Particularly the precedent 
of Latimer.
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but Hakewill retorted that this would do no good as none appeared to 
exist.^
However, the House did its best to pull itself together. The 
validity of the King’s medieval precedent was questioned on the 
grounds that it was merely an ordinance, not a statute, and that it 
was the product of special circumstances - the trial of Richard II, 
with which the Commons did not want to be associated. Members 
wondered whether it mattered that no oath had been administered 
during the examination of Floyd. Coke asserted that the House was 
a court of record, and that it was entitled to deal with an offence 
committed outside Parliamentary sessions but denied in Parliament, 
because the denial constituted a renewal of the offence. He was, 
of course, going back completely on what he had said barely two 
months earlier - when different circumstances prevailed. On 9 March 
he had declared that the Commons alone had no power to punish any 
but members and their dependants, itself almost certainly in contra­
diction to the position the House had adopted in punishing Michell,
From this shaky position, unsupported by precedent, the Commons sought
2
and were granted a royal audience.
Nicholas, op. cit., ii, pp.5-8. The proposal of Montagu and 
Moore, like the bill against Proctor in l6lO, is an interesting 
foreshadowing of the revival of attainder in I64I.
 ^C.D. iii, p. 12)4; iv, pp.292-3; v, pp.133-5; C^. i, p.546.
Coke claimed that precedents existed for the Commons* action but he 
did not substantiate his contention with effective examples: C.D.
iii, pp. 138-9, Hakewill was no more successful a few days later; 
ibid., iii, pp.177-8.
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Before they went to the King they held another debate in which 
they did their best to convince themselves of the legality of their 
actions. They found fault with James* precedent, asserting that the 
very existence of the Commons* power of judicature over their own 
members and those who offended them showed that the precedent had 
not been followed. Cranfield injected a gloomy note into the debate 
by saying that the Lords would probably claim that their power had 
been usurped: this would compel the King to judge impartially between
the Houses instead of showing the leniency towards the Commons that 
might otherwise have been expected. In the afternoon the King made 
a predictable reply to the Commons* appeal to the law of reason and 
to their assertion that the House v/as a court of record. He 
disputed their claims but reserved a full answer until their prece­
dents had been written down, and he w^ned against "challenging an 
omnipotency or ... erecting a judicature which is not known how far 
it may reach".^ It was a reasoned challenge which the Commons would 
never have been able to meet satisfactorily.
Perhaps James realised that it would be unwise to alienate the 
Commons by making his victory clearer; perhaps he altered his plans 
in order to end the whole issue as quickly as possible. The outcome 
of the examination of Floyd ordered by the King supports the latter 
surmise. Floyd so annoyed the King by his confession that James
^ Nicholas, op. cit., ii, pp.13-14; C.D. ii, p.343; iv, p.296.
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determined to punish him at least as heavily as had the Commons,
He therefore told the Commons that he was proposing to send Floyd 
to the Lords.^ This announcement precipitated another round of 
excited discussions in the Commons as the House saw its unique right 
to present cases to the Lords under attack. Roe argued that the 
Lords had no authority to take cognisance of a public grievance unless 
the Commons presented the matter to them, and warned the House that 
the King’s proposal might endanger this privilege and lead to their 
exclusion from such business. Other members bemoaned the lack of 
precedents and resolved that arrangements should be made for the 
preservation of records. More immediately, they appointed a committee 
of eight to set down their proceedings against Floyd. In consequence,
the entry for 4 May in the Commons Journal states that Floyd was
2
"impeached before the Commons assembled in this Parliament*.
As far as we know this is the first and only occasion on which 
the word "impeached" is used in 1621 of the Parliamentary trials of 
that year. Yet the case of Floyd is less like an impeachment, if
this term is used to describe a trial by the Lords of charges or 
evidence transmittW to them by the Commons, than virtually every
The diarists vary in the tone they attribute to the King's 
message. The majority report it as a proposal, indicating the course 
of action he will adopt unless the Commons have any other suggestions. 
According to Smith the Commons were left far less room for making 
proposals^ C.D, iii, p.164; iv, p.303; v, p,366; vi, p.400.
 ^Nicholas, op. cit., ii, pp.19-23; C.J. i, p.608.
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other case in this Parliament, The Lords had taken no part in the 
proceedings which the Commons were describing in their entry. On 
the other hand, the committee responsible for advising the House on 
this consisted of men such as Coke, Phelips, Noy, Alford and Samuel 
Sandys, who are likely to have weighed their words carefully. What 
did members mean and why did they choose to express themselves in 
this way, using phraseology which was not taken from the medieval 
records so assiduously studied, and which was not to be repeated in 
1626 when the formula for impeaching Buckingham was to be drawn 
exactly from the fourteenth century? It hardly seems possible to 
provide a wholly convincing explanation. Perhaps the verb "impeached" 
bore no particular or technical significance in 1621, and there is 
no doubt that it was in general use at this time to mean "accused".
Only five years later, however, it had acquired technical significance, 
at least in the mind of Selden, untypical though he may have been 
of the average member; and those who determined to "accuse and impeach" 
Buckingham probably had some reason for using language which was 
apparently absent in I624 or 1621. Perhaps "impeached" had a different 
meaning in 1621 from that which it later assumed. If so, we are 
unlikely ever to know what this was, and it seems likely to have had 
only a short period of currency, for the familiar meaning was emerging 
by 1626. Perhaps the word was used of Floyd's case deliberately to 
obscure matters. Some members had been trying hard to prove that 
the Commons had power to act as they had done, and even those #10
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had cast doubts on such claims were unlikely to be eager to advertise 
the predicament in which the House had placed itself. Perhaps the 
entry in the Journal deliberately used the word "impeached", knowing 
that it referred to a judicial process, in an attempt to maintain a 
belief in the existence of a unicameral judicature by the Commons in 
such cases. Again, it may be that "impeached" had a respectably 
antique ring to it, which, coupled with a vagueness about its technical 
meaning deriving from its apparently infrequent use in this sense, 
stood the House in good stead. Certainly, one of the diarists 
consciously or unconsciously lends assistance in this respect by 
omitting all mention of the Commons from his account of the proceedings 
and simply says that Floyd was "impeached in Parliament", adding that 
"the Parliament adiudged" him.^ Furthermore, even members who found 
the Commons* behaviour difficult to justify recognised that the House 
had brought the case to some sort of conclusion. Shortly before 
the judgment was entered in the Journal Noy recommended that it should 
be "putt in the forme of a Judicature and to be drawne presently; 
and not in the words of Question in it, but positively as Judgments 
are". It may be that by describing Floyd as "impeached" the House 
was merely recording what it believed it had done. If this is true, 
it is hardly surprising that this word was not used of other cases
^ C.D. iii, p.170.
^ Ibid.. iii, p.l68.
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vfhere a very different procedure was followed. Yet despite such 
explanations, it must be acknowledged that the entry made in the 
Journal on 4 May still remains something of a puzzle.
The next development in the case was that the Lords, with a 
timing which cannot have been accidental, asked for a conference with 
the Commons. The request arrived on 5 May, and at the conference 
the Lords insisted that the Commons* claims for their rights of 
judicature should be examined by judges and king’s counsel.^ Some 
members of the lower House had been worried that the conference would 
damage the Commons’ liberties and jurisdiction and Coke did his best 
to convince the Lords of the validity of the Commons’ position.
Edvfin Sandys* attempt to appeal to reason led Pym to write in his 
diary that "he quickly betooke himselfe to an easyer taske...", 
turning to the zeal the House had shown in dealing with this attack 
on the King’s family. One of the Lords* most effective retorts was 
to enquire what the Commons* reaction would be if the Lords infringed
C.D.iii, p.173; L.J. iii, p.110. One of the questions arising 
from this case is why had the Lords not intervened earlier. Doubtless 
there had been a great deal of discussion behind the scenes and Relf 
suggests that Coke and Noy, together with Pembroke, one of the Commons* 
chief allies in the Lords, used the issue as a means of strengthening 
the juriiMiction of the upper House. As the peers were embroiled 
with the King over Yelverton this was probably welcome. Spedding 
felt that the Lords were frightened to protest, particularly as 
(until the Journal entry of 4 May) they had no official notice of 
the sentencing of Floyd, and waited for the King’s encouragement 
before doing so. It is important also to remember that the Lords were 
themselves well occupied at this time, dealing with the Yelverton issue 
and sentencing Bacon and Michell. Relf, op. cit., pp.xvii-xviii; 
Spedding, op. cit., vii, p.274.
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their power to propose subsidies, contrary to the ordinance of 9 
Henry IV, as the Commons had infringed the jurisdiction given to the 
Lords by the ordinance of 1 Henry IV,^
The Lords remained unconvinced and when, two days later, they 
debated what the Commons had said in their defence they agreed that 
none of the precedents given by the Commons was relevant to this case. 
The Commons had not shown that they had a right to sentence a man 
who was not a member of their House for a matter that did not concern 
them. Consequently, they asked for a new conference. The request 
produced some grumbling when it reached the lower House. Montagu 
had been engaged in a search for information about a pursuivant who, 
though not a member of the Commons, had been punished by them, but 
the case was more firmly established in his memory than in the records. 
However, some members at least could see the writing on the wall 
clearly enough : Edwin Sandys made a conciliatory speech in which he
showed that the Lords were not challenging the justice of the Commons’ 
judgment but their power to give it, and that the House had been 
trying to prove the wrong things at the last conference. This type 
of approach to the anxious members had its effect; at the conference 
the Commons quietly accepted criticism of their evidence as well as
2
^ C*D* ii, pp.349-50; iv, pp.313-4.
^ iii, p.113; C.D. iii, p.191. Montagu soon gave up: on
the 11th, he told the House that he had been in touch with Cotton 
who told him t%at the precedents would be best ignored: Ç^D. iii, 
p.229; C.J. i, p.619.
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the statement that the Lords believed their privileges had been 
infringed. Both Houses politely declared that they wanted agreement. 
To obtain this they met separately to discuss the appointment of a 
sub-committee and later arranged that this should meet on 10 May to 
arrange an accommodation. This sub-committee rapidly produced a 
settlement: it recognised the Lords' power to deal with Floyd and
promised that the action of the Commons would not establish a precedent, 
It was agreed that the Commons would confirm their promise by drawing 
up a protestation which would be entered in the Lords' Journal.
Coke even retreated from asking the Lords to punish Floyd, merely 
leaving him to their wisdom, a v/ithdrawal for which he was subsequently 
criticised in the Commons.^
Both Houses accepted the settlement and the Lords made arrange­
ments to examine Floyd. Half the members of the committee they 
appointed had been similarly involved in Bacon's case. Their work 
proceeded smoothly except for one minor fracas with the Commons which
nevertheless reveals the insecui’ity some members of the lower House
2
still felt about the settlement. On the 26th the peers heard
C.J. i, p.613; Nicholas, op. cit., ii, pp.43-5; C.D. iii, 
pp.229-32, 237-8. There was, however, some doubt as to exactly what 
the Commons had asked the Lords to do, Edwin Sandys argued that the 
"request (was) limitted to the Execution not to the Sentence and 
examinacion": C.D. iii, pp.230-1; iv, p.334.
L.J. iii, p.125. The dispute was over the Lords* request to 
the Commons for a trunk containing Floyd's papers. There was a fear 
that its contents might be used to damage them by altering their 
judgment : C.D. iv, p.360-l.
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Floyd's poor and rather insolent reply to the committee's charge and 
on the same day sentenced him. The Commons took no part in the last 
stage, neither being sent for nor demanding judgment. It seems that 
this was because they had already given judgment upon him. There 
was certainty a belief that a judgment pronounced by one of the Houses 
could be reversed only by that House. Perhaps it was feared that 
this right might be damaged if the Commons assisted at the Lords* 
sentence.^
Undoubtedly the Commons had been divided over the case of Floyd.
Some members felt that their privileges would be endangered by any
surrender; others, chiefly the more experienced, felt that their
privileges would be endangered by further persistence. Coke saw the
merit in both positions and, for a time, tried to ride both horses.
The dispute caused some bitterness between the Houses which found an
2
echo outside Parliament. Yet it led to an important compromise:
^ L.J. iii, pp.104, 133-4; v, p.156; Nicholas, op. cit., ii, 
p.107; C.S.P. Dorn. I6l9-2i, p.253; C.S.P. Ven. 1621-3. p.53; Williams, 
op. cit.. ii, ^.256; Spedding, op. cit., vii, pp.275-6; C.D. v, p.
386. It has been pointed out that if the Lords had no independent 
power of original jurisdiction and if the case of Floyd was not an 
impeachment, the Lords' punishment v/as no more justifiable than the 
Commons' action: Hargrave's preface to Hale, op. cit., p.xix;
D.S. Berkowitz, 'Young Mr. Selden. Essays in Seventeenth-Century 
Learning and Politics', chapter V, p.36.
2
See Sir Robert Cotton's pamphlet A Briefe Discourse concerning 
the Power of the Peeres. and Commons of Parliament, in point of 
Judicature (n.p., I64O), which appeared at this t i m e , I t  claims 
that the Commons' right to participate in judicature would have been 
apparent from mary precedents had not the keeping of records been
left to the clerk of the Lords who, either deliberately or through 
negligence, had failed to incorporate them in his Journal: pp.5-6.
The title of this pamphlet has been subject at times to slight 
variation.
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although their judgment of Floyd was left standing, the Commons* 
claim to sentence any except members or those accused of breach of 
their privileges was swept aside. They remained strictly dependent 
upon the Lords for success in dealing with other defendants, and they 
failed to extend their own judicature. However, disappointing though 
this was to the more militant members, they could talce comfort from 
the fact that they had successfully excluded the King from interfering 
in what was now becoming an established process. Although James had 
not formally agreed that the Houses might work out a conclusion between 
them, his failui^e to carry out his proposal to present Floyd to the 
Lords himself, and his inactivity during the final stages of the case, 
show that he tacitly consented to the arrangement. In doing so, he 
abandoned not only his implied right to accuse before the Lords, but 
also a very strong position against the Commons of 1621. The 
frequency with which, in this Parliament, the King was prepared to 
let his case go by default is strong evidence that he, at least, had 
little grasp of the potentialities of Parliament's revived judicature.
Meanwhile, the Lords had dealt with Michell, whom the Commons, 
late in February, had sentenced-,i apparently using a jurisdiction which 
was even at that time doubtful and which had by now been abandoned. 
Since then Michell had languished in the Tower. He had been discussed 
in conference with the Lords, examined by the lower House, and 
mentioned in written evidence, sent by the Commons to the Lords, about
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the thread patent, in which he had been associated with Mompesson,
Just before the Easter recess the peers were told that he would be 
sent to them if they so desired, but the Commons do not seem to have 
talcen any initiative in this respect, either then or later. Indeed, 
it seems that, at this stage, the Lords were more determined than were 
the Commons to punish Kichell, for at the same time they recorded 
that he had been "found guilty of many great Misdemeanors . and 
they discussed what should be done. The Commons, however, had not 
lost all interest in the matter. On 21 April, they resolved to 
question the alehouse patentees, Dixon and Almond, and the referees, 
chief of whom was Mandeville, the Lord Treasurer. This drew from 
the King the protest that no man should "be questioned for mistakynge 
the lawe upon a Reference" and although, after a full debate on 11 
May, the matter was quietly dropped, the momentum generated during 
the previous three weeks perhaps helped to ensure Michell's punisimient. 
No formal charge against him seems to have been sent to the Lords 
but on 26 April the peers had examined him and the following day went 
into committee to consider their sentence.^ No sense of urgency seems 
to have possessed them and they soon became distracted by the 
Yelverton issue, with the result that not until L May did the final
C.D. ii, p.258; iv, pp.252-3; v, pp.28, 30, 343, 347; L.J. 
iii, pp.63, 65; Relf, op. cit., pp.35-6; C.J. i, p.586. The charges 
against him were read out by Mr Serjeant Crew who later performed the 
same function in Bennet*s case. He shared his responsibility in the 
cases of Mompesson and Yelverton.
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debate on Michell’s punishment take place. Charles, Buckingham
and Arundel argued against degradation from knighthood, but this, as
well as exclusion from public office, a fine, and imprisonment during
the King’s pleasure, all formed part of the punishment fixed. The
Commons were summoned to the Bar of the Lords to demand judgment on
what the peers described as their "Complaint" against Michell, The
Speaker used the form no?/ becoming increasingly familiar : ^
the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the house of Commons, 
haveing presented to yowr Lordships one Sir Francis Michell 
and Sir Giles Mompesson for inormus and gross offenders, 
heearing that yowr Lordships, after a iudgment before passed 
on the then Sir Giles, that yow are ready to pronounce 
sentence on Sir Francis Michell, theay are now comm to demaund 
it. (2)
Despite these statements by the Lords and the Speaker, there 
seems to be no evidence in the records that the Commons had ever 
formally resolved to send Michell to the peers. Still less can 
Selden’s assertion that Michell was "accused and impeached" by the 
Commons be justified from contemporary evidence.^ Nevertheless,
L.J. iii, pp.89-90, 95, 108-9; C.D. v, p.553; I&oholas, o£. 
cit.. i, p.341; Gardiner, Debates 1621. pp.64-5. The wording was 
similar to that used when the Commons demanded judgment against 
Bacon (L.J. iii, p.l06). For Mompesson the formula had been rather 
different (ibid., iii, p.72). For the ceremony before the Earl 
Marshall’s commissioners at which Michell was degraded from his 
knighthood, see Camden, op. cit., ii, p.657.
 ^CjD. iii, p.170.
^ Selden, Of Judicature, p.30.
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whatever the part played by the Commons in securing Michell’s 
condemnation by the Lords, it is interesting to note the Speaker's 
claim that the Commons had presented Michell to the peers a.s an offender. 
Now Maude Clarke argued, quite convincingly, that in 1621 "the Commons 
had done little more than to demand inquiry ; though summoned to hear 
judgement, the whole conduct of the trial was outside their control".
This seems to be valid, but it is partly based on another opinion 
which may be debatable. She goes on to state that not until I626 
was the idea of indicting a man of an offence plainly understood, 
and she accui'ately points out that in Middlesex's case in I624 "not 
the man but the articles of accusation were presented" P e r h a p s  
the Speaker in 1621 was merely telling the Lords that the Commons had 
handed Michell over to them: as the Commons appear not to have drawn
up a charge his words may have had no particular significance, but it 
is just possible that they did and that the Commons of 1621 understood 
well enough the process of indicting a man of an offence.
The Commons were fortunate, especially in view of the confusion
over Floyd, that the Lords, before sentencing Michell, did not choose
2
to question their early activities in the case. The case of Michell 
might have become more important than it did. The slow pace both
^ M.V. Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', fourteenth Century 
Studies, p.268.
p
But as early as 22 March the idea was current in the Lords 
that Michell was committed by the Commons for contempt: Harleian
MS 158, f.239; üi, P.&3.
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Houses adopted shows not only how insignificant Michell was compared 
v/ith Parliament’s previous victims but also how certain the Houses 
now were of success whenever they acted jointly.
Michell’s case was the last one to be brought to a successful 
conclusion in the Parliament of 1621, but right up to the end of the 
first session on 4 June both Houses were continuing to investigate 
abuses and complaints. Mary of these had come to light during the 
course of the earlier trials and might themselves have ended in 
judgments but for the interruption in June. Of these, two cases 
reached the point at which the Commons laid evidence before the Lords : 
that against Bennet took the form of an accusation which the Lords 
started investigating and which would undoubtedly have led to Bennet’s 
p uni slime nt; the evidence concerning Theophilus Field, bishop of 
Llandaff, was not formed into an accusation, partly because Field, 
like Bacon, was a member of the House of Lords, but the Lords did 
investigate it. No great harm came to Field but the Commons did 
secure one minor scalp.
Bennet’8 case was straightforward and raised no new issues, 
though it gave rise to some discussion of the Commons’ authority.
Judge of the prerogative court of Canterbury, Bennet was accused of 
corruption, and evidence was accumulated by the Commons’ committee 
during the.Easter recess. By the moment when this was handed over 
to the committee for abuses in courts of justice an ominously large
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amount had been collected.^ The Commons had declared that members 
of the House of Lords could appear before their committees as witnesses
in the case after Coke had assured them that this was in accordance
2
with the precedents. During the third week in April the Commons 
debated the procedure to be followed with a care and caution which 
makes all the more surprising their precipitate action against Floyd 
ten days later,^ Speakers discussed the extent of the Commons* 
power: "There is iudgment of fact which is ours. Judgment of paine
which is the L o r d s " a  statement by Samuel Sandys which was forgotten 
or ignored during the opening of the attack on Floyd. ï^m declared 
that when Parliament was divided into two Houses its power was also 
divided: inquisition to the Commons, judgment to the Lords. But
he added that the Commons still had some share in the judgment and 
should beware of handing over to the Lords too much of their power 
of inquisition. Shrewdly, he advised the House to present to the 
Lords only the evidence that was fully v,yproved. The debate shows
^ C.D. iv, pp. 214, 218-23, 236. But Chamberlain still believed 
that Bennet*s friends would carry him through: G.S.P. Dorn. 1619-23,
p.248.
C.D. iii, p.13. He does not appear to have named his precedents. 
Attempts in subsequent Parliaments to secure the attendance of the peers, 
Middlesex and Buckingham, led to difficulties.
^ Especially as, unlike Floyd, Bennet was a member of the Commons.
A possible explanation is given below: see p.210 n.2.
^ C.D. iii, p.53.
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that there was still much room for argument about the best procedure, 
but the House agreed that Bennet should answer on the following 
Monday, either in person or by counsel. A select committee was 
appointed to prepare matters, and the heads of charges, though not 
the names of witnesses, were given to Bennet.^ On 23 April, having 
heard from Coke of the fate of judges who, in the past, had taken
2
bribes, the Commons expelled Bennet and placed him under house arrest. 
They approved the accusation drawn up by their committee and arranged 
to ask the Lords for a conference at which it might be handed over.
It was while these decisions were being reached that Hakewill commented 
"I have observed when we have gone to the Lords it hath been by 
impeachment, clamor or accusation", a remark which presumably indicates 
that he believed that more than one method of approach to the Lords 
was possible.^
Unfortunately, we do not know whether members agreed with Hakewill 
who, in any case, probably thought that the Commons were acting
^ 11, p.505; 111, pp.42, 55; Iv, p.258.
This caused controversy, as it was claimed to be without prece­
dent, but it was defended on the increasingly familiar ground that 
in cases of necessity there was a great right to make a precedent.
The necessity arose from the fear that Bennet would flee abroad 
through "his match with the Dutch", i.e. his third wife: C.D, ii,
p.314; iv, pp.245-9.
Coke mentioned Chief Justice Thorpe (24 Edward III) who was found 
guiliy of corruption. He was not hanged, contrary to what Coke 
stated; ibid., ii, p.313.
^ C.D. ii, p.314. For a discussion of this remark, see p. 7^ - 
above.
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precipitately: "He is but barely accused yet".^ Still less do we
know which method the House adopted. At the conference with the
Lords which took place on the 24th, Sackville declared himself
"Commanded by the Lower house to complain of Sir John Bennet
while Coke v/ound up: *"//e have given nothing but an opinion, your
2
lordships must give the judgment". The judgment was never given. 
During the remaining weeks of the session the Lords granted Bennet 
bail and examined the witnesses but displayed no appearance of haste. 
Nor is there any evidence to show that the Commons became impatient. 
The Lords eventually gave Bennet until the next access of Parliament 
to reply to the charges against him but by them both Houses had lost 
interest in him.^ However, this conclusion emphasises the difference 
in the treatment Bennet had received compared with some of his prede­
cessors. The headlong rush to conviction was absent, while the
^ CjD. iii, p.55.
2
Ibid.. iii, pp.74-7. Sackville seems to have presented at least 
some of the objections in writing: ibid.. vi, p.394. Selden says
that the Commons "accused" Bennet: Of Judicature, p.31.
^ L.J. iii, pp.87-8, 130-1, I46-8. Though on 15 December Perrot 
did complain in the Commons that he had been neither cleared nor 
sentenced. The Lords told the petitioners against Bennet that they 
still intended to deal with him but at the next access of Parliament: 
at that moment they were too busy: C.J. i, p.664; L.J. iii, pp.
197-8. He was eventually sentenced in the Star Chamber : G-.A. Harrison,
ed., 'The Diaiy of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, deciphered for the period 
January 1622 to April 1624' (Unpublished M.A. thesis of the University 
of Minnesota, 1915. A microfilm of this thesis is deposited in the 
Library of the University of London), pp.97-100.
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decision to send him the heads of the charges is indicative of an 
approach v/hich was willing to give him a reasonable chance to defend 
himself. The case shows that procedure was still flexible and capable 
of modification.
The Commons showed rather more eagerness to see an end to the case 
against Field, largely because their own prestige and standing v/ere 
involved. In March they had been told by Davenport that Field had 
received a recognisance from Edward Egerton. This promised Field 
payment if he succeeded in persuading Bacon to grant Egerton a favour­
able decree. Field had failed to obtain this and, according to 
Davenport had refused to surrender the recognisance. The Commons had 
suggested to the Lords that they should investigate the matter and 
punish Field if he were found to be guilty. They made no formal charge 
against him^ but the Lords did investigate Davenport's accusations.
They were found to be groundless and the Lords, apart from hearing a
2
proposal that a reproof be administered to Field, let the matter drop.
There the case rested until 14 May when the Commons, still smarting 
in the aftermath of their defeat over Floyd, debated it. Davenport 
had denied, on oath, before the Lords what, unsworn, he had declared 
to the Commons. The Commons felt that they had been made to look
^ But they did talk about their "Complaint" against him: C.D. ii,
p.149; iii, PP.271, 356; iv, p.352; v, p.164; Nicholas, oj)_.. cit., 
ii, p.83. Selden does not mention the case.
^ L.J. iii, pp.53-5; Relf, op. cit., p.52.
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foolish and were worried that Davenport's example would find its 
imitators ?/henever the Commons examined without first administering 
an oath. Furthermore, the Lords had neither asked the Commons to 
demand juclgment on Field nor told them the grounds for the judgment. 
Halcewill then proposed that the Commons should abandon the practice 
followed during the session by which they waited for an invitation 
from the Lords before demanding judgment. He urged the House to assert 
its right to demand it uninvited, and Alford complained that because 
they were not told the basis of a sentence given by the Lords they did 
not know which charges had been proved nor whether a punishment wgs 
fair. He advocated an examination of the ancient manner of demanding 
judgment, and claimed that the precedents gave the Commons the right to 
demand another judgment if they found the first unsatisfactory.
Brushing aside Hakewill's objections that Davenport was the Lords' 
prisoner and that all their information was based on unofficial reports, 
the House committed Davenport to the custody of the serjeant to be 
released on bail and set up a committee to conduct the enquiry proposed 
by Alford. The following day the House received, presumably from 
this bodj'', the reassuring if slightly irrelevant information that in 
the cases of Neville and Latimer they had not only demanded judgment 
but had even selected some of the punishments.^ On the l6th the
0£
^ C.D. ii, p.368; iii, pp.249-50; v, p.165; vi, p.156; Nicholas, 
. cit., ii, p.69. The information was accurate.
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Commons agreed to send a message to the Lords asking whether they were 
ready to give judgment because the Commons intended shortly to demand 
it, in accordance with their ancient rights and customs, Sackville 
was chosen to deliver the message; he reported the Lords* answer that 
they would deal with the case as soon as they had time.^
In fact, the Lords ignored the Commons* hint that they wished to 
be called upon to demand judgment and the Commons did not assert what 
they had implied was their right to demand it without invitation: 
the proposed change in procedure had failed to materialise. On the 
30th the Lords simply informed the Commons that they had asked the 
Archbishop of Canterbury to arlmonish Field: although not faultless he
had not been found guilty of any bribery. At the same time they 
handed their examination of Davenport to the Commons, thereby inviting 
the lower House to deal with a matter which was no concern of the peers 
The Coi^ imons heard Davenport's apology and excuse that, when faced with 
the oath, he realised that he had no proof of what he had claimed 
against Field, They listened to precedents for punishment and on the
C.D. ii, pp.372, 373; V, p.377. In his definition of impeach­
ment, as opposed to complaint, Elsynge said that judgment was not to 
be given until the Commons demanded it; H. Elsynge, 'The moderne 
forme of the Parliaments of England '. American Historical Review 
(1948), vol. liii, no. 2, p.302. In applauding the Commons' decision 
of the 16th, Roe and Sackville said that it would "refresh our old 
custom of demaunding iudgment, that so things commended to the Lords 
may not lye ther uniudged": C.D. iii, p.271.
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last day of the session sentenced him to a month's imprisonment in 
the Tower,^
One of the impressions that the cases of Bennet and Field leave
behind them is that both Houses were somehow less determined in pursuit
of their victims now than earlier. Perhaps, as Spedding suggested,
2
they were satiated. But if the Commons had really lost some of their 
initial enthusiasm two difficulties arise which malce it seem likely 
that Spedding's explanation is too simple.
The first difficulty is that during the last three weeks of the 
session the Commons began to investigate allegations of extortion 
brought against two men. These were John Lambe, Chancellor of 
Northampton, destined to be knighted a few weeks after the close of 
the session, and Richard Craddock, justice of the peace and Chancellor 
of the Bishopric of Durham. The House agreed that the evidence should 
be handed to the Lords after the usual investigations and, with an 
optimism not shared by all members, arranged that these should continue 
after the end of the session. One might reasonably have expected that 
the interruption in sittings would cause the House to lose interest
^ Ibid., ii, pp.410-11; iii, p.356; iv, pp.4l6-7.
2
Spedding, op. cit., vii, p.248. Chamberlain, writing to
Carleton, on 2 June, felt that Parliament was becoming more lenient.
He pondered on the reason, suggesting that its first fury was over 
and that it was loath to impose further fines until those already 
inflicted were better employed: McClure, op. cit.. ii, p.377* The
lack of urgency in dealing with Bennet may be explained by the 
popularity he enjoyed in the Commons : Roberts, op. cit.. p.32.
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in Lambe and Craddock, but this was not so. Unlike Bennett, the 
two Chancellors were still subject to the investigations of the 
Commons v/hen the autumn session opened, and the House showed itself 
still anxious to proceed with the case. Shortly before that session 
ended they were invited to be present at the next access of Parliament 
and there was a clear intention to continue the attack unless they 
gave a satisfactory answer.^
The second difficulty arises from the extent to which members 
realised the significance of what had taken place during the first 
session. Doubtless many of them thought that they had merely been 
investigating isolated but important grievances. These are the 
members whose enthusiasm would have declined. But at least one member, 
an influential one, saw things in rather deeper terms. Speaking in 
the long debate of 30 May on the threatened adjournment Fÿm commented 
on the achievements of this Parliament. "Judgment, the which hath
slept theis 300 yeears and is the greatest benifit that may be, is
2
now revived." Having struggled to revive this judgment he, and 
those members who thought like him, were unlikely to lose their 
enthusiasm for it.
Satiety seems therefore unlikely to be more than a partial
Nicholas, op. cit.. ii, pp.59-61, 362-3, C.D. iii, pp.260ff, 
384; C.J. i, p.668. They were still in the Commons* mind in 1624:
Rawlinson MS B. 151, f. 103v; Diary of Sir Walter Erie; B.M. 
Additional MS 18597, ff. l66v., 190-1.
^ C.D. iii, p.353.
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explanation for the decline in the tempo of judicature. An additional 
explanation may well lie in the fact that, by the late spring of 1621, 
the process was no longer struggling for survival. Indeed, the main 
answer seems to be revealed by comparing the importance of these cases 
v/ith each other; there can be little doubt that the earlier cases were 
more important than the later ones. MissrRelf has argued that 
Parliamentaiy judicature was "an effort to restore to Parliament its 
place in the system of courts which it had occupied in the fourteenth 
century, or even more to put it above the courts of equity v/hich had 
superseded it".^ This view harmonises well with the belief that there 
was a gradual extension of several types of judicature within 
Parliament in the early seventeenth century, and Miss Relf has, of 
course, set her interpretation alongside the study she has made of 
the groT/th in the unicameral judicature of the Lords. If the reason 
she gives for the revival of Parliamentary judicature is correct, 
it is reasonable to expect that more work v/as required to achieve 
success in the earlier cases than in the later ones, and that the 
first victories were more important than the subsequent ones.
It is also possible to examine the comparative importance of the 
cases of 1621 from a political standpoint, and perhaps to explain the
Relf, op. cit.. p.xiii. Cf. Mrs. Poster's view that the Commons 
of 1621 and 1624 undertook the investigation of patents and monopolies 
because there was no adequate remedy in the courts or Privy Council: 
'Patents and Monopolies', loc. cit. , p.77. In the context of Miss 
Relf's opinion, a Lord Chancellor was a superb victim.
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decline in judicial vigour in terms of the political insignificance
of tiie later victims as opposed to their earlier counterparts. For
there can be little doubt that men like Floyd and Bennet were of less
consequence than Mompesson or Bacon. But too much can be made of the
political overtones of these cases.^ One may suspect that a few of
the more sophisticated members, and perhaps those who, in February
and March, had pursued the referees most hotly, were aware of the
2
political significance of what they had done; but the charges which 
were brought were concerned primarily with grievances and offences 
against the law, rather than v/ith political attacks or suggestions 
of governmental mismanagement. Members were more preoccupied with 
administering justice than with political opposition. Moreover,
James* ovm attitude helps to confirm this. He would hardly have 
permitted the session to continue if he had suspected that the trials 
were politically motivated, and he would surely have regarded the 
earlier trials with more hostility than the later ones if he had worried 
about their political implications. In fact, as the weeks passed 
he increasingly felt that the Commons were not keeping strictly to 
their brief of investigating grievances. For him Easter was a
^ Relf, op. cit., p.xiii.
^ Lambe, who is of course likely to have made the most of this, 
wrote to the King about his antagonists: "The Complainantes are
underhand sett on and countenaunced by greater persons in this Gouniye 
that thorough me, ayme att your Majesty’s Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction" : 
C.D. vii, p.608.
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watershed: until then, he told them on 4 June, all had been well,
but since Easter the Commons had taken up "extravagant matters and 
out of Parliamentary causes". He was probably tliinking mainly of 
the Floyd case, though his leniency to Bacon and the arrests made 
after the session ended are an indication of what he thought of the 
fairness of some of Parliament's decisions.^ But although his speech 
of 4 June shows that James had no inkling of the real danger and 
significance of the manner of Bacon's fall, it does exhibit M s  
growing appreciation and understanding of one aspect of the situation. 
James regarded the proceedings before Easter as bearable because he 
still believed, then, that he could control the House, but as time 
went on and. he lost one skirmish after another, his optimism - and 
with it his contentment and self-confidence - slipped away. For 
throughout the session, the Crov/n suffered from the lack of effective 
support in either House. It was a black day for the apostle of free 
monarchy when the only vote against the sentence on the man he had 
appointed as his Lord Chancellor was given by a person of the calibre 
and reputation of Buckingham.
Some of the conclusions of this chapter may now be summarised.
C.D. vi, p.409; Gardiner, Debates 1621, p.79; Cabala, pp.307-8; 
Nicholas, op. cit., ii, appendix. Lionel Cranfield told James that 
in his view the Earl of Southampton's circle was almost wholly 
responsible for the raising of grievances in this Parliament: C.D.
vii, p.6l6.
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Although the procedure adopted by Commons and Lords in the trials of 
1621 is, in broad outline, similar in each case, there are clearly 
substantial and important variations in detail. There is, for 
example, no fixed moKoeait at which the Commons agree to present evidence 
to the Lords. Sometimes they prepare a detailed charge, passed by 
a vote of the whole House, and begin to impose penalties upon the 
offender; when they go to the Lords they are merely looking for 
confirmation of what they have already decided and, possibly, for a 
harsher punishment. Sometimes the Commons draw up no formal charge 
and malce no pronouncement upon the correctness of the accusations; 
they lay the evidence before the Lords, with or without comment; they 
are relying heavily upon the Lords who, fortunately for the Commons, 
usually reward their confidence. This difference in procedure can 
be largely explained in terms of the importance of the victim - though 
this hardly accounts for the Commons' circumspection in dealing with 
Bennet - and of the changing claims made by the Commons between 
February and June l621.
On a less important level, another example of the diversity of 
procedure is to be found in the ceremony in which the Lords announced 
their punishment. Normally the Commons were asked to be present to 
demand judgment, but in the cases of Yelverton and Field they merely 
heard or were told what had happened.
Procedure was influenced by the Commons ' attitude to the man they 
were attacking. Michell and Flcyd were dealt with much more
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summarily than the remainder, though the system adopted in l621 - 
collection of evidence by committees before which the defendant did 
not appeal' - allowed little opportunity for a reasoned defence because 
committee reports tended to be adopted unquestioningly by each House,^ 
Another influence upon procedure in 1621 was that of precedent. 
Something has already been said of the extent to which records of 
medieval Parliamentary judicature were available to members, and there 
is no doubt of the respect with which precedents di^awn from these were 
regarded, despite the meaningless and irrelevant way in which they 
were sometimes dragged into debdtes. But the absence of precedents 
did not seriously impede the Commons. Members might bemoan the lack 
of precedents but they were prepared to supply the deficiency with
grandiloquent appeals to the law of reason: necessity was the mother
2
of invention; they might malce, as well as follow, precedents. On 
the other hand, they liked to have at least the appai^ent support of 
precedent. The storm over Floyd showed what could happen when the 
Commons became too adventurous, and the day after the House had agreed 
to that settlement it received a warning from Noy when it was 
considering procedure in the cases of Lambe and Craddock: *%en wee
goe in new wayes wee are like to goe astray, Lett us keepe the
^ Spedding, op. cit., vii, p.246. 
^ C.D. ii, p.68; vi, p.347.
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ould waye."^ Precedents were used whenever they might be useful - 
in determining the powers of the Commons, in attempting to decide 
procedure, in fixing punishments. But while they provided guidance 
they also provided justification, a fact which points to greater
maturiiy in the exercise of its judicature than this Parliament has
2
normally been credited with. Misuse of precedents normally passed 
unchallenged because of the impotence of the defence, but the fact 
that they were misused and, in Floyd's case, shown to be worthless in 
supporting the Commons* claims, makes it necessary to ask whether they 
were used merely cynically in l621, in an attempt to blind the 
uninitiated vd.th legalistic science. The chief exponent was Coke - 
though he had his imitators - and he was perfectly capable of turning 
round in his tracks. Nevertheless, for him as well as for other 
members the traditional path was a serious matter and to accuse them 
of cynicism would be to miss the point. For conditions in 1621 were 
conspicuously different from those in the late fourteenth centuiy.
The medieval impeachments were an open attempt to control the 
King's government by attacking his ministers; the Parliament of 1621 
was certainly not thinking in these terms, even if there may be 
occasional hints of it. This Parliament acted as it did in response 
to the conditions of 1621, not in an attempt to revive, for their own
^ T b M . , V, p. 169*
 ^ Cf. Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit., p.268.
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sake, the glories of its ancient judicature. Yet in the records of 
that judicature displayed a procedure which well suited the
requirements of 1621 and which was therefore worth following. Natur­
ally, the precedents would not fit exactly, and naturally the men of 
1621 regarded these through the distorting mists of their own 
unhistorical approach to the ancient powers of Parliament. But the 
accusation of cynicism can be dismissed because while mapy of them were 
lawyers, for v/hom the means is at least as important as the end, they 
were also politicians, for whom the end must have prime appeal.
Two final points remain to be made about the use of precedents
by this Parliament. The first is that the King himself confirmed the
importance of these searches among the records: following Selden*s
work for the Lords during the first session, he was examined and his
papers were seized at James* command.^ The second point is that the
Commons needed to turn frequently to the precedents and to defend their
2
right to search the records. This need arose from the fact that 
Parliamentary judicature was still a tender growth in 1621. Among the
records, the Commons could find examples of successful judicature and 
it was, above all, success that was required in the early weeks of 
this session.
Nicholas, op. cit.. ii, appendix; Gardiner, Debates 1621, pp. 
99-101; L.J. iii, p.176. Edwin Sandys and the Earl of Southampton 
were examined on their Parliamentary activities at the same time as 
Selden. Questions put to all of them, together with the answers made 
by Southampton, are given in Petyt MS 538/19, ff. 1-3?.
2
• C.D. ii, p.208.
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Although in 1621 there was a variation both in procedure and in 
the extent to which precedents were followed, there is little evidence 
to suggest that members, or at any rate their leaders, were noticeably 
inconsistent. The question whether or not to send a defendant to 
the Lords provides quite a good test. Of course, in some cases this 
question never seems to have been put and we lack alternative informa­
tion on this issue, but in four cases - those of Mompesson, Bacon, 
Bennet and Floyd - evidence of attitudes does survive.^ Both Coke and 
Digges advocated co-operation with the Lords against Mompesson, Bacon 
and Bennet. Coke advised the same course against Floyd after the 
rash decisions in which he took no part; while Digges adopted this 
position from the start. But after the Commons had passed judgment 
on Floyd, Digges responded to the new situation by suggesting that 
the case should be quietly buried. Phelips is less predictable; he 
proposed an approach to the Lords in the cases of Bacon and Bennet, 
but he strongly advocated the punishment of Floyd by the Commons.
When their right to do so was challenged, he suggested that the King 
should be asked to confirm the sentence and a few days later he was 
responsible for advancing the view which Digges eventually adopted.
Noy seems to have believed in the efficacy of an approach to the King: 
he placed faith in this solution to the confusion over Floyd and he
In the case of Marshall (see pj.28 n. 2 , above), which was of
a rather different 1ype from these four, Samuel Sandys advocated an 
approach to the Lords while Noy opposed this: C.D. vi, pp.116-7;
Nicholas, op. cit., i, p.366.
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proposed that the Commons should take this s tep after transmitting 
Bacon to the Lords. But he made no such suggestion when he spoke 
in favour of sending Bennet to the peers. The attitudes of Edwin and 
Samuel Sandys are interesting but distinct. Edwin supported the 
Commons* judgment upon Floyd on the grounds that the Lords were too 
busy to be troubled with him, but after the King*s challenge he became 
an advocate of an approach to the peers, Samuel remained an unrepentant 
supporter of what the Commons had done, and was even prepared to 
contemplate an appeal by Floyd from the decision. But neither man 
opposed the presentation of Bennet to the Lords, which Samuel eventually 
advocated, though they did raise some objection to the timing of this. 
V/hether or not men like Roe and Hakewill were consistent is difficult 
to say because they appear to have stated their attitude in only one of 
the four cases. Roe supported Flcyd * s punishment by the Commons, but 
also thought that they should complain to the lords of the Council, 
whose prisoner he was. A fevr days later, when the House was wondering 
what to do next, he said that, as the Commons had by-passed the Lords, 
they could not now approach them. Finally, Hakewill*s view emerges 
in the case of Bennet when he supported the approach to the Lords.^
This information can be put in another way. None of these men 
seems to have spoken against sending Mompesson, Bacon or Bennet to the
^ CjD. ii, pp.148, 314; iii, pp.53-5, 123, 138, 166; iv, pp.ll6 , 
166-7; V, p p .559, 563; C.J. i, pp.532, 560, 561, 587, 604, 605, 608; 
Nicholas, op. cit., i, pp.283, 284, 298, 370-1, 373; ii, pp.21-2.
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Lords. The passions aroused by Floyd * s behaviour led to a few 
inconsistencies, but some of the proposals offered were forced upon 
their authors because of the peculiarities of a case in wiriich matters 
had progressed beyond the point at which reference to the Lords 
normally took place.
The cases v/hich have been considered in this chapter have long 
been called impeachments. As we have seen, except for the proceedings 
against Floyd, they are not given this name in the contemporary records, 
while there is evidence that some members believed that there were 
various procedures which the Commons could adopt to approach the Lords. 
At some stage, probably later, Selden and Elsynge analysed these 
procedures, seeing them in terms of two main types and using the words 
* complaint* and 'impeachment* to distinguish between these. In 1621 
the Commons use the first of these terms on some of the occasions when 
they present charges or evidence to the Lords. But it would be wrong 
to conclude that a case so described is a 'complaint' in the rigid 
sense intended by Selden or Elsynge. These cases cannot easily be 
fitted into the Procrustean beds set up by those two writers, and the 
fact that Coke apparently made no classification of the Parliamentary 
trials in which he took part must act as a warning to any attempt to 
do so now. Moreover, 'complaint* lilce 'impeachment* was in common 
enough use in a general sense at the time.
Nor can we be sure that contemporaries did not think of these 
cases as impeachments without actually ever saying so. Although the
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term must have presented itself to any member who looked at the
medieval records, its use may have been deliberately avoided for
fear of alarming the King, Yet this theory has its difficulties.
It argues a degree of management by the leaders of the Commons which
was hardly attained until the trial of Strafford, and secondly it
overlooks the fact that members were perfectly prepared to refer, by
name, to medieval cases which were bound up with the fates of the
"sillie we alee" Kings of whom James so hated to be reminded.^ But this
second objection may not destroy the theory: perhaps to James it
mattered more how a thing was said than what was said. It may be that
members did deliberately avoid using the term to spare the consequences,
but if so it seems an inescapable deduction from this theory that
'impeachment* had some special and probably political significance to
both the King and leading members of Parliament. There is no evidence
to suggest this in the records of 1621, where the charges and evidence
are indeed of a largely non-political character; but if 'impeachment*
did then carry the political overtones which have subsequently been
associated with it, the character of the cases of l621 would explain
2
why the term is used in connection with only one of them.
All, therefore, that can safely be said is that there is little
^ See p. 157 , above.
2
It might, very tentatively, be suggested that, despite Floyd's 
insignificance, his offence was more political in character than many 
in 1621.
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justification for describing the trials of 1621 - with the possible 
but curious exception of Floyd's - as impeachments, particularly 
because most wi'iters on the subject have, as Miss Relf has pointed 
out, "considered impeaclment only as a political measure".^ Yet 
fundamentally disputes about terminology have a restricted importance. 
What is much more important to notice about the cases of 1621 is that 
various procedures were tried and that the Commons learnt from their 
mistakes. In 1624 and 1626 procedure was further developed and modified, 
These changes tend to be obscured v/hen all the cases are described 
as icpeachmentSo
In other words. Parliamentary judicature v/as developing in the 
l620s, just as unicameral judicature was evolving in much the same 
period and earlier. The cases of 1621 may look forward to the impeach­
ment of Buckingham in 1626 add even of Strafford in I64I, but they are 
not necessarily identical in type to these. They may resist 
classification because they ante-date the age of the classifiers and
the theorists: they may simply be examples of the "due proceeding
2
of Judicature, ". Perhaps they bear the same relationship to their 
successors as Lee's trial in I368 bears, in Maude Clarke's view, to
Relf, op. cit., p.xiii. M.A. Gibb regards with scepticism the 
claims of the cases of 1621 to be regarded as impeachments, but she 
allows this fate to Middlesex: Buckingham, 1392-1628 (London, 1935),
p . 153 and n.
p.23.
p
E. Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England,
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the impeachments of 1376. Although, as we have seen, her interpret­
ation has been challenged, she believes that procedure by petition 
against Lee gave way to procedure by indictment in 1376, and she malces 
two points which are relevant to the present discussion. She drav/s 
a comparison between Lee's trial and the cases of 1621, stating that 
in the latter proceedings took place
at the prayer of the Commons or on their complaint; the charges 
against them were forwarded by the Commons and supported by 
particular accusers .... In fact, as in Lee's case (1368), 
the Commons had done little more than to demand inquiry; 
though summoned to hear judgement, the whole conduct of the 
trial 7/as outside their control, (l)
Though she says that the Commons "impeached" their victims in 1621
it is an implication of her argument that she should not have done so,
because her second point is that the idea of indictment, with v/hich
f
she believes impeachment to be closely connected, was only "becoming 
clear" in I624 and not "at last plainly understood" until I626.
Perhaps her arguments may not be wholly convincing, but taken in 
conjunction v/ith the evidence from 1621 they must give food for thought.
Yet whatever the precise character of the cases of 1621, 
Parliamentary judicature had been revived. The work of James* first 
two Parliaments may have helped, and the pov/ers granted to their 
committees provided those bodies v/ith much of the authority which, 
in 1621, enabled them to undertalee detailed work ranging from the
^ Clarke, 'The Origin of Impeachment', loc. cit., pp.267-8*
 ^Ibid., p.268.
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examination of witnesses and condemnation of patents to advice on 
procedure and the framing of charges. But the judgment "which hath 
slept theis 500 yeears" and of whose revival Fym spoke in June 1621, 
was on a different scale from the judicature exercised between I604 
and 1612|., By a judicious mixtui'e of precedent, common sense and the 
luck that frequently attends the bold, the two Houses ended the first 
session of 1621 with a weapon of remarkable value and potential.
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Chapter IV
The Fall of Middlesex
When Clarendon wrote his History of the Rebellion he said that 
Buckingham entered upon the Parliament of 1624 with the destruction
of Middlesex^ as one of his objectives, confident that in this he would
2
have Prince Charles* support.*" There is no reason to quarrel with 
this view, but it leads to the observation that, as a victim of the 
growth of Parliamentary judicature in the reign of James I, Middlesex 
shares with Yelverton in 1621 the dubious distinction of being odd man 
out. Both incurred the disfavour of the dominant interest at Court 
and, unlike all the other men who suffered from this judicature, both
Lionel Cranfield was created Baron Cranfield in 1621 and Earl 
of Middlesex in l622. I shall refer to him henceforth by his 
territorial title rather than by his family name.
Details of his financial deals, including those which figured 
in his trial, have been most carefully and thoroughly worked out by 
M. Preartwioh, Cranfield. Politics and Profits under the Early Stuarts.
2
Edward, Earl of Clarendon, The His^tory of the Rebellion and 
Civil Wars in England begun in the year I64I. ed. W.D. Macray (o^ tford, 
1888), i, pp.27-8. John Hacket said that contemporaries referred to
it as "the Prince * s Undertaking"; Scrinia Reserata: A Memori^
Offer*d to the Great Deservings of John Williams (London, 1^95)> p.
190. Clarendon*s view is confirmed by R.C. Johnson, *The Public 
Career of Lionel Cranfield, Earl of Middlesex (1575-1645)* (Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis of the University of Minnesota, 1556. A microfi&m copy 
of this thesis is deposited in the British Museum), p.290.
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were brought down partly or substantially because of the power of 
this interest* At first sight this consideration might seem to 
detract from the significance of both cases in the development of 
Parliamentary judicature, and particularly from the significance of 
that of Middlesex which, unlike Yelverton’s, was the leading case of 
its session. But in fact that development was to be strengthened 
in 1624 by the proceedings against Middlesex as it had been in l621 
by those against Yelverton. Various procedural advances were made, 
and methods became rather more complex and sophisticated in 1624, but 
the Commons were to end the session rather dissatisfied with their 
achievement. Despite the favourable political circumstances, they 
would find that they were unable to secure the result they desired. 
Possibly it was to remedy this situation that further procedural 
changes were made in I626, perhaps to give the Commons greater control 
over the process of Parliamentary judicature. But be that as it may, 
the lower House was to gain useful experience from the trials of 1624.
Although the omens did not favour Middlesex when the Parliament 
of 1624 opened, the hostility of the Prince and the Duke was by itself 
insufficient to secure his overthrow, particularly as in the early 
stages of the Parliament James shoived no sign of abandoning his Lord 
Tseasurer. Specific accusations had to be made and these were not 
forthcoming until after the Easter recess. But in the early days of 
April an almost simultaneous attack was launched in both Houses. On
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the 2nd the Lords heard a report that at a meeting of the committee 
for munitions, which was investigating the defences of the kingdom, 
evidence damaging to the reputation of a member of their House had 
been produced. It soon became clear that this member was Middlesex, 
so that, from the start, this case differed from its predecessors in 
1621, because the attack originated as much in the Lords as in the 
Commons. On the same day Sir Edwin Sandys presented to the lower 
House a long report from the committee of trade. This dealt with 
reasons for the decline of trade and indicated three types of imposi­
tion, with which Mdddlesex was soon to be associated.^ The Lords 
arranged for a sub-committee of the committee for munitions to take 
examinations, but the Commons merely resolved to continue to debate 
the report on the following day. However, three days later the lower 
House was offered information of a more explosive character. On the 
5th Sir Miles Fleetwood, Receiver-General of the Court of Wards and 
one of Middlesex’s subordinates as Master, accused him of manipulating 
the King’s revenues, altering the orders of the Court of Wards, and
L. J. iii, p.286; S.R. Gardiner, ed., Notes of the Debates in 
the House of Lords, officially t^en by Henry Elsing. Clerk of the 
Parliaments. A.D. 1624 and lo26 (London, 181^: Camden Society, New
Series, vol. xxiv), p.50l Diaiy of Sir Walter Erie: B.M. Additional
MS 1859f?, ff. 112-112V. (Erie’s Diary gives Sandy s’ report under 
26 March, but the diarist misplaces his account by a week at this 
point and did not correct his error until 12 April.). Buckingham 
was a member of the committee for munitions: Johnson, op. cit..
p.298. Sandys not Phelips, as Zebel states, was chairman of the 
committee of trade : S.H. Zebel, ’The Committee of the Whole in the
Reign of James I’. American Political Science Review (l94l), vol. 
XXXV, no. 5, p.951.
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of taking bribes. A debate followed in which Sir Edward Coke 
referred to the allegations as "a Grievance of Grievances", but 
Sandys counselled caution and Nqy said that if the accusations were 
not proved Middlesex’s accusers should be punished. However, Poole 
reminded the House that to examine the greatest offenders was its 
ancient right, and the Commons resolved to refer the whole charge to 
its committee of grievances, of which Coke was chairman, for examination 
that afternoon.^ This committee at once realised that as Middlesex 
was a member of the Lords it could not require his presence unless 
he chose voluntarily to answer before it; but the fact that it was 
prepared to contemplate this procedure against a peer suggests an 
assertiveness lacking in 1621, idien committees of the Commons had 
normally not heard defendants in cases of Parliamentary judicature.
The committee also seems to have determined to conduct its proceedings 
as fairly as possible, because it resolved that if copies of the 
charges against Middlesex were to be freely available to members of
Diary of John Holies: Harleian MS 6383, ff. Il8v.-119v; Diary
of Sir William Spring, p.192; C.J. i, p.755; Johnson, op. cit.. p.301, 
Spring’s Diary has hitherto been known as the Gurney Diary as it at 
one time formed part of the manuscript collection of J.H. Gurney of 
Keswick Hall, Norwich, The manuscript is now the property of the 
College Library of Harvard University and its author has recently been 
identified by members of the Yale Parliamentary Diaries Project.
Spring was M.P, for the County of Suffolk. I owe "this information 
about the identification and present ownership of the diary to the 
kindness of Miss Dorotiy Bridgwater of Yale University Library. That 
Library provided me with a microfilm transcript of the diary, and I 
use it by kind permission of the Heurvard College Library, where the 
diary is catalogued as MS Eng. 980.
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the Commons tlie accused should also receive the se. ^  During the
next few days it conducted a detailed investigation of Fleetwood’s
charges, paying particular attention to the allegation that Middlesex
had accepted two bribes of £300 each from the farmers of the great
and petty customs. The witnesses presented to it were not uniformly
satisfactory, as tdieir evidence was inclined to improve on reflection
and after contact with other witnesses; but by 9 April the House and
2
its committee were ready to debate the next step. On tliat day the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed that as the House had heard 
accusations against Middlesex it should no?f hear his answer and any 
witnesses he might produce to clear himself. This suggestion produced 
some division of opinion: Sir Thomas Jermyn maintained that the House
was not the proper place in v/hich to hear Middlesex’s answer. The 
Commons were "the grand Jury to finde the busynes", but having 
investigated it they should transmit it to the Lords, where Middlesex 
should answer, Brooke disagreed: "The Tresorer desyrd as muche an
acquytall in this hows, as y^ upper". Sir Humphrey May, Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, supported Brooke in a speech which suggests 
a link in his mind between ’clamour’ and ’complaint’ but tantalisingly 
leaves it unexplained:
^ Diary of Edward Nicholas: S.P. Dorn. 14/166, f.ll2.
^ i, p.758; Holies, ff.l22-124v,, 127v.-128; Nicholas,
ff. Il8v.-123v., I3OV.-I33; Dialer of Sir Thomas Holland; Tanner 
MS 392, f. 89; Erie, ff. 128v.-129.
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e 6
auntient sl^le of y co^laints of this hows, was called
y clamor of y Commons (y word then beeing taken in better
senee then now) but now it would iustly be calld a clamor,
if we should only hear his accusation, & not his defense.
The House eventually resolved to heau' Middlesex’s answer the following
afternoon,^ but there was clearly still doubt about the procedure to
be followed and the function of each House in cases likely to involve
co-operation between both of them.
On the same day as this debate took place the Commons heard
another report from Sandys’ committee of trade. This involved
Middlesex in responsibility for two types of burdens: he had benefited
personally from the duties on sugar; and he had inflicted an
unwarranted composition on groceries in the outports. The report
led Spencer to propose the appointment of a select committee to collect
information for presentation to the Lords, that "according to the
example of our ancestors" the offenders might be punished. He also
reviewed what had been done in the past with authors of impositions,
mentioning Latimer "impeached of the same Offence" as lyons, to whom
he also referred. His speech, which is recorded in the Commons Journal,
shows that Spencer, at any rate, was prepared to refer to impeachment
by name, although the word itself appears no more frequently in the
records of 1624 than in those of 1621. If fears of provoking the
King explain the abstinence of 1621, they did not inhibit Spencer in
1624. His speech also raises the question whether or not he was
^ C.J. i, p.761; Nicholas, ff. 130v.-131; Holies, f. 12Tv.
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thinking of the case, which was building up against Middlesex, as an 
impeachment. His reference to Latimer does not necessarily suggest 
this, and he does not say that Lyons was impeached. He may have 
quoted these cases merely to provide examples of men whose situations 
paralleled Middlesex’s, rather than of procedures which were similar. 
However, his remark may perhaps be seen in the light of Selden’s 
discussion of Middlesex’s case in his treatise. Of the Judicature in 
Parliaments. Selden says that Middlesex was "accused and impeached", 
though as will be seen he subsequently described procedural develop­
ments which, taking place in the course of the trial, prevented the 
case from fitting into his own definition of impeachment. Now, in 
stating that Middlesex was "accused and impeached" Selden used 
language which nowhere appears in the records of the case but which 
is, of course, the medieval formula. It may be that Selden, probably 
writing after the trial of Buckingham when this formula was used, 
remembered more clearly the details of the medieval cases he so 
assiduously studied than the exact procedure employed against Middlesex; 
but it is also possible that members like Spencer did believe, at 
least in the early stages of Middlesex’s trial, that they were 
impeaching him.^
p.759; J. Selden, Of the Judicature in Parliaments, 
p. 31. The first mention that I have found of Middlesex as having
been impeached occurs in a despatch of the Venetian ambassador of 
8/Ï8 September, l626: "The late Treasurer Cranfield ... was impeached
by the king when Prince of Wales and by Buckingham ..." : C.S.P. Ven.
1625-26. p.539. It is, of course, normal for modern accounts to
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After Spencer’s speech it was Coke’s turn to remind the House 
of vdiat its ancestors had done. He listed the cases of Latimer,
Lyons, and the Dulce of Suffolk, maintaining that Latimer had been 
punished although "hee had excused himselfe by authority from the 
king , a defence vdiich the Commons v/ere soon to encounter. Previously, 
Sir Arthui’ Ingram, Middlesex’s partner in many business deals, had 
tried to defend his friend, but the House adopted Spencer’s original 
proposal and appointed a select committee. This committee was charged 
with finding out the projectors and advisers of the impositions on 
sugar and groceries, as well as on wines, a duty with which Î/Iiddlesex’s 
name had not originally been connected but which had been laid at 
his door by the Secretary, Sir George Calvert, during the debate,^
When this committee reported to the House on the 12th it confirmed 
Calvert’s information, and the Commons adopted its proposal that all 
three impositions should be referred to the committee of grievances.
By this date, therefore, the committee of grievances was responsible 
for all the Commons* investigations into the accusations against 
Middlesex, and it was also ready to hear his answer. But whereas
refer to Middlesex as having been impeached: for example, Prestwich,
op. cit.. p.423 etc.; R.H. Tawney, Business and Politics under James I. 
Lionel Cranfield as Merchant and Minister (Cambridge. 1958r. p.231; 
but on p *238 Tawney says "We do not know by whom the word impeachment 
was first pronounced".
^ Spring, pp.219-21; Holies, ff. 125v.-127; Erie, ff. 125v.-128v; 
C.J. i, p. 760.
^ C.J. i, p. 763; Nicholas, ff. 14OV.-I42.
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in 1621 it had been almost wholly responsible for many investigations 
from the beginning, in 1624 a good deal of preliminary work had been 
done in other committees : the procedure was becoming more complex.
While these developments had been occurring in the Commons, the
Lords* committee for munitions had bjeen investigating charges that
Middlesex was responsible for the neglect of the ordnance, to which
was later added an accusation of fraudulent dealing in the lands of
Sir Roger Dallison, a former Master of the Ordnance Office.^ On
5 April Middlesex exhibited some of the arrogance idiich earned him
so many enemies by claiming that he was the victim of a plot, an
allegation which he subsequently failed to substantiate. By the 12th
the Archbishop of Canterbury was ready to report from his committee
and the House gave Middlesex an opportunity to reply to the report.
It then asked the sub-committee of the committee for munitions to
2
draw up heads of charges against the Lord Treasurer.
The parallel progress of developments in both Houses up to this 
point suggests a carefully co-ordinated campaign. But now a hitch 
occurred. Middlesex was soon to answer the Commons* charges against 
him, but he had not obtained the permission of the Lords to do so.
This led to a debate in the upper House on the 12th, but the matter
^ L4J. iii, pp.299-300.
^ L.J. iii, pp.290, 296, 3OI; Gardiner, Debates, 1624 and 1626. 
pp. 60-2 ; H.M.C. Report on the Manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleugh 
and Queensbeny (London. 1899-192^) / volV iii. VI; The Montagu Papers: 
Second Series, pp.235-6.
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was quickly resolved in favour of permitting Middlesex to answer. 
Significantly, Buckingham intervened to state that no one should be 
blamed for the failure to seek the peers* approval, but the Lords 
ended the debate by reaffirming that members of their House should 
not answer complaints in the Commons without licence.^
The realisation of this procedural error may have been one of 
the reasons why Middlesex did not answer in the Commons* committee on 
the 10th as originally arranged, but obviously it was not a reason 
he could make public without creating further difficulties for himself. 
Before the committee met, therefore, Brooke delivered to the House 
a message from Middlesex asking for a postponement of his reply on 
the grounds that he had received the charges only the previous evening 
and that he had been occupied in preparing an answer to the Lords* 
enquiries. This message provoked some criticism: the committee had
sent to Middlesex only those charges concerning bribes, and Lord 
Cavendish complained that, as these wepe matters of fact, the Lord 
Treasurer should not require much time to consider whether he should 
admit or dery having received such gifts. As a consequence, the 
House refused to alter the arrangements and ordered that Middlesex* s 
answer should be given to its committee that afternoon. Naturally 
enough, when the committee assembled it received no word from Middlesex, 
and Fleetwood at once tried to capitalise on this by proposing that
^ L.J' iii, p.299; Gardiner, Debates. 1624 and 1626. pp.65-6.
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the House should forthwith discuss his charges and arrange for their 
transmission to the Lords. But tliis suggestion seems to have received 
no support and shortly afterwards the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
brought another message from Middlesex aslcing that he should be 
permitted to answer on the following Monday afternoon, 12 April.
Several members, including Fleetwood, at once supported this request 
and despite some further debate it was later agreed to by the House.^ 
Because of this postponement, Middlesex had obtained the consent 
of the Lords to answer before the Commons* committee of grievances 
before he actually did so. His secretary brought the reply, which 
was not admitted until he had certified that Middlesex had dictated 
it to him. Not unreasonably, the Lord Treasurer confined himself 
to explaining his dealings with the farmers of the customs and derying 
that he had received bribes from them. But in the ensuing debate 
maiy of the other matters cited against Middlesex were considered and 
Sir John Eliot contributed to the drama of the occasion by declaring 
him "unwortly the favour of his country unwortly the countenance of
^ Ç4J. i, p.762; Nicholas, ff. 136v.-138v; Erie, f. 130; Diary 
of Sir Thomas Holland: Rawlinson MS D, 1100, ff. 5, 5-5v. Holland’s 
Diary is in two parts: the section in the Rawlinson MSS covers the
period 10 April - 15 May, 1624; that already cited in Tanner MS 392 
stops at 9 April. All future references are to the Rawlinson MS.
Fleetwood * s abrupt change of mind, in which Cavendish joined, 
may be a further indication that the real reason for the agreement 
to Middlesex’s request was that he and others now realised that the 
Lords had yet to give permission for Middlesex to answer.
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his prince and ripe to be commended up to the Lords".^ When Coke 
reported to the House it resolved that five separate types of charge 
should be presented to the Loixis : the two bribes from the customs
farmers; malpractices in the Court of Wards, which included altering 
its orders, extorting higher fees, and permitting the use of a stamp 
of Middlesex’s signature; the misuse of the sugar duties; the 
collection of duties on groceries from the outports; and the imposi­
tion on wines. The House then referred the vàiole matter to a select
2
committee of twenty-six members for preparation.
There seems to have been no opposition to the proposal to go to 
the Lords, so it is difficult to know exactly why this course was 
chosen. That it was not absolutely obligatory, the case of Aryan, 
later in the session, seems to show. Part of the answer no doubt 
lies in the fact that Middlesex was a peer, but a remark of Digges’ 
during the debate on the 12th suggests that there may have been another 
reason. He drew a distinction between the offence concerning the 
bribes, which he thought too unimportant to be sent to the Lords, and 
matters harmful to the Commonwealth, which should be transmitted to 
the peers. A day or two later the House adopted the same position 
when it refused to transmit to the Lords someone who was thought to 
have forged evidence against Middlesex, because it was considered that
^ Erie, f.l33; Holies, f. 129v.; Holland, ff. 12-12v.
^ Nicholas, ff. 1W.T.-14.5; Holies, f. 129v.; Holland, f. 12v. ; 
Tawney, op. cit.. p.241^ C.J. i, p.764.
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the offence was too petty.^ These two pieces of evidence indicate 
that some members were coming to regard transmission to the Lords as 
a procedure to be reserved for the more important offences. Perhaps 
they had felt this previously, but there is no evidence that in 1621
they had been unwilling to present to the Lords any of the information
2
that Bacon had talien bribes.
To return to Middlesex’s case: during the debate on the 12th
Phelips had argued that the chairman of the committee of grievances 
should deliver the Commons’ accusation to the Lords, thus following 
the precedent set in Bacon’s case. Digges had disagreed, proposing 
that as in Mompesson’s case the matter should be distributed among 
several members. When the select committee reported on the 13th the 
House modified Phelips’ suggestion and arranged that Coke and Sandys, 
chairmen respectively of the comraitteesof grievances and trade, should 
deliver its charge to the Lords. However, before sending a message 
to the upper House asking for a conference the Commons listened to 
speeches from the two men. Coke surveyed the matters for which he 
was to be responsible - the accusations concerning the bribes and the 
Court of Wards; while Sandys dealt with the more hazardous business 
of the duties and impositions. Here the problem was to avoid any
^ Nicholas, f. 143v.; Holland, f. 12; Diary of John Fym: B.M.
Additional MS 26639, f. 4v.
P
But a remark by Moore in the case of the commoner, Bennet, should 
be noted. He said that, if the accusation was not weighty, it was 
not worth sending to the Lords: C.J. i, p.383.
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questioning of the right to impose, with its implications of challenge
to the rqyal prerogative, and the House rapidly adopted Sandys* proposal
that the word oppression should be substituted for imposition. It also
resolved that it did not intend to cast aspersions on aiy member of
the Privy Council apart from Middlesex; and Seymour played a valuable
part in clearing away the rather wild allegations that the Lord
Treasurer was responsible for suggesting the collection of benevolences
and the dissolution of the last Parliament.^
With these preparations completed the whole House assembled that
afternoon at Whitehall for the conference with the Lords. In his
introductory remarks Coke declared that the Commons
appear for Multitudes, and bind Multitudes....
They are the Representative Body of the Realm; for all 
the People are present in Parliament by Person Representative; 
and therefore, by the Wisdom of the State, and by Parliament 
Orders, the Commons are appointed the Inquisitors General 
of the Grievances of the Kingdom....
Spring, p.233; Erie, ff. 140-2; Holland, f. 2?v.; Fÿm, f. 6v.; 
C.J. i, p.767. The King took upon himself sole responsibility for the 
exaction of benevolences and on I6 April the Speaker received a letter 
from him stating that Middlesex had begged him to continue the last 
Parliament: G.A, Harrison, ed., ’The Diary of Sir Simonds D ’Ewes,
deciphered for the period January 1622 to April 1624’, p*271; C.J. 
i, p.768. C. Roberts, The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart 
England. p.38, says that Sandys disobeyed the Commons and referred to 
the dissolution and the collection of benevolences when he made his 
speech to the Lords. His source is Harleian MS 4289, ff. 191-5, 
but this record of Sandys’ speech is a copy and in the margin of the 
section dealing with these two charges is a note that they had been 
deleted in the original: f. 192. Neither charge appeared in the
final accusation and there therefore seems to be no reason to suppose 
that San3ys exceeded his instructions.
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In referring to the Commons’ function as representatives of the realm 
to enquire into the grievances of the kingdom. Coke was justifying 
their action in the same way as their proceedings against patents and 
monopolies had been justified in 1621* Grievances were particularly 
the province of the Commons: the Lords were too exalted to be much
troubled by them. It was an idea which was not new even in 1621: in
l6lO an unidentified member had made much the same point.^
After this introduction. Coke stated that in their inquisition 
they had uncovered "many great, exorbitant, and heinous Offences" 
committed by the Lord Treasurer, and that no member of the Commons 
Sad been prepared to declare him not guilty. He followed this with 
details of the charges and ended by reciting Middlesex’s oaths of 
office. Sandys followed Coke, displaying all the caution he had shown 
earlier in the Commons, and the case concluded with "the Knights, 
Cittizens, and Burgesses, humbly pray and demand iustice of your Lo^^^". 
The peers then referred the case for examination to their sub-committee
2
for munitions, which they increased in size from ten to fifteen members.
E.R. Foster, ’The procedure of the House of Commons against 
Patents and Monopolies’. Conflict in Stuy?t England, pp.62, 75; E.R. 
Foster, ed., Proceedings iiTParliament. l6lO, ii.~146. See also 
p.134 > above. This concept assumes greater significance when set 
in the context of the growth in size of the electorate in the early
seventeenth century. The evidence for this expansion and the part
played by the House of Commons in achieving it have been discussed 
by J.H. Plumb in ’The Growth of the Electorate in England from 1600
to 1715’. Past and Present (1969), no. 45, pp.90-116.
 ^I^. iii, pp.307-11; Erie, ff. 142v.-143t.
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This sub-oommittee worked hard during the next week but not until 
the 24th was it ready to make a first report. On that day the Archbishop 
of Canterbury reported that, having examined mary witnesses, the sub­
committee had drawn up part of the charge. This was an amalgam of
the accusations collected by both Houses, and it consisted of six parts. 
The first three were concerned with the taking of bribes from customs 
farmers and seem to have included a bribe which did not figure in the 
Commons* accusation. The fourth part referred to the abuse in the 
sugar farm and the fifth to the levying of the composition on the 
outports. The sixth part combined the malpractices in the Court of 
Wards with the neglect of the ordnance and the fraudulent dealings in 
the lands of the Dallison family.^ The Lords ordered that a copy of 
the charge should be sent to Middlesex, but they were careful to note 
in their Journal that this should not be used as a precedent to break 
the normal practice by idiich parties accused received their charge at 
the Bar. Middlesex was told to present to the House the names of any 
witnesses he wished to have examined, and to attend himself at the Bar 
on 29 April to answer the charge. He was also warned that his charge
2
mi^t be added to later from among other matters still under examination.
H.M.C. Montagu Papers, p.237; L.J. iii, pp.318-9; Johnson, 
op. cit.. p.315. Since this sub-committee began its work the Lords 
had received two further petitions about Dallison’s lands. One was 
read after Abbot’s report: H.M.C. MontaguoPapers. p.237; L.J. iii,
p.320.
^ b.J. iii, pp.319, 320. The charge was sent to Mddlesex because 
the absence of many lords at Windsor for the celebration of the Feast
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Middlesex now embarked on a period of intense activity, designed 
to win for himself every possible adv^tage in the crisis that was 
fast approaching. On the 26th he wrote to the King imploring him to 
persuade the Lords to grant him longer time for the preparation of his 
answer. Three days later he followed this with a petition in which 
he said that the King could save him by being present to hear his 
cause, adding that "There must be somwhat in it more than ordinarye 
that there is so great paynes taken to ruyne mee".^ On the 27th and 
on each of the next two days he also sent petitidns to the Lords. He 
first asked for counsel to be assigned to him to assist him in making 
his answer, and he suggested that the examination of witnesses should 
be deferred until he had done this. The Lords had apparently antici­
pated the first request because on the previous day they had asked 
their sub-committee for privileges to search the precedents and report 
how those accused b efore them in the past had answered. They now 
told him that he could use what counsel he pleased but that they would 
not be permitted to attend at the Bar; they also refused to postpone
of St. George meant that the House would be poorly attended for the 
next few days. This gave Middlesex a respite which otherwise he 
might well not have had: C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-5. p.223. The Lords*
order about the charge begins "Whereas, by the ancient Customs of this 
House, the Parties accused and complained of are to receive their 
Charge at the Bar ..."
^ C&bala. ^tvsteries of State, in Letters of the great Ministers of 
K. James and K. Obarles. pp. 2<ë7-8 ; Sackville (Knole; MSS Series 1. 
Cranfield Addenda, Bundle IV. The bundle is labelled: Cranfield MSS
Impeachment, and is at Kent Record Office, Maidstone. I am indebted 
to Lord Sackville for permission to make reference to his manuscripts.
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the examination of witnesses, a list of whom Middlesex had attached 
to his petition. In his second petition he pleaded with the Lords 
for more time in which to prepare the interrogatories on which these 
witnesses were to be examined, and he also asked to be sent copies of 
the depositions made on both sides without which he maintained that 
his defence would be severely handicapped. The Lords’ reaction was 
hostile; Middlesex was told that to send witnesses for examination 
without accompanying interrogatories showed disrespect, and his second 
request was dismissed as wholly unsuitable. He was reminded that 
they expected him to answer before them on the following morning. 
However, instead of doing so, the Lord Treasurer sent yet another 
petition: asserting that he was ill, he asked for a postponement of
the hearing and he repeated his request for copies of the depositions. 
The answer was a good deal milder than might have been expected: 
having heard the previous two petitions and their answers to them re­
read, the Lords adopted the Prince’s motion that the request for delay 
be granted. Middlesex was told that if his health permitted he was 
to appear on 1 May, bringing his answer with him; if not, he was to 
send his answer in writing, submit his interrogatories within the next 
two days, and appear in person on 7 May for the final determining of 
his cause.^ Unless the Lords took Middlesex’s illness at its face 
value, which seems unlikely, there are two reasons which may account
^ LjJ. iii, pp.321, 323, 325-7; H.M.C. Montagu Papers, p.239.
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for their readiness to accede to his request: it is possible that the
King may have brought pressure to bear on their leaders as a consequence 
of Middlesex’s letter to him of the 26th, but if so it is likely that 
the petition of the 28th would have received a different reply. It 
therefore seems more probable that shortly before the 29th they became 
aware of deficiencies in one, or possibly two, of the charges already 
sent to Middlesex and seized upon the opportunity of a deferment with 
alacrity. At any rate, as soon as the reply granting Middlesex’s 
request had been despatched, the Attorney General read an addition to 
the charge concerning the sugar duties, and a new accusation relating 
to profiteering as Master of the Great Wardrobe; and when Middlesex 
received these he commented that it was as well that the first charge 
had been altered because it had previously been utterly mistaken.^
With the help of this revised schedule the case now proceeded 
rather more smoothly. On 1 May Middlesex sent to the Lords his answer 
to the charges. In this long and elaborate document, undoubtedly 
prepared with the assistance of his two counsel, Nicholas %rde and 
William Hakewill, he denied mary of the accusations and explained away 
others, declaring himself ready to justify all that he had written.
L.J. iii, pp.327, 328; Johnson, op. cit., p.323. Johnson 
regards the King’s letter as the cause of the granting of Middlesex’s 
request. It is also, of course, possible, as Tawney suggests, that 
the Lords realised that their original schedule was too tight, thou^ 
what he regards as stages unavoidable before the trial could open 
would readily have been avoided if Middlesex had confessed as Bacon 
did in 1621: Tawney, op. cit.. pp.246-7.
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He also sent interrogatories on four parts of the charge, petitioning 
to submit the remainder on the following Monday, the 3rd. He renewed 
his request for copies of the depositions, claiming that he had never 
expected to receive them before he had made his own answer; and at 
last, on the 3rd, believing that they were ignoring all the precedents, 
the Lords granted Middlesex’s wish,^
Meanwhile the Commons had settled a small but important piece of 
procedure. On 23 April they had received a petition complaining that 
Middlesex had placed an extra imposition upon hops. In due course the 
committee of trade recommended that the matter should be sent to the 
Lords, but two members, Poole and More, wanted it examined by the House 
first. However, the Commons decided to be guided by their memory 
that in Bacon’s case all petitions presented against him "after the 
transform^" had been immediately sent up to the Lords without further 
examination. Accordingly, this new matter was transmitted "not as a 
thinge iudged by them but to be considdered by the Lords as theye sawe 
Cause".^
On 4 May, the Archbishop of Canterbury told the Lords that the
^ b.J. iii, pp.329-35, 337-8; H.M.C. Montagu Papers, p.239; 
N.E. McClure, ed., The Letters of John Chamberlain, ii, p.555.
^ Nicholas, ff. 170-170v.; Erie, ff. l65v.-léé; lÿm, f. 28; 
Sir Simonds D'Ewes Journal of the Parliament of 1624: Harleian MS
159, f. 116; C.J. i, p.696.
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examination of Middlesex's witnesses had been completed,^ Nothing
now remained but for the House to await the Lord Treasurer’s appearance
at the Bar on the 7th. At this point the King intervened. Summoning
the Lords to him he delivered a speech which excelled in the art of
sitting on the fence. He began by telling them that as "I am the
Judge, in whose Room you are to exercise Judgement" he thought it
necessary to advise them lest their judgment conflicted with his views
in the matter. Although he acknowledged that they were "the most
2
Honourable Jury of England" yet it was necessary to point out that 
because Middlesex, unlike Bacon, had justified himself in answering 
the charges, they must take great pains to uncover the truth. James 
then commended to them Middlesex’s application and good service, 
maintaining that all good treasurers must, of necessity, be hated; 
but he also reminded them that Middlesex was appointed "upon a 
Reformation" so that if he had himself transgressed he was doubly to 
blame. James took upon himself responsibility for some of Hie items 
in the charge - though he did not specify these - because he said that
L.J. iii, p.541. Dudley Carleton told his father that Middlesex 
had produced forty witnesses, tv/elve of whom had deposed directly 
against him: C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-3, p.232. The number of witnesses
gives some idea of the scale of the task that faced the Lords.
p
L.J. iii, p.343. Later in the Journal account of the speech 
James said "The Informers are the Lower House, and the Upper House 
are the Judges": p.344. Rawlinson MS B. 131, f. 67v. has "Jurie"
in place of "Judges" here, but this is of small consequence: the
Lords, of course, fulfilled the function of both judge and jury which 
is one of the characteristics which gives this type of judicature its 
unique quality.
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they were done with his knowledge and consent, but he ended by
declaring that he would never maintain a man in a bad cause. At no
point in his speech did the King do more than hint at the political
pressures which were so largely responsible for Middlesex’s ruin, and
it is hardly surprising that Chamberlain reported to Carleton that
opinion was divided as to whether James had spoken in favour of, or
against, his Lord Treasurer.^
When the hearing opened on 7 May the Lord Keeper, Bishop Williams,
presided and the case against Middlesex was presented by Sir Randolph
Crew, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, and Sir Thomas Coventry,
Attorney General, two of the lavyers attendant upon the Lords.
Middlesex was brought to the Bar without his Staff and knelt until
told to stand. Crew opened the charge:
The Commons, being the general Inquisitors of the Sores and 
Grievances of the Kingdom, have presented to the Lords their 
Complaint against this great Lord and Officer; whereof, and ; 
of other Misdemeanors, their Lordships have taken Cognizance. (2)
This introduction requires some discussion. It indicates, first,
that, while the Commons’ peculiar ri^t to investigate grievances was
acknowledged, the evidence thus discovered was not to be the only basis
^ L.J. iii, pp.343-4; McCiare, op. cit.. p.559; Erie, f. 174. 
James came closest to referring to the pressures exerted by Charles 
and Buckingham when he warned the Lords not to permit any man’s 
particular aims to establish a precedent which might prove prejudicial 
to them and their heirs; L.J. iii, p.344.
^ L.J. iii, p.344.
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for the trial. Middlesex was also being charged with "other
Misdemeanors", those which the Lords* own enquiries had revealed.
The case against him had, from the very beginning, been the result of
the work of both Houses, a factor which makes this trial exceptional
among the cases of Parliamentary judicature being studied. Yet in
spite of this, the charge itself had been drawn up by the Lords. In
Selden*s view this duty was forced upon the peers, because the Commons
had presented their accusation orally at a committee of the two Houses.
In explanation, he says that they had departed
from the Ancient Course in this, they delivered not their 
Accusation in writing (he being absent;) Had it been in 
the open House, an Impeachment by word of mouth had been
sufficient, and the Suit had been theirs: but it being at
a Committee, how could the Lord Treasurer take notice of 
their Impeachment? wherefore the Lords of necessity did draw 
up a Charge against him out of their Accusation, ai^ then it 
became the Kings Suit, and they were abridged of their power 
to reply, or demand Judgment, (l)
Now it will be remembered that Selden, who had earlier stated that
Middlesex was "accused and impeached", defined impeachment as a procedure
in which the suit belonged to the Commons, while one characteristic of
a complaint was that the proceedings were ex parte re&is. Elsynge*s
treatise also makes this point and adds that in an impeachment the
Commons have the right to reply to the accused’s defence, while
Selden, Of Judicature, pp.64-5. The Commons did demand judgment, 
but only when the Lords invited them to do so; they did not employ 
their "power to reply" to Middlesex’s defence.
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"Judgment is not to bee given till they demand it".^ It therefore 
seems as though Selden believed that by a certain stage Middlesex’s 
case had ceased to be an impeachment. This is not, of course, to say 
that the Commons or the Lords shared his view, even though he was now 
a member of the former. But there may be some significance in Crew’s 
reference to the Commons’ accusationagainst Middlesex as "their 
Complaint".
A final point may be made about Crew’s introduction. He states 
that the Commons’ complaint was presented to the Lords, and Maude 
Clarke considered this important: "... not the man but the articles
of accusation were presented". But she contrasted this with the 
concept of the Commons as general inquisitors of the grievances of 
the kingdom, pointing out that Coke had concluded the long speech, 
which he had introduced with this concept, by declaring that the 
Commons’ "complaint is of a high lord, the lord treasurer ..." She 
therefore concluded that, despite the fact that Middlesex himself was 
not presented to the Lords, "the idea of indictment was becoming clear".
^ bbid.. p.14; H. Elsynge, ’The moderne forme of the Parliaments 
of England’. American Historical Review ( 1948). vol. liii, no. 2, p.302.
2
M.V. Clarke, ’The Origin of Impeachment’. Fourteenth Century 
Studies, p.268 and n.2. Maiy years ago, C.H. Mcllwain pointed to the 
connection between the concept of the Commons as the grand inquest of 
the nation and their function of presentment: The H i ^  Court of 
Parliament and its Supremacy, p.189.
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However, it may perhaps be questioned how far this distinction between
presenting the man and presenting his accusation was clearly drawn.
There is an account, possibly not contemporary, in the diary of
Simonds D*Ewes, of the Commons* decision to go to the Lords. According
to this. Sir Thomas Holland, a member of the Commons, had told D*Ewes
that the House had "resolved to transmitt himm (i.e* Middlesex) upp
w ^  his charge to the Lords as a guilty person to bee censured by
them".^ This remark suggests that the presentation of the offeiïier
was as important to the Commons as the presentation of their accusation;
but on the other hand it may be doubted whether Holland knew enough
2
law to appreciate the distinction.
After Crew's introductory speech he developed a procedure which 
was to be followed throughout the investigations of the next few days; 
either he or his colleague, the Attorney General, would introduce a 
particular part of the charge which would then be supported by deposi­
tions of witnesses read out by the Clerk. Middlesex would then 
answer, often calling witnesses in his defence. Following this, the 
prosecution might reply, sometimes challenging what the defence 
witnesses had said, and Middlesex might make a rejoinder.^
^ Harrison, op. cit.. p.271.
^ C.D. i, pp.90-4.
^ Tawney, op. cit., p.249. Tawney points out that unlike Bacon, 
Middlesex was required to attend at the Bar; but of course Bacon 
entered no defence.
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Although an amateur confronted by legal experts, Middlesex 
fought the case against him every inch of the way. He also stretched 
the Lords* patience to breaking point: after two full days* hearing,
between which he had won a Saturday*s respite, he retired to his bed 
and announced to a delegation sent to visit him that he was receiving 
un-Christian treatment. This delegation reported that he was 
perfectly well, and he narrowly escaped being sent to the Tower for 
his impudence. When he reappeared in the House on the afternoon of
the 11th he complained about the manner in which the Attorney General
had conducted the case, and the Lords had to interrupt proceedings 
to clear their officer.^
Between 7 and 11 May the Lords examined all the charges that had
been brought against Middlesex with the exception of that referring
to an imposition on wines and the belated accusation of an imposition 
on hops. In one instance the King had intervened effectively to assert 
that he had approved the alterations in procedure in the Court of 
Wards, and that part of the charge had been dropped. But, predictably, 
much of the case had gone badly for Middlesex and he doubtless
L.J* iii, pp.360, 371, 373-4; McClure, op. cit.. ii, p.559. 
Middlesex*s answer to the charges is given in L.J. iii, p.349, 358-él, 
365-7, 369-70, 374, 376-8. Like Bacon, Middlesex also had a collection 
of precedents made, undoubtedly to assist his defence: Sackville
(Knole) MSS Series I. Cranfield Addenda, Bundle IV (At Kent Record 
Office, Maidstone); Sackville (Knole) MSS Series I. Cranfield Papers. 
Unnumbered MSS, Bundle IV (at the Historical Manuscripts Commission, 
London).
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recognised this when he made his concluding speech on the morning 
of the 12th. He very briefly recapitulated some of his earlier 
remarks and then reminded the Lords of his service to the King and 
its value. He finished by craving pardon if he had omitted arything 
or annoyed the House in ary way.^
The Lords occupied the remainder of the day in debating and 
voting on each part of the charge. Here again they adopted a set 
procedure: each part was taken in committee and the Lord Keeper
frequently set the tone in his introductory speech. Five or six 
speakers followed, and the House then resumed to Vote whether Middlesex 
was censurable on that part of the charge. The Lords dealt first 
with the accusation of mismanagement in the Great Wardrobe. Here they 
at once had to face the difficulty that Middlesex had received a pardon 
for pocketing the difference between the running costs of this depart­
ment and the annual allowance, an action in aiy case permitted to him 
by his patent. He had, however, failed to keep accounts, though he 
was under no legal obligation to do so. While the Lords were making 
up their minds about the pardon and deciding that none the less 
Middlesex was still guilty of mismanagement, they censured him for 
taking bribes from the customs farmers. They also had no hesitation 
in imposing a censure for the accusations concerning the Ordnance 
Office and Dallison's lands. On the charge referring to the Court
^ L.J. iii, pp.375, 378.
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of Wards they were more cautious: the King had already intervened
here and the Lords felt able to censure Middlesex only for those 
sections dealing with the doubling of fees for liveries and the use 
of the signature stamp; they declared that it was not proved that 
he had appointed his Secretary to take fees for petitions or that he 
had benefited from concealed wards. However, when they stepped back 
to view the complete charge at the end of their debate they decided 
that he deserved a censure for the whole thing. Rather uneasiOy, 
they let him off the charge concerning the sugar duties because the 
King had acknowledged that he knew the extent of Middlesex's gains 
from the lease, but Charles warned the House not to forget that the 
King had suffered financially because of the Lord Treasurer's behaviour. 
Finally the charge about compositions on groceries in the outports 
failed because Middlesex was able to justii^ himself fi*om precedent.^
When the Lords met on 13 May they first sent a message to the 
Commons warning them to expect a further message of importance 
shortly. They then had read out the charges and the votes passed 
on the previous day. Next, they went into committee to obtain 
guidance on punishment from a whole galaxy of medieval precedents.
Before fixing on this they debated Middlesex's claims to good service, 
belittling some and rejecting others. Then by means of seven
^ L.J* iii, pp.379-81; Gardiner, Debates. 1624 and 1626. pp.74-84; 
H.M.C. Montagu Papers, pp.241-2.
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questions they resolved on the Lord Treasurer's punishment* They 
declared that he should lose all his offices and be excluded from 
holding ary in future. He was never to sit in Parliament again and 
was to be prohibited from attendance at Court. He should be imprisoned 
in the Tower during His Majesty's pleasure and pay to the King a fine 
of £50,000. There was some feeling that the financial penally was 
too low and Saye proposed linking a higher fine with confiscation of 
Middlesex's lands. Other members, including the Prince, thought that 
the Lord Treasurer should be compelled to make restitution to those 
he had wronged; but the Lords merely accepted an offer by the Lord 
Chamberlain to introduce a bill making his lands liable for his fine.^ 
The final scene in the destruction of Middlesex was closely 
similar to that in which Bacon had been the central figure three years 
earlier. The Lords despatched Crew and Coventry to the Commons to 
tell them that they were ready to deliver judgment on Middlesex if the 
lower House would come to demand it. With the peers and the Speaker 
in their robes, the Lord Treasurer, dressed in black, was brought to 
the Bar. The Speaker declared that the Commons had "transmitted unto 
your Lordships several Offences against the ... Lord High Treasurer
L.J.iii, pp.382-3; Gardiner, Debates, 1624 and l626. pp.84-91. 
Saye suggested a figure of £80,000; the Commons had apparently 
thought in terms of £200,000: C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-3. p.244. Chamberlain,
who was invariably hostile to Middlesex, thought it remarkable that 
the Lords did not degrade him. He also noted the similarity between 
the sentences of Middlesex and Bacon; McClure, op. cit., ii, p.560; 
Johnson, op. cit., p.165.
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of England" and du3y demanded judgment.^ The Lord Keeper then 
pronounced the censure, after which the Lords appointed a committee 
to acquaint the King with the sentence and to ask him to take away 
the Staff from Middlesex.^
The Commons were not pleased with the sentence or with the final 
stages of the attack on Middlesex: they had expected a harsher penally
and a censure more specific to the charges. They may first have 
been provoked by the omission from the list of charges of the imposi­
tion on wines, an accusation which the Lords perhaps ignored in order 
to avoid aiy conflict with the royal prerogative. ^  But whether or 
not because of this omission, the Commons, prompted by Robert Phelips, 
realised on 11 May that they possessed no independent record of the 
charges transmitted to the Lords. They therefore resolved that Coke 
and Sandys should set down the charges as presented lest there should 
be "as in the case of the Lo: Chanceler Bacon, no memorialls remayning". 
On the 13th, before the Commons went to the Lords, Phelips reminded 
them of his motion but although Coke went over the charges for which 
he had been responsible Phelips hardly seems to have got his way if 
the skeletal record in the Journal is any guide. Moreover, although
^ Two accounts substitute "Complaints" for "Offences" in the 
Speaker's statement: Holland, f. 87v.; Nicholas, f. 199v.
^ L.J. iii; p.383; Gardiner, Debates. 1624 and I626, p.92.
 ^D.C. Apielman, 'Impeachments and the Parliamentary Opposition 
in England, I62I-I64I*, pp.95-6; H.M.C. Montagu Papers, p.243; 
D'Ewes Journal 1624, f. 121v.
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the Speaker was apparently instructed to repeat to the Lords every 
head of the charge presented and to demand judgment on all of them, 
he did not do so.^
When the Commons returned from the Lords, angered by the sentence, 
Phelips again tried to prod them into action. He complained that 
the Lords
did decline from the auntient mann (i.e. manner) of 
iudging in plmt, for it was a use that evy iudgemt 
given here and transmitted ov by us to the lo did 
receave its weight and pticler iudgemt above with 
their loPP®. (2)
If the sentence fell short of Tdiat the Commons expected, they had in 
the past demanded an additional censure - and he cited the case of 
Michael de la Pole as an example. He proposed that Noy and Selden 
be asked to search the precedents. Noy tried to bring the discussion 
back to the immediate issue by moving that committees of both Houses 
should meet to record the judgment against Middlesex; but the only 
resolution adopted was that a search of the precedents be undertaken 
to determine how such judgments had been made in the past "by the 
Lords upon Complaint made by the Commons". A committee of antiquaries 
Coke, Cotton, Noy, Phelips and Selden - was appointed and, apart from
^ CjJ. i, pp.787-9; Erie, f. 179; Nicholas, f. 197» Nicholas 
gives this instruction to the Speaker; it does not appear in the 
Commons Journal. Sandys does not seem to have delivered to the Commons 
his part of the charge until 28 May: C.J. i, p.797; Nicholas, f. 233.
^ Nicholas, f. 200.
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the addition of a further member a few days later, that is the last
we hear of it or of the Commons* grievance - both doubtless overtaken,
the one by the end of the session and the other by the enfeebling
influence of the passage of time,^
As the session drew to a close the Houses cleared up the remnants
of their case against Middlesex, The Lords ladd down procedure for
the future in consequence of proposals made by their sub-committee of
privileges on 28 May. Proceedings before them were to be "clear and
equal"; a defendant was to receive copies of all depositions
sufficiently in advance of the hearing to give time for preparation,
and, if he asked for it at the appropriate moment, he was to receive
2
the assistance of learned counsel. If there is little in this order 
from which Middlesex had not benefited, it is nevertheless significant 
that the Lords were attempting to guarantee and institutionalise their 
reviving power of judicature. As for Middlesex himself, the Lords 
embarked on an investigation of demands for restitution, and both 
Houses passed the bill to make his lands liable for the payment of 
his debts, though in the Commons Phelips protested about the precedent
^ C.J. i, pp.789, 791; Erie, ff. 183-183?; Nicholas, f. 200; 
D'Ewes Journal 1624, ff. 121-121v.
2
L.J. iii, p.418. From the Lords* order it is not clear vdiether 
they were now prepared to allow counsel to plead for a defendant, or 
merely, as they had permitted to Middlesex, to advise him, Selden 
indicates that they had intended the former and believes that, in 
derying Middlesex the full benefit of counsel, they had shown a mis­
understanding of the precedent in Michael de la Pole's case: Of
Judicature, p.103.
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that was being created. When James gave his assent to this bill at 
the prorogation, he tried to make use of the opportunity to reassert 
his own authoriiy. He told the Commons that though they might present 
general grievances they should not be too eager to hunt them out, nor 
should they determine on a remedy until he had had "the hearing and 
allowing of it". He declared that he would not in future permit 
"ary officer of his to be complained of in Parliament without leave", 
and he reminded them, quite correctly, that the sentence, some parts 
of which he rejected, was subject to his confirmation. But his speech 
might have carried greater conviction had he been prepared to give 
more assistance to his Lord Treasurer both during and after the trial. 
In fact, the severity of the sentence was reduced more slowly than 
mary people expected, and a great deal more slowly than Middlesex 
found comprehensible; there was probably some truth in the Venetian 
Ambassador's nasiy report to his superiors that the advantages to be 
derived from the sentence, such as the redistribution of Middlesex's 
offices, would "console him (the King) for the treasurer's fall".^
If the attack on Middlesex originated in the personal hostility 
towards him of Charles and Buckingham, the Commons and Lords did 
not develop it merely as disciples of this leadership. They accused
^ iii, pp.396, 420; C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-5. p.259; C.S.P. Yen. 
1623-5 , pp.325, 343; McClure, op. cit., ii, pp,561-2; Nicholas, 
f. 232v; Erie, ff. 205-205?. On 13 May Dudley Carleton had written 
to his father that everyone expected the King to remit Middlesex's 
fine; C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-5. p.245. For Middlesex's attitude, see,
for example, C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-5. pp.318, 481.
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him of crimes and of other activities with an enthusiasm which was 
clearly not second-hand.^ Moreover, while it is possible to question 
the fairness of some of the case against Middlesex, a detailed and 
specific charge had been brought against him. As in Bacon's case, 
the accusation was not, in itself, political - whatever the pressures 
that inspired it - and it reflected only indirectly on Middlesex's 
competence as a minister. While it is true that, for the second 
time in three years. Parliamentary action had ruined an important 
minister of the Crown, and while some of the implications of this 
may well have lain behind James* speech at the prorogation, the 
accusation was of a different character from that levelled against 
Buckingham in 1626.^
Apart from these general considerations, the process of judicature
However, it is perhaps going too far to agree with Eusden that 
for the first time the Commons were able to carry through an action 
against a minister of state on their own initiative and authority ;
J.D. Eusden, Puritans. Lawyers, and Politics in Early Seventeenth- 
Century England (New Haven, 1958), p.152.
2
See Tawney. op. cit.. pp.250ff., and Prestwich, op. oit. . pp. 
455Ff. Selden maintained that Middlesex harmed himself by absenting 
himself from the House, "for he might have stayed there until Judgment, 
unless when his own Cause came in agitation": op. cit.. p. 101.
Elsynge substantially confirms this: a member of the Lords accused
of misdemeanours might remain in his place until his judgment, except 
during the examination of his cause or while his censure was debated: 
Elsynge, op. cit.. p.302.
^ It is, however, necessaiy to avoid being influenced by Clarendon's 
intriguing but unauthenticated story of James' warning to the Prince 
and the favourite of the consequences of their Parliamentary activities 
in 1624: Clarendon, op. cit.. i, p.28. See also Spielman, op. cit.
p.92.
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was refined, sharpened, and to some extent modified in the course 
of this case. The use of comniittees by the Commons became more 
complex: the committee of grievances was employed to continue and
complete work begun in other committees; while its invitation to 
Middlesex to answer before it represented an extension of its powers. 
The Commons presented to the Lords definite charges against Middlesex 
whereas in 1621 they had merely handed to them without comment 
information about Bacon. Although they were bolder in dealing with 
Mompesson they required a whole series of conferences with the Lords 
for the purpose, #iereas in 1624 one conference sufficed. But while 
they had handed to the Lords the written evidence they had collected 
against Mompesson, their delivery of the charges and supporting 
information in the case of Middlesex was purely oral: in this respect
they did not advance from their position in Bacon's case.^ However, 
the prospect of duelling with a peer and a h i ^  officer of state did 
not inhibit them as it must have done in l621: they invited Middlesex
to appear before their committee of grievances to answer their 
accusations, though doubtless in doing so they did not overlook the 
advantages of the acquiescence of Charles and Buckingham. Finally, 
the Lords in l624 developed a feature of Parliamentary judicature
Hargrave isolates four examples of procedural immaturity in 
Middlesex's trial, but only one of these, the oral presentation of 
the case, can be accepted without qualification: preface to M. Hale,
The Jurisdiction of the Lords House, p.xxxv. In pointing to 
"Irregularities" in Middlesex's case Tawney seems to have accepted 
too uncritically Hargrave's analysis : Tawney, op. cit.. p. 248.
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which had shown some signs of existence in 1621 - that of investigating 
and drawing up charges of their own, quite separate from those framed 
by the Commons against the same man. In 1621 it is arguable that
the Commons* initiative was responsible, as for example in the case of 
Yelverton, for the Lords* action; but in 1624 the timing of the 
Lords* enquiries precludes this explanation of the investigations of 
their committee for munitions. Their work through this committee 
compels us to make some modification of the traditional view that the 
Lords* part in Parliamentary judicature is exclusively that of judge 
and jury. Certainly they were dealing with a peer but they were 
undertaking part of the Commons* function of acting as informers.
The Commons gained in confidence as a result of the accusation 
against Middlesex, and proceedings advanced in formality. Hesitations 
and uncertainties remained, forms were not clearly established, but 
it was soon to prove possible to contemplate what would probably have 
seemed unattainable in 1621 - an attack through the processes of 
Parliamentary judicature on a man of the stature of the Duke of 
Buckingham.^
A further dimension might have been added to Parliamentary 
judicature in l624 if some advice of Cotton's had been implemented. 
Apparently, the Spanish ambassador had accused Buckingham of planning 
to use Parliament to place James under restrictions and to transfer 
the government to Charles. Cotton advised the Duke to complain 
to the Lords and then withdraw from the House. The Lords would 
then ask the Commons for a conference and a message would be taken 
by the Speakers of both Houses to the ambassador, requiring him to 
produce his charge and proofs: Harleian MS 304, ff* 40-40v. I am
grateful to my supervisor, Mr Roger Lockyer, for drawing my attention 
to this material.
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Two other cases in the Parliament of I624 are of some significance 
for the development of Parliamentary judicature. They are those of 
the Bishop of Norwich, Samuel Harsnett, and the Master of Corpus 
Christi College, Oxford, Dr> Aiyan, The Bishop, a man of Arminian 
views, was first complained of to the Commons before Easter, by the 
citizens of Norwich,^ For several weeks little seems to have happened, 
but after the committee of grievances had freed itself of the charges 
against Middlesex it began to investigate the matters alleged against 
the Bishop. There was the usual variety ; he had suppressed 
preaching, extorted higher fees, failed to register institutions to 
livings, introduced popish practices and punished the disobedient, 
and set up over the font an image of the Holy Ghost in the shape of 
a dove which "by certen engines" was designed "to come downe in the 
time of Baptisme, and hover over the water". From the beginning 
members were divided about what should be done: Brooke felt that the
matter was outside the Commons* jurisdiction and should be referred 
to the Archbishop of Canterbury; Perrot and others thought that they 
should direct their main attentions to the King; But Coke claimed 
that the House might legitimately deal with the matter, and Sherland 
and Rich proposed that, because it was a grievance, it should be
^ J. Ballinger, ed., Calendar of Wynn (of Gwydir) Papers, 1515-1690 
(Aberystwyth and London, 1926), p.196; L.J. iii, p.388.
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presented to the Lords.^ This final suggestion was adopted and a
charge in six parts was dravm up. The business was again delayed
by the Lords* preoccupation with Middlesex but the charge was finally
presented at a conference on 19 May, when Coke claimed that "it was
ordinary for the Commons to complain of the Governors of the Church..."
After the Archbishop of Canterbury had reported to the Lords, the
Bishop at once denied virtually the whole charge in a long and apparently 
2
able speech.
The Lords then discussed their next step. Saye wanted the 
appointment of the normal type of examining committee, but Charles 
proposed that only the charges concerning fees and institutions to 
livings should be examined by the Lords, suggesting that the remainder - 
of a more purely religious character - should be referred to the High 
Commission. Spencer supported Saye; Sheffield countered the Lord 
Steward's criticism that a reference to the High Commission would 
endanger the Lords* privileges unies the Court reported to the Lords, 
by saying that in the past the House had referred matters complained of
^ C.J. i, p.784; Erie, ff. 167-9; Holland, ff. 71, 72?., 75?; 
Pym, ff. 3I-3IV. The varying points of view appear in debates on 
16 April and 3 May: Holland, ff. 36, 74?.-75.
^ ÇiJ. i, pp.784 , 786 , 790; I^. iii, p.384 , 388-90; National
Library of Wales 90592 Letter No. 1226: Letter of 24 May from Heniy
Wynn to his father. According to Locke, the Bishop's answer was 
so satisfactory that the accusation would have been dropped had not 
he asked for an examination, but this view is not confirmed by other 
accounts: C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-5, p.252.
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for final determination in other courts. Finally, Saye produced 
an acceptable compromise by which all six parts of the charge were 
to be referred to the High Commission for a report on which the Lords 
would pass a jud.gment. Charles then declared that this was whqt 
he had intended in his original proposal.^ One wonders whether this 
debate made Charles realise that the Lords were not always as 
biddable as only a few days eai'lier he might have thought.
The Commons took exception to the procedure the Lords had 
adopted. Some disquiet seems to have been expressed on the following 
day but there is no record of real anger until the 27th. On that 
day Robert Phelips, #io had been concerned about the lack of an 
adequate record in the lower House of its charge against Mddlesex, 
drew attention to the fact that the Lords had sent the Bishop to the 
High Commission. He said that this represented an indignity to the 
Commons, they havihg voted the matter worthy of the Lords' examination: 
they should not "be patient att such slightings". “Whether the
Gardiner, Debates. 1624 and 1626, pp.96-7. According to L.J. 
iii, p.590, the Lords took this decision because of the shortage of 
time but Elsynge's notes show that this is too simple an explanation.
2
The attack on the Bishop displeased the King, who regarded the 
puritans as responsible. Unless Charles' success as the idol of 
Parliament had gone completely to his head he can hardly have disagreed 
here with his father. Had the session lasted longer, the refusal 
of the Lords to abandon the case completely to the High Commission 
could have proved embarrassing for both James and Charles. For 
James* opinion, see G. Roberts, ed., Diary of Walter Yonge (London, 
1848: Camden Society, vol. xli), p.lSl C.S.P. Dorn. 1623-5, pp.
265, 267.
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Commons agreed with Phelips and whether either House did anything 
f^^ther about the Bishop of* Norwich the record does not reveal, but 
Phelips * comments do seem to have persuaded the Commons to change 
course in dealing with Aryan.^
At the end of April Spencer had delivered to the Commons a 
petition against Aryan from the fellows of his college. It was 
referred to a select committee from which Selden reported on 20 May. 
Whether or not Aryan had appeared before the committee we do not know, 
but it had found him guilty on four counts - misuse of the college 
endowments, avoidance of the visitor's examinations, negligent admin­
istration, and wanton behaviour - and recommended, without apparently 
giving a reason, that these be transmitted to the Lords. At this 
point Sir Henry Poole, influenced perhaps by the Lords' decision of 
the previous day in the case of the Bishop, asked the Commons whether 
they were not wronging themselves by leaving all judicature to the 
Lords. He was quickly silenced by Sandys who said that it was 
inappropriate to raise such questions so near the end of the session; 
and the committee's recommendation was adopted. But on the 27th, 
after his criticism of the Lords' behaviour, Phelips reverted to
Erie, ff. I86v.-187; Nicholas, f. 224v; Rawlinson MS B. 151, 
f. 68v. The Commons did, however, order to write down the heads 
of the charge against the Bishop and these were delivered to the Clerk 
on 29 May: C.J. i, pp.714, 715, 798; Erie, f. 196. Why Pym was
chosen is not clear: Coke, as the man who had presented the charges
to the Lords, was the obvious choice. Perhaps lÿm's intervention in 
the debate about Aryan on the 27th had something to do with it: 
see p. 266 , below.
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Poole's speech and said that the Commons should not confirm the
Lords* "clayme of Judicature". Fym pointed out that the Commons
could not disguise the fact that they lacked this right, but the House
reversed its previous decision to go to the Lords. It was, however,
Pym, supported by Sandys, who proposed the alternative course which
the Commons adopted - that they should petition the King for Aryan's
removal.^ In his speech of prorogation James objected to the Commons *
"Complaint" on the grounds that their oath of supremacy forbade them
to deal with church matters, and that they had complained against Anyan
without hearing him. From Parliament's point of view the complaint 
2
ended there.
The decision to adopt the well-established course of petitioning 
the King seems to make Aryan's case a commentary upon the disappoint­
ments suffered by the Commons in their attacks on Middlesex and the 
Bishop of Norwich. Apparently lacking effective means of remedying 
the situation in these two cases, they chose to deliver a snub to the 
peers by refraining from sending Anyan to them. In so doing, they 
demonstrated their awareness that alternative means were available to
^ CjJ. i, pp.692, 707, 791, 796; Erie, ff. 164?., I86v.-l87; 
Spring, pp.272-3; Rawlinson B. 151, f. 68v.
L.J. iii, p.424. Anyan was the subject of further accusations 
to the Commons in I626 but these do not seem to have progressed beyond 
the investigatory stage: R.F. Williams, ed., The Court and Times of
Charles the First (London, 1848), i. p.91; Diary of Sir Buistrode 
Whitelocke: Cambridge University Library MS Dd. 12.22, f. 29?.
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them for dealing with cases important enough to be sent to the Lords.
But in addition their attitude in the closing stages of all three cases 
perhaps provides an explanation of the procedural modifications adopted 
in 1626. In the proceedings against Buckingham, the Commons were to 
be more assertive than previously. Perhaps this was because the 
representatives of the realm were growing in confidence, and appreciated 
the need for great resolution if they were to achieve any success against 
a man of Buckingham's eminence; but it is also possible that such 
changes were made in an attempt to avoid a rep^.tition of the disappoint­
ments of 1624.
It may be that it is as dangerous to apply to the cases of 1624 
as it was to those of 1621 the rigid distinction between impeachment 
and complaint drawn by Selden and Elsynge. Although in the accounts 
of these trials the former term appears hardly at all while the latter 
figures frequently, we cannot be sure that ary such distinction was 
recognised in 1624.^ On the other hand, the procedure followed in 
that year - whatever it may be called - gave the Commons insufficient 
control of a case after its transmission to the Lords to ensure a result 
which satisfied them. Furthermore, Selden's analysis of Middlesex's 
case seems to confirm this by stating that the Commons* power to reply
S.R. Gardiner talked about the revival of impeachment in connec­
tion with the case against Middlesex; The History of England from the 
Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War. lb03-42. v, 
p.230. Selden described the Bishop of Norwich as "accused and impeached", 
but the records do not contain this phrase. He did not mention Anyan:
Of Judicature, p.32.
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to Middlesex's defence was removed as a result of the form adopted 
for the accusation against him. In 1626 when circumstances were fan 
less favourable to the Commons than they had been in 1624, the House 
not only declai*es that it is impeaching its victim but it also assumes 
an interest in the case, after the transmission to the Lords, which 
it has not previously claimed. The cases of l624 mark a further, 
but not the final, stage in the development of Pa.rliamentary judicature.
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Chapter V 
The Impeachment of Buckingham
As the Parliament of 1624 drew to a close the Earl of Kellie 
wrote to the Earl of Mar that it was apparent from "the course that 
is now caryed that if the Parlament did leas te oiye time that their is 
verrye few or noe officer that wold scaipe their h a n d s . W h i l e  his 
comment testifies vividly to the increased authority of Parliament it 
is also true that dissolution and prorogation, or the threat of either, 
had often effectively deterred members from reviving on a subsequent 
occasion the grievances of a previous session. After l624, however, 
this manifestation of the royal prerogative lost its power to interrupt 
permanently a case of Parliamentary judicature : investigations begun
in one Parliament would be resumed in the next. There are mary reasons
for this change, several of them obvious enou^: more fl*equent 
Parliaments meant that the burning issues of one assembly were not 
extinct before the next met; members were gaining in confidence and 
experience, and no longer assumed that grievances had only to be
^ H.M.C. Supplementary Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of 
Mar and keilie (London. 1930), p.202.
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complained of to be remedied. But the change of monarch also provides 
part of the explanation. James had been prepared to give some 
encouragement and assistance to those of his ministers and servants 
whom Parliament chose to attack, but there was a point beyond which 
he would not go in their defence. Dissolution did on occasion 
interrupt investigations, but frequently not before Parliament could 
feel that it had achieved a good deal. If James responded inadequately 
to Parliament's complaints he did, at least, respond. Charles, 
although recognisably the son of his father, rapidly showed himself 
to possess substantially different attitudes towards Parliament.
In the Parliaments of 1625 and 1626 investigations which ultimately 
involved, or would have involved, the exercise of Parliamentary 
judicature were conducted into the actions of the Duke of Buckingham 
and Dr Richard Montague. The details of both cases help to illustrate 
Charles' attitude to Parliament and the extent to which it differed 
from James', but, more important, it is possible that the attitude of 
the new monarch helped to determine the form that the proceedings 
against Buckingham took.
The attack on Buckingham in l626 can hardly have been unexpected. 
Already, in the Parliament of 1621 there had been indications that he 
was too intimately connected with some of the grievances complained 
about, and there would doubtless have been more distinct mutterings 
in 1624 had he not pût himself at the head of the forces of criticism
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in that session. But in the Parliamentary session at Oxford in I625 
his opponents found their voice. On 11 August, in a House worried 
on account of the plague and increasingly uneasy about the govern­
ment's foreign policy, Seymour, supported by Phelips, openly accused 
Buckingham of incompetence. This was no chance occurrence: it seemed
to contemporaries like the beginning of an organised attack, the first 
to be made by the Commons on a minister whom they did not accuse of 
brealcing the law.^ As a consequence Charles dissolved Parliament.
If the King hoped that his action would produce a quiescent 
Commons in the next Parliament he was not long to remain undeceived. 
Salvetti, the Tuscan Resident, predicted in September that a new 
Parliament would insist on resuming where the last had left off by 
demanding enquiries into the conduct of those who had spent the war
^ H. Hulme, The Life of Sir John Eliot. 1592-1632 (London, 1957), 
p.93; S.R. Gardiner, ed., Debates in the House of Commons in 1625 
(London 1873: Camden Society, New Series, vi) , p.118; C. Roberts,
The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England, p.51; J. 
Rushworth, Historical Collections, i, p.195; H.M.C. Mar and Kellie, 
p.232. Shortly before Seymoui-'s speech Cotton and Eliot seem to have 
been collaborating on a speech which was never delivered. Full of 
precedents of royal favourites whose behaviour had almost ruined the 
country, it may nevertheless have circulated among members in manuscript 
form: Hulme, op. cit., p.92; J.N. Ball, 'The Parliamentary Career of
Sir John Eliot, 1624-1629' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University 
of Cambridge, 1955), pp. 112, 115; J.N. Ball, 'Sir John Eliot at the 
Oxford Parliament, 1625'. Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. (1955), vol. xxviii, 
no. 78, pp.113-27, especially pp.121-5; Cottoni Posthuma; Divers 
Choice Pieces of that Renowned Antiquary Sir Robert Cotton, pp.273-81.
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supplies; and the Venetian Ambassador, reporting in mid-January, said 
that there was talk among Parliamentarians of refusing supplies "unless 
he (Buckingham) is put down". Some uneasiness may even have clouded 
the Duke's horizon because in a further despatch a week later the 
same Ambassador said that his dependants were tiying to secure a strong 
party for the forthcoming Parliament. Moreover, the government 
disqualified several of the leaders of the previous Parliament from 
sitting by pricking as sheriffs men like Coke, Seymour, Phelips and 
Alford.^ Whether the absence of such members materially affected the 
course of events in l62é, we cannot say: we do not know what would
have happened had they been present. But the lack of Coke's leader­
ship may have permitted some fresh thinking on procedure, and it is 
reasonable to suppose that other men filled the breach. Members like 
Fym and Selden appear to achieve greater prominence than before.
When Parliament met on 6 February it did not at once launch an
attack on Buckingham, and his name was not mentioned in connection with
2
ary complaint until 22 February. On that day Eliot reported from a 
select committee which had been set up to consider the seizure and
H.M.C. Eleventh Report (London, 1887-8), Appendix i, p.31;
C.S.P. Ven. 1625-26, pp.298, 3II; Hulme, op. cit., p.92, n. 4.
Hulme suggests that in December I625 Eliot may already have been 
planning the charge against Buckingham: p.102.
2
Nevertheless Mead regarded Eliot's speech of 10 February as 
aimed at Buckingham: R.F. Williams, ed., The Court and Times of Charles
the First, i, p.82; Hulme, op. cit., pp.105-7.
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arrest of English property in France. The committee had discovered 
that the French action had largely stemmed from the capture of one 
of their ships, the St Peter of Newhaven. by the English fleet during 
the previous autumn. Although the ship had been released, it had 
been rearrested on orders from Buckingham as Lord Admiral, on the 
ground that it was carrying Spanish goods. During the debate on the 
report the House had its attention concentrated more closely on the 
Duke by Lord Cavendish, who read a letter stating that Buckingham had 
refused to examine proofs of the legitimate character of the St Peter's 
cargo. As a result of the day's work the Commons and its select 
committee embarked on an investigation of witnesses.^
Three days later the Lords produced their first challenge to 
Buckingham. They adopted a proposal made by their grand committee 
of privileges that after the end of the session no lord should be 
permitted to hold more than two proxies. The Duke, with eleven, 
opposed the suggestion and Chamberlain wrote that he had had "one 
feather pluckt from his wing ..." According to Pesaro, the Venetian
C.J. i, p.823; Diary of Sir Bulstrode Whitelocke: Cambridge
University Library MS Dd. 12.20-21, ff. 70v., 74v. (This diary, which 
may not be Whitelocke's work, exists in two manuscript volumes, MSS 
Dd. 12.20-21 and Dd. 12.22, each separately foliated. MS 12.20-21 
records events in Parliament up to 10 May; MS 12.22 begins on 11 May. 
Unless otherwise stated, references are to the first volume'.)
Written interrogations were drawn up for the examination of at 
least one of these witnesses: already the Commons were employing
greater formality than previously: C.J. i, p.824.
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Ambassador, the Lords* decision greatly encouraged the Commons.^ 
\/hether or not for this reason, the Commons began to broaden the scope 
of their investigations: by means of a committee of the whole, under
the chairmanship of Christopher Wandesford, they determined to enquire 
into evils, then to discover their causes, and finally to suggest 
remedies. On the 27th this committee, which subsequently took its 
name from its three objectives, resolved that there were two evils - 
the reduction in the honour and istrength of the kingdom and the 
stopping of trade - and immediately began an investigation of their 
causes. During the course of its work on the following day Sir 
Robert Harley proposed that "single or unsound councell" might be a 
cause, Corriton supported this and Harris suggested blaming "Men 
unable put in places ..." In pursuance of these ideas the committee 
resolved to examine the Council of War which had been appointed to 
supervise the spending of the subsidy granted in 1624.
Although the Commons had no difficulty in securing the attendance 
of members of the Council of War they were less successful in
L.J. iii, p.507; S.R. Gardiner, ed., Notes of the Debates in 
the House of Lords, officially taken by Henry Elsing, Clerk of the 
Parliaments. A.D. 1624 and 1^26, pp. 114-5: N.E. McClure, ed., The 
Letters of John Chamberlain, ii, P.65O; C.S.P. Ven. 1625-26, p. 352.
^ C.S.P. Yen, 1625-26. p.352; Harleian MS 6445, ff. 3?., 6v.-7v., 
9-10; Whitelocke, ff. éov., 59?., 58v. (V/hitelocke has written part 
of his account by starting at the back of his notebook and working 
towards the front. This explains the form taken by some of my 
references to his folios.)
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obtaining clear answers to their questions* These were designed 
to establish whether the Council’s advice had been followed, but 
after the House had listened to a variety of reasons why its questions 
could not or should not be answered it abandoned the examination.^
The Comnons fared little better in their enquiries into the history 
of the St Peter, The conunittee found evidence to suggest that part 
of the ship’s cargo had been confiscated for the benefit of the Duke, 
and although the House was not prepared to adopt Eliot’s motion that 
this be declared a grievance it did despatch a messenger to Buckingham 
demanding to know within three days why the ship had been arrested a 
second time. Its enthusiasm led it straight into the procedural 
difficulties from which Buckingham himself had helped to extract the 
House in 1624. Members had again forgotten to apply to the Lords 
first before requiring an answer from a member of their House. So 
when Buckingham asked for leave to make his answer to the Commons, the 
peers remembered their dignity and asked their committee of privileges 
for advice on procedure. Naturally, this committee reminded them 
of the order made in 1624, and the Commons had to retrieve the situation 
by maintaining that their order had been wrongly entered by the Clerk 
and that they had intended only giving Buckingham notice that a 
complaint had been received about the St Peter. Honour having been
^ C .J . i ,  PP.829, 832, 835; H a rle ia n  MS 6445, f .  17; Whitelocske,
f. 29.
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satisfied, Buckingham’s attorney appeared in the Commons on 6 March 
with the Duke’s answer. In this he denied that the ship’s cargo had 
been touched, and he declared that the second arrest could hardly 
have been responsible for the seizure of English goods in France as 
the latter event had preceded the former by a month. He admitted 
having ordered the rearrest but stated that he had done so at the 
King’s express command. This defence brought the Commons face to 
face with a familiar difficulty: nothing that they might say or
resolve must reflect upon the King because the King could do no wrong. 
If errors were committed his councillors must be to blame: evil
advisers were the obstacle between the undoubted wisdom of the monarch 
and the unquenchable love of his subjects. As recently as 28 February 
Digges had proposed to the committee for evils, causes and remedies, 
that it should clear the King of responsibility for any of the causes; 
and if the constant reiteration of the righteousness of the monarch 
was beginning to make the more adventurous minds question its validity 
there is no doubt that even these continued to render formal loyalty 
to the doctrine. On this rock, sharpened by the technical difficul­
ties of a complex enquiry, the St Peter, as the repository of the 
Commons* hopes, began to founder. On both 11 and 16 March Eliot
failed to persuade the House to declare the matter a grievance and on
the second occasion Digges proposed that it should rest. It was not
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to be revived until 1 May.^
By the middle of March, therefore, the Commons had devoted a 
good deal of time to the exploration of two lines of attack on 
Buckingham, neither of which had proved very fruitful. Moreover, 
the government was trying;with some success, to persuade them to turn 
to the more general and less dangerous issues of the safety of the 
kingdom and the international situation. However, in the committee 
for evils, causes and remedies, they had continued to investigate the 
causes of the evils besetting the land. On 6 March they had debated 
the inadequate state of the naval defences and Spencer had criticised 
the sending of badly needed ships to La Rochelle. At the end of that 
debate they had resolved that the coasts had been insufficiently 
guarded since the termination of the treaties with Spain: at least
these general questions were more speedily resolved than intricate 
matters like that of the St Peter. Then on 10 March, Dr Meddus 
reported to his correspondent, the Rev. Joseph Mead, that he had heard 
that a member of the Commons had thirteen articles prepared to present 
against a very great man, which would lead either to his ruin or to 
their dissolution. His information was not quite accurate but on 
the following day Dr Turner, member for Shaftesbury, told the committee
^ Ç4J. i, pp.827-8, 830, 831, 835; L&J. ill, pp.513, 514-, 515-6; 
Gardiner, Debates. l624 and 1626. p.118; Hulme, op. cit.. pp.110-11; 
Whitelocke, ff. 45v., 42v., 52, 53; Harleian MS w*45, f. 8.
^ C.J. i, p.832; Whitelocke, ff. 39v., 38v; Lansdowne MS 491, 
ff. 146v .-148v,
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for evils, causes and remedies, that
there should be a causa generalissima stated, should 
be the Mother of y rest, y Common fame presents one man 
to be this cause .,.
He then put six questions: was not the Duke responsible for the loss
of the King’s regality in the Narrow Seas; were not the gifts made 
to him and his relations a reason for the decline in the King’s wealth; 
was not the accumulation of offices in his hands and those of his 
friends and kin, some of idiom were incapable of filling them, a reason 
for the evil government besetting the commonwealth; had he not 
secretly favoured recusants; had not the sale of offices which he had 
arranged led to evils; did not his failure to sail with the last fleet 
help to lead to its misfortunes?^
^ Whitelocke, ff. 18®’, 18^, 37; Sloane MS 826, f. 24; Williams, 
op. cit., i, pp.89-90; W.A.J. Archbold, ’A Diary of the Parliament 
of 1626’. E.H.R. (1902), vol. xvii, no. 68, p.732; L. Pearsall Smith, 
The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton (Oxford, 190X7), ii, p.294n.
In his account of this episode Gardiner described Turner as a man 
’’otherwise of no note”. While in a general sense this is no doubt 
true he had already contributed usefully to this Parliament, once at 
an earlier meeting of the same committee and once with some apposite 
remarks during the debates on the St Peter; Harleian MS 6445, ff#
4v.-5; Whitelocke, f. 53v; S.R. Gardiner, The History of England 
from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak"of the Civil War. lé03-42, 
vi, p.76. Professor Hulme. op. cit.. p.ll4n.. and Dr Ball. 
’Parliamentary Career of Eliot’, pp.l65-6, I69, have disposed of the 
old theory that Turner was a spokesman for Eliot, and Ball has pointed 
out that Turner was a dependant of Pembroke whose relations with 
Buckingham were strained in I626. This doubtless encouraged him to 
speak as he did, but there is, of course, no reason to suppose that 
he was not largely motivated by personal conviction. For other 
connections perhaps partly responsible for the sources of attack on 
Buckingham in this Parliament, see M. Prestwich, Cranfield. Politics 
and Profits under the Early Stuarts, pp.483-4.
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Turner’s speech was the lineal descendant of Seymour’s at the 
end of the 1625 Parliament.^ Both men helped to alter the whole 
character and authority of Parliamentary judicature. Hitherto when 
ministers appointed by the Stuarts had been accused in Parliament, 
they had been charged with offences perpetrated in the execution of 
their duties: it had not been suggested, Tidiatever might have been
thought, that they were not competent to perform those duties. Behind 
the illusion of the competent minister, dismissed for peccadilloes, the 
doctrine that the King could do no wrong could survive ; it could not 
long survive attacks on ministers for incompetence,
Charles reacted to Turner’s speech by sending a message to the 
Commons demanding satisfaction. He said that Turner’s attack on 
Buckingham was unsubstantiated by proofs and was in reality an attack 
on his and his father’s government, and he repeated James’ contention 
that he could not permit enquiries about the meanest of his servants.
He also complained about a seditious speech of Clement Coke, son of 
Sir Edward, and said that this had emboldened Turner, On the following 
day, 15 March, the House sitting as a grand committee cleared Coke of 
uttering sedition and appointed a sub-committee to frame a reply to 
the King; on the l6th they turned to the more important matter of 
Turner’s speech. They first heard Turner again: he began by
protesting his loyalty and then discussed the criticism Charles had
^ See p,271 above ; and Roberts, op. cit.. p.51.
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made of the weakness in his attack on Buckingham - that it v/as not 
based on proofs provided by the evidence of witnesses. He said that 
he believed that common fame was a legitimate and Parliamentary basis 
for a presentment. The corrmittee held an inconclusive debate, 
finally agreeing to adjourn for two days to give Tm^ner time to 
prepare a fuller reply. Little more progress was made on the next 
occasion but on 22nd, after a debate in which Spencer made the nice 
point that the complaint about Turner’s speech was itself based upon 
common fame, the committee reached a decision. It resolved that the 
accusation against Buckingham was indeed grounded upon common fame 
and it decided that it would next debate whether this was a Parliamentary 
form of proceeding.^
This leisurely pace shows the Commons being deliberately obstruc­
tive and the King eventually complained bitterly about it. But it 
doubtless helped to divert attention from the real progress made in 
the committee for evils, causes and remedies. Here, under the 
inspiration of Turner’s six questions, causes of two evils from 
v/hich the kingdom was suffering were rapidly identified, and a sub­
committee under Eliot’s chairmanship was set up to enquire into the 
cause of these causes. On 25 March Wardesford delivered a detailed 
report from his committee to the House. He listed ten causes upon 
which the committee had agreed and stated that so far Buckingham had
^ C.J. i, pp.835 , 837; Y/hitelocke, ff. 43 , 51, 53 , 54 , 75 , 76, 
185; B.M. Additional MS 22474, ff. 12-12v.
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been found responsible for four of these. The House formally approved 
the committee’s original findings on the two evils aid accepted nine 
of the proposed causes, holding the tenth over for further considera­
tion. It then arranged a day for the consideration of those causes 
with wliich the Duke’s name had been connected, and sent him wo$)d of 
its intentions.^
Buckingham’s adherents had failed to stop the headlong progress 
of the committee for evils, causes and remedies, and Charles was 
still awaiting a reply to his message about Coke and Turner. On the 
27th the Commons debated the King’s request for a subsidy and Eliot 
seized the opportunity to compare their predicament with some of the 
darker episodes of the late middle ages. Largely under his influence 
the House resolved to pass a subsidy bill as soon as it had heard the 
King’s answer to its grievances. At this point Charles intervened 
in a situation that was rapidly getting out of hand.
^ Whitelocke, ff. I8^v. ff, 55ff, 84ff; H. Hulme, 'The Leadership 
of Sir John Eliot in the Parliament of I626’. Journal of Modem 
History (1932), vol. iv, no. 3, p.371; Archbold, op. cit.. p.736;
C.J. i, pp.841-2. The Lords, however, on 28 March, refused Buckingham 
permission to answer the Commons: L.J. iii, p.543.
^ Whitelocke, ff. 5?., 93. Eliot referred to Hugh de Burgh and 
Michael de la Pole, associating them with the misfortunes of their 
respective Kings, Henry III and Richard II. Ball says that Eliot 
was careful to avoid giving the impression that such ministers had 
been ’impeached”: ’Parliamentary Career of Eliot’, p. 181. When, a
few days later, Eliot compared the attack on Buckingham with that on 
de la Pole, he emphasised that his use of this precedent was not 
intended as a reflection upon Charles or his government: Whitelocke,
f.ll9v.
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On the day appointed for a further meeting of the committee 
dealing with Turner’s speech he ordered the Commons to attend him 
with the Lords at Whitehall on the following morning and in the 
meantime told them to suspend all further business* Largely through 
the Lord Keeper, Charles addressed them on that occasion in tones of 
considerable bitterness. He complained that they had ignored his 
request for justice against the two members and that their committee 
had "walked in y® stepps of Turner, and ... (had) proceeded in an 
unparliamentarye inquisition". After lavishing praise on Buckingham 
he ordered them to cease their examinations and to obey his previous 
commands. He then turned to the question of supply, pointing out 
that ondy two days in twelve had been devoted to its discussion and 
objecting to the manner in which it had been made dependent upon 
redress of grievances. He warned them that the sum proposed - three 
subsidies and three fifteenths - was inadequate and that unless they 
increased it unconditionally within three days he would not promise 
to continue their sitting.^
The Commons took exception to this speech and, after hearing 
Wentworth say that they would need all their wisdom to protect their 
liberties, suspended all other business and resolved themselves into 
a grand committee to consider it. They heard Eliot declare that 
their investigations had been soundly based and that "this place ever
^ C.J. i, p.843; Whitelocke, ff. 103v.-106.
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had the course of questioning, examining the subject", but before 
they had reached any conclusions they were interr\;ç)ted by a message 
from the Lords asking for a conference. V/hen, as a committee of the 
whole, they assembled in the Painted Chamber, they found the government 
intent on conciliation. Through Buckingham, Charles cancelled the 
threats and limitations surrounding the subsidy and gave them leave 
to continue their investigation of grievances "in the auntient wayes 
of yo p de ces so*.' , , and not so much to se eke faults as the meanes 
to redresse them". The Duke then entered into a long justification 
of his own actions, ranging widely over the ten causes which the Commons* 
committee had enumerated. On their return to their own House the 
Commons seem to have dealt with the Duke’s ill-timed answer by ignoring 
it, but in committee they debated whether a remonstrance was required 
to protect their liberties. Some members argued that the ejqplanation 
just given rendered this unnecessary but Digges and Wentworth helped 
to have a sub-committee appointed to draw one up.^
The fight between the government’s supporters and its critics was 
continued at this sub-committee, which spent some time reviving the
^ Ç&J. i, p.843; B.M. Additional MS 22474, ff. 22ff, 31-31v; 
Whitelocke, ff, 107-107v.. 109v.ff, 117-117?., 118?; Diary of Sir 
Nathaniel Rich, frame 75 (The original manuscript of this diary has 
disappeared. However, Cornell University possesses a photostat copy 
of the manuscript and ny references are to the frames of a microfilm 
made from this copy .)
Herbert was chairman of the grand committee, Glanville of the 
sub-committee, thou^ on at least one occasion reported from the 
latter: Whitelocke f. 121; C.J# i, p.843#
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issue of the legitimacy of common fame as a basis for an accusation. 
Members were as usual quick to depy apy intention of casting aspersions 
upon the King, but v^en the remonstrance was presented to the House 
it was framed in determined, if loyal, language. It denied that Coke 
had spoken seditiously and said that he had, in any case, at once 
explained his few unwise words, adding that the House would have dealt 
with both speeches had not the King’s message to attend him interrupted 
proceedings. On the more important issue of the Commons’ investigations 
it maintained their claim to examine apyone found responsible for 
grievances and it asserted that "whatsoever wee shall doe accordingly 
this parliament, we doubt not but it shall redound to y^ honour of 
your Crowne, & welfare of your subjects". On the Tuesday before Easter 
the remonstrance was presented to the King, who replied that he would 
not at once give an answer but would like the Commons to adjourn for 
eight days as the Lords had done. The motion to do so was passed by 
a majoriiy of only thirty in a vote of two hundred and seventy.^
The Commons were clearly in no mood to be deflected fi»om their objective.
Meanwhile, a situation which was soon to prove embarrassing for 
the government, while encouraging to its opponents, had been developing 
in the House of Lords. The Earl of Bristol, ambassador to Spain at 
the time of the marriage negotiations, had fallen from favour and had 
been placed under restriction on his return home. No charges had been
^ C.J. i, p.844; Whitelocke, ff. 119-120, 122v., 124.
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brought against him and his attempts to receive a hearing had been 
refused. When Parliament was called in l626 the Earl was not sent a 
summons, and when he petitioned the Lords on 22 March for assistance 
in his plight it was to this in particular that he drew their attention. 
His petition led to the issue of a writ but, when he also received a 
letter ordering him not to attend, he again appealed to the House. In 
this second petition he placed the blame for the treatment he had 
received on Buckingham’s head, and said that if the Lords would hear 
him he would explain how the Duke had abused the King and his father, 
the state and both Houses of Parliament.^
It w%s out of this situation that there grew Bristol’s charges 
against Buckingham and the King’s counter charges against Bristol.
These accusations have little direct part in the history of Parliamentary
J.O. Halliwell, ed., Letters of the Kings of England (London, 1848), 
ii, P.23O; L.J. iii, pp.537, 54^, 5^31 A^comparison between Bristol’s 
case and the medieval appeal might be worth making. On 9 May.Digges 
referred to Bristol’s accusations as an appeal (Diary of Sir Richard 
Grosvenor for l62é; Trinity College, Dublin, MS 6II (references are 
to a typescript of this manuscript), p.70). If it was, why did not 
Charles intervene with the statute of 1 Henry IV, cap. 14, by which 
appeals were abolished? Gardiner said that Bristol was impeached.
Apart from a solitary remark of Bristol’s (for which see p.297 n.l 
below), the only evidence to support this is provided by a marginal 
heading in the Lords Journal. Some of these headings occur in the 
manuscript Journal and are therefore contemporary; others, including 
this one, do not, and were presumably provided when the Journals were 
prepared for printing: S.R. Gardiner, ed., ’The Earl of Bristol’s
defence of his negotiations in Spain’. Camden Miscellany, vol. vi 
(London, I87I: Camden Society, vol. civ), p.ii; L.J. iii, p.652.
Another marginal heading, similarly absent from the manuscript Journal » 
states that the "E. of Bristol impeaches the Duke of Buckingham to 
the Commons ...": L.J. iii, p.580.
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judicature, for although the Commons clearly derived encouragement 
from this additional challenge to Buckingham, the case itself was 
almost wholly confined to the House of Lords. However, it will require 
some attention as, to an extent, it affected the development of the 
trial of Buckingham. Furthermore, it must have worried the Duke : 
up to Easter his support in the Lords had seemed firm enough, but 
during the recess he was apparently considering a proposal to strengthen 
his position there by securing the creation of twenty new peers.^
Y/hen the Commons reassembled on 13 April the King sent them a 
message renewing his request for rapid supply and stating that he did 
not intend to reply to the remonstrance because of the shortage of time. 
There was some protest but, possibly because a number of members had 
still to return, no action was taken. The absence of members, which 
it was thought might benefit Buckingham, was certainly the reason why 
the committee concerned with his affairs did not resume work until the 
I8th, but when they did so it was with unabated vigour. New allega­
tions, such as Buckingham’s extortion of money from the East India 
Company, were investigated, while further examinations were made of 
subjects like the misuse of the King’s revenues and the sending of ships 
to La Rochelle, which had been first discussed before Easter. When 
yet another message about supply arrived from Charles, the Commons*
^ C.S.P. Ven. 1625-26, p.390. Pesaro also reported that Buckingham 
had approached many members with inducements to help his cause.
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answer was a resolution to set aside all business other than 
Buckingham’s: they argued that the sooner they completed it, the
sooner they would be able to satisfy the King’s requests for money.
By the 21st work was sufficiently advanced for the House to accept 
Digges’ proposal that a select committee be appointed to consider the 
state of the "great Business now in hand", to reduce it into form and 
to survey the relevant precedents. Twelve members were appointed, 
including the chairmen of the various committees and sub-committees 
which had dealt with the case since the beginning of the Parliament. 
That same afternoon, Glanville, on behalf of the select committee, 
asked whether the House would decide if "common Fame a Ground for this 
House to proceed upon; because it conduceth much to the Business now 
in hand". No longer could the Commons avoid dealing with this 
fundamental issue: they resolved to debate it on the following morning
and instructed the lawyers to be present with their precedents and 
their officers with the records.^
When the debate opened, Mallett, as so often in this Parliament,
1 Whitelocke, ff. 126v., 139?., I47?.ff, 150; C.S.P. Ven. 1625-26. 
p. 387; CgJ. i, pp.84-6, 847; Hulme, Life of Eliot, p.127. The 
members of the select committee were Eliot, Herbert, Fym, Hoby, Digges, 
Selden, Erie, Glanville, Lake, Wandesford, Whitby and Sherland, In 
the early stages of its work Glanville often reported from it and was 
chairman on at least one occasion. Later Digges was the usual 
reporter. It is not entirely true to suggest, as Spielman does, that 
Glanville reported on procedural matters while Digges dealt with the 
actual subjects of the impeachment: D.C* Spielman, ’Impeachments
and the Parliamentary Opposition in England, I62I-I64I’, p. 124 n. 52; 
C.J, i, pp.847, 849, 850, 853, 856; Whitelocke, f. 159v; Grosvenor,
p.29.
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gave the official view. He produced a whole series of reasons why 
common fame should not be accepted as a basis on which the Commons 
could proceed: their methods should not resemble those of a grand
jury; a party accused on common fame would have to answer both the 
fame and the accusation; if he was cleared he would have no redress 
against his accuser; common fame would be more frequently employed 
by lesser courts if Parliament had been accustomed to accept it; the 
Lords had rejected the Commons’ case against the Bishop of Durham in 
1614 because it was grounded upon common fame. His arguments were 
hardly answered in the speeches which followed, but these did not lack 
persuasiveness. Wilde claimed the authority of Braeton for saying 
that all suspicion must be grounded upon common fame, adding that 
some presumptions did not admit to proof. He pointed out that, to 
be acceptable, the fame must arise among men of "the better Sort" and 
Littleton supported him, saying that there was a great difference 
between common fame and rumour. Littleton also declared that the 
Commons were "not a House of definitive Judgment, but of Information, 
Denunciation, or Presentment; for which common Fame sufficient". 
Sherland adopted the most advanced position, arguing that if fame w^s 
a sufficient basis for accusations concerning the life of one man, it 
should also be permissible in those relating to the life and soul of 
the commonwealth. But Wentworth and Selden had sdready put the really 
influential argument, political rather than legal: only upon common
fame might men safely accuse the great; "The Faults of the Gods might
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not be told, till the Goddess Fame born". For this reason the 
Commons resolved that common fame was a proper ground for their own 
proceedings and for ary transmission of the case that might be made, 
either to the King or to the Lords.^ Without this decision the case 
against Buckingham would have failed then and there, because no one 
had yet come forward prepared to present specific information against 
the Duke, In this respect it differed significantly from the cases 
of 1621 and 1624, in which detailed evidence had been secured frcm 
particular witnesses.
During the next week, the ccanmittee for evils, causes and remedies, 
and its sub-committee for the cause of causes, wound up their business, 
and the select committee busied itself examining witnesses and contin­
uing investigations. The House offered Buckingham a further opportunity
of a hearing and, when the Lords refused to permit this, proceeded to
2
vote him responsible for eight causes. It then received from the 
select committee the astonishing news that, contrary to the advice of 
the royal doctors, Buckingham had administered medicine to James during
C.J. i, pp.847-8; Whitelocke, ff. 152v., 154v. As Spielman 
points out, Sherland*s speech looks ahead to the trial of Strafford 
in 1641: op. cit.. p.126. No one in the debate seems to have
mentioned the concept of notoriety, which common fame closely resembled, 
but a few days earlier Noy had said "Ther is a proceeding on a notoriety 
of y® fact & uppon c. (?) fame": Whitelocke, f.ll9.
^ Whitelocke, f. 155; C.J. i, pp.848-9; L.J. iii, pp.570-1;
Hulme, Life of Eliot, p. 127. Four of the causes had been successfully 
laid at Buckingham’s door by Eliot’s sub-committee in March: C.J.
i, p.841. In refusing Buckingham permission to answer the Lords
referred back to their order of 28 March: see p.281 n.l above.
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his last illness. This seemed to confirm rumours which had been 
circulating for some time, that the Duke had poisoned the King, and 
the Commons at once referred it to a grand committee for consideration. 
Very rapidly, this committee confirmed the report but avoided suggesting 
that treason had been committed. Ignoring the vigorous protests of 
the Chancellors of the Exchequer and the Duciy of Lancaster, the House 
added the accusation to the Duke’s charge as an "act of a transcendent 
Presumption, of dangerous Consequence".^ On the following day, the 
King, probably making a virtue of necessity, asked the Commons to conclude 
the case in whatever way they chose but to do so as quickly as possible.
The House thanked him and promptly arranged to revive the matter of
2
the ship, St Peter.
^ C.S.P. Ven. 1625-26. p.15; CjJ. i, pp.850-1.
^ C.J. i, P.85I; H.M.C. Thirteenth Report (London, 1891-3), 
Appendix, vii, p.10 (Notes in Parliament, I626 and 1628, compiled by 
Ikjf. Lowther) ; Whitelocke, f. I68. Ball ( ’Parliamentary Career of 
Eliot*, p.179) suggests that Charles probably withdrew his opposition 
to the Commons’ proceedings to avoid the awkward constitutional 
implications that could be read into an impeachment made without royal 
consent. This seems to argue a greater degree of understanding of a 
constitutional situation than Charles in fact possessed, as well as an 
equally uncharacteristic anxiety to show respect for the proprieties 
of the law. That he had not forsaken strong-arm tactics is revealed 
by the pressure to which Cotton was subjected at this time to cease 
supplying the Commons with precedents, and by the arrests of Digges 
and Eliot which were soon to occur: Williams, op. cit., p.98. The
Bishop of Mende repcar-ted to d ’Herbault that the charge concerning the 
death of James had worsened Buckingham’s position because, hitherto, 
he had always believed that Parliament could be dissolved to save him. 
If Charles now chose this course before the charge was dealt with, it 
would be aesumed that he was implicated in his father’s death: Paris
Archives: Baschet’s Transcripts: P.R.O. 31/3/63, f.66.
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On 1 May the House voted that the Duke’s behaviour in the rearrest 
of the St Peter was a grievance : its adoption of a course vainly
urged by Eliot in March shows how far opinion had moved against 
Buckingham. During this debate Rolle advanced an argument which was 
to be used more forcibly later when he said that, even though the King 
commanded the rearrest^ Buckingham should not have obeyed to the point 
of breaking the law: if an officer of the Crown did so, he should be
punished.^
On the following day, Digges, supported by Glanville, reported 
that the select committee of twelve had approved ten causes of the 
two evils afflicting the kingdom and had determined that Buckingham 
was the cause of all these. From its investigations of these the 
committee had drawn up thirteen articles against the Duke and it now 
laid them before the Commons, A strenuous attempt was made to persuade 
the House to present the articles to the King, but it resolved to 
follow "ye old way" and transmit them to the Lords. It would perhaps 
have decided thus aiyway, but Strangways may hage settled the matter 
by arguing that this was the normal course and by warning the House 
not to show distrust of the Lords, Accordingly, the select committee
C.J. i, p.852; Grosvenor, p.9. Eliot adopted a similar position 
on 10 May: T.B. Howell, ed., A Complete Collection of State Trials
and Proceedings for High Treason and other Crimes and Misdemeanors 
from the earliest period to the year 1783 (London, l8l6)V ii, column 
13^
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was given the task of arranging how the decision should be carried out,^
The committee made two recommendations which represented a
departure from recent practice. It proposed that the accusation
should be divided among ei^t members, who would be responsible for
its presentation to the Lords. Each of these members would have two
assistants who would help with the presentation of his section, but
not speak. This proposition was accepted without demur and, when the
Commons* case was eventually transmitted to the Lords, Digges and Eliot,
respectively, presented the preamble and epilogue, #iile Herbert,
Selden, Glanville, Sherland, Pym and Wandesford divided the articles
of the charge among themselves. All these men had been members of
2
the select committee. However, that committee’s second recommenda­
tion met opposition. As Digges read the draft of the preamble to the 
Commons it became clear that, in addition to the customary oral trans­
mission of the case, he was proposing that the charge should also be 
embodied in a bill, Sandys at once objected that one method was 
sufficient and that to present the accusation in writing was a new way
^ ÇîJ. i, P.853; Whitelocke, ff. 173-173?; H.M.C. Lowther's 
Notes, pp.11-13; Grosvenor, pp.l6, 23. Of the ten causes mary had 
already been reported to the Commons and voted on: see, for example,
C.J. i, p.349 (account for 24 April).
^ C'J' I, p.854; H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, p.13; B.M. Additional 
MS 22474, f. 104. Sherland replaced Whitby who fell ill before his 
part was delivered: Sherland had previously been one of Whitby’s two
assistants: L.J. iii, p.590. It appears that the select committee 
originally proposed that Erie should deal with the part eventually 
delivered by Glanville. No reason is given for the change: C.J. i,
p.854; B.M. Additional MS 22474, f. 104.
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of delivering it. The proposal was referred back to the committee, 
which, if it bothered to reconsider it, did not change its mind. So 
when, on the 6th, the committee presented its last major report, 
detailing the complete charge and showing how it was to be distributed, 
the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Sir Humphrey May, took up 
the cudgels. He asked the committee to explain why "we goe in a new 
way; càlling this a bill different from the late way". Selden 
answered him ;
we used to make the accusacion of those persons accused 
by word of mouth: and that a good course. But as true
that when accusacions are of mary parts; this course was 
also used: as 50 Ed. 3: 28 H. 6: there a large accusacion 
is called a bill ...
Another diarist gives part of the same speech more cryptically, and
raises again the problem of the meaning of the word clamour : "Some
excused (accused) by clamour of y® commons, some by mouth of y® commons.
The precedent-worshipping Commons accepted Selden’s guidance but this
leaves unexplained why the committee had recommended adding procedure
by bill to the normal method. Certainly the case was complex, but
some of its predecessors had not been exactly simple, and in the past
the Commons had been anxious to avoid committing themselves in writing.
C.J. i, p.856; H.M.C. Lowther’8 Notes, pp.13-14, 17; 
Grosvenor, pp.29, 53; Whitelocke, f. 181. Selden’s references are,
probably, to the impeachment of Latimer in 1376 and, certainly, to 
the impeachment of Suffolk in 1450. In both cases bills (or peti­
tions) were employed in the Commons’ accusation, and, in the case of 
Suffolk, over twenly charges were listed by this means. For Latimer
see p.25 above; for Suffolk see Rot. Pari, v, pp.176-83.
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Clearly the accusation was of great importance, but this had been 
equally true of that against Middlesex in 1624, and if procedure by 
bill had then been thought a suitable method the Commons would surely 
have had no difficulty in using it. One is left wondering whether 
the bill was in some way a cloak behind which the intention to proceed 
by impeachment could hide until the last possible moment, or whether 
it was regarded by the committee as an essential part of this procedure. 
There is some evidence to support both possibilities, but it is first 
necessary to consider their implications. They assume, of course, 
that impeachment had some special significance, at least to the 
committee, and that it was thought necessary to disguise the intention 
to impeach Buckingham. Why secrecy might have been regarded as 
important we can only guess, but it may be that to use the term would 
have destroyed the contention of men like Eliot that they were not 
intending to attack the King or his government. As for the assumption 
that impeachment had some special significance, we know from Selden’s 
treatise, probably written at about this time, that he believed this. 
Now, it is interesting that it was Selden himself who answered May’s 
criticism of the committee’s decision to proceed by bill, as well as 
orally, against Buckingham. For it will be remembered that it was, 
in his view, the failure of the Commons to present their accusation 
against Middlesex in writing that lay at the root of the process by 
which they lost the power, in that case, to maintain their own suit - 
a power which was to Selden one of the characteristics distinguishing
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a Commons’ impeachment from a Commons* complaint. Though Selden 
might be a theorist, believing in distinctions which, to the average 
member, may have meant nothing, he was at this moment in a position 
to influence the development of Parliamentaiy judicature from the 
standpoint of a practising politician.^ Furthermore, the fact that 
he chose to make a distinction between impeachment and complaint 
suggests that some, at least, of the Commons* leaders were aware - 
or were becoming aware - not only that there were various procedures 
available to them but also that impeachment was a recognisable and, 
within limits, definite process which offered distinct advantages to 
those choosing to use it.
As for the wording of the bill itself, it is, of course dangerous 
to argue from the silence of the records, but when Digges on 3 May 
read to the Commons the draft of his preamble Buckingham merely stood 
accused. The select committee did not report its final work on the 
charge until the afternoon of Saturday, the 6th, and the engrossed 
articles were not read to the Commons until the morning of Monday, 
the 8th - the veiy day of the presentation of the charge to the Lords. 
Even at the last minute some minor alterations were made to these 
articles and not until this was done was the message sent to the Lords
In his treatise Selden says that the Commons "accused and 
impeached ... Buckingham ... and delivered their Declaration in writing, 
that the said Duke might be put to his Answer" : Of the Judicature in
Parliaments. p.32.
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asking for a conference,^ This message contains the first open 
acknowledgement to appear in the record that the Commons were impeaching 
Buclcingham: it is possible that at the last minute the word impeachment
was slipped into the bill. Of course, if there were evidence that 
the intention to impeach Buckingham had become widely known before 
the introduction of the bill, the suggestion that the bill was a means 
of keeping this intention secret would at once collapse. But the 
records give little indication that any such knowledge was widespread.
Occasionally, before the transmission of the charge to the Lords, the
2
proceedings are described as a complaint, but in the records of the 
case before 8 May, there is only one reference to impeachment.
Moreover, this reference is cryptic and negative, suggesting that 
impeachment was not being contemplated. During the discussion of 
the accusation that Bucldngham had administered medicine to James, 
Marriott maintained that the committee, which had already recommended 
adding this to the Duke’s charge, did not intend to "impeach him so
C.J. i, pp.856, 857; H.M.C. Lowther*s Notes, p.14. The guess
that the bill was the means by vAiich impeachment was surreptitiously 
introduced perhaps received support from Sandys’ apparent failure to 
renew the strong objection he had first raised, when the debate was 
resumed on the 6th. He was not a member of the select committee 
and so might not at first have known what was afoot.
^ B.M. Additional MS 22474, f. 22. The term also appears 
occasionally after the charge w%s sent to the Lords: L.J. iii, pp.
615, 649; Rushworth, op. cit.. i, p.377.
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dear to the King ...
If impeachment had some special significance which led to the 
need for secrecy, why was there no eruption of anger when the inten­
tion did become known? Two answers are possible. First, if the plan 
remained secret until the morning of 8 May, there was no time to whip 
up opposition before the Commons met the Lords that afternoon.
Secondly, after the Commons had impeached Buckingham there was little 
point in conducting a post mortem; it would simply underline the extent 
to which the government’s supporters had lost control of the situation. 
Moreover, Charles doubtless felt that his attack on Eliot and Digges, 
soon to take place, was a fairly satisfactory revenge.
In ary case, it was doubtless of limited interest to Charles 
whether or not his favourite was impeached, even if he attached aiy 
special significance to the term. To him what mattered was that 
Buckingham was under attack, and during the first week in May little 
happened in either House from which he could draw comfort. He had 
tried to prevent Bristol’s charge against Buckingham from getting under
H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, p.9. On 1 May the word was used in the 
Lords, probably imprecisely, in Bristol’s case. There is nothing in 
the charges either by or against him to suggest an impeachment, and 
yet he desired not "to be impeached until his Charge of so high a 
Nature be first heard": L.J. iii, p.576. The charge against him was
brought by the King, and the Commons were in no way responsible for it.
According to the calendared version of Salvetti’s despatches to 
the Florentine court, he had reported in March that the Commons wished 
to proceed against Buckingham "by impeachment". But the use of this 
term cannot be justified from the Italian transcript of his despatch. 
This merely states that the Commons wanted to bring a process (un 
processo) against the Duke: H.M.C. Eleventh Report. Appendixp.51;
B.M. Additional MS 27962, vol. iv, f. 142v.
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way in the Lords by accusing the Earl of high treason, but the Lords 
had decided to hear the charges from both sides and Bristol had 
retaliated with a charge of high treason against th4 Duke, Yifhen the 
news that Buckingham had been accused of treason reached the Commons, 
Eliot moved that they should ask the Lords to commit him to prison.
At that moment the House refused to listen, but a few days later it 
reconsidered the proposal and eventually adopted it. Moreover, through 
his son, Bristol delivered to the Commons a copy of his charge against 
Buckingham, This contained allegations that the Duke had shown strong 
inclinations towards Catholicism and had plotted the conversion of 
Charles. Hearing this, the Commons promptly revived their unfinished 
investigation into the Duke’s part in encouraging papists, ignoring 
a demand from the King that they should end their inquisition and 
present the charge, and even examining a witness who more properly 
belonged to the Lords.^
On the afternoon of 8 May the two Houses met in committee in the 
Painted Chamber and Digges introduced the Commons’ impeachment of
 ^I^, iii, p.578; CjJ. i, pp.853 , 855 , 857; Williams, op. cit.. 
i, p.99; H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, pp. 11, 15; Hulme, Life of Eliot, 
p.152; Y/hitelocke, ff. 178-9. The committee for evils, causes and 
remedies, was reconvened to conduct the revived investigation.
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Buckingham.^ The lov/er House had clearly aimed at making the
occasion as impressive as possible: it had ordered that places should
be reserved for the eight speakers and their assistants, and that
those not appointed to deliver the charge should remain silent. In
addition, the phrasing of the bill shows how much bolder the Commons
had become since 1621 and 1624; while the concept of an indictment
which Maude Clarke believed essential to any impeachment, is apparent;
For the speedy Redress of great Evils and Mdschiefs, and of 
the chief Cause of these Evils and Mischiefs, which this 
Kingdom of England now grievously suffereth, and of late 
Years hath suffered ... the Commons ... do, by this their 
Bill, shew and declare against George, Duke, Marquis ...
(a long list of his titles and offices is given) ... the 
Misdemeanors, Misprisions, Offences, Crimes, and other 
Matters comprized in the Articles hereafter following;
and him the said Duke do accuse and impeach 6f the said
Misdemeanors, Misprisions, Offences, and Crimes. (2)
Each article was read out and the member responsible then spoke to it.
Eight articles had been dealt with when the Lords announced themselves
"wearied with the heat" and asked for an adjournment. In consequence.
C.J. i, p.857. The Lords gave the Commons a meeting, not a 
conference "bicause they will only lend us their eares", but Whitelocke 
persists in calling it a conference: ff. 96, 182. Presunably because
of the length of the charge, it was more convenient for the Commons 
to meet the Lords in committee than to present their case at the Bar 
of the upper House. If Selden is to be believed (see p.248 above), 
to meet in committee in no way impaired the Commons* claim to a 
continuing interest in the case, provided that thb charge was presented 
in writing - and on this the House had already resolved.
^ L.J. iii, p.619; C.J. i, p.857; M.V. Clarke, 'The Origin of 
Impeachment'. Fourteenth Century Studies, p.268.
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the remainder of the charge was delivered on the 10th, and Eliot 
concluded the Commons* case by reserving their right to add subse­
quently any further accusation or impeachment, to reply to the Duke * s 
defence, and to offer any necessary further proof. His final request 
was that Buckingham should be put to answer all the articles, and that 
every one of them should be considered in the course of the proceedings 
and judgment.^
On the following morning a delegation from the Commons, headed
by Rich, appeared before the Lords to ask for Buckingham’s commitment
2
to safe custody. Two reasons were given: he had been impeached by
^ B.M. Additional MS 22474, ff. lOlv, 142; luJ. iii, p.5?0;
H.M.C. Report on the Manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleugh and Queensberry, 
vol. iii, VI: The Montagu Papers: Second Series, p,288; Whitelocke, 
ff, 96ff. The thirteen articles were: 1, holding an excessive number 
of offices; 2, buying the position of Lord Admiral; 3. purchasing 
the Wardenship of iiie Cinque Ports (these three articles were delivered 
by Herbert); 4. failure to guard the Channel adequately; 5» the 
affair of the St Peter (Selden); 6. extortion of money from the East 
India Company; 7. handing over ships to the French; 8, their use 
against La Rochelle (Clanville); 9. compelling Lord Roberts to buy 
his honour; 10. sale of the offices of Lord Treasurer and Master of 
the Wards (Sherland who replaced Whitby when the latter became ill);
11, procuring honours for the Duke’s relations; 12, misusing and 
profiting from the King’s revenue (Pym) ; 13, administering medicine
to James in his final illness (Wandesforxi) : L, J. iii, pp,619-24;
B,M, Additional MS 22474, f. 104; G-rosvenor, p.53, gives article 6 
to Selden but is the only account to do so.
p
A good deal of argument had previously taken place in the Commons 
as to the exact procedure to be adopted in delivering this message.
Rich had argued that it should be presented by the Speaker at the Bar 
of the Lords. He evidently felt strongly about this as he made the 
same point about the presentation of MontagueFs charges to the Lords: 
Grosvenor, pp,71-2.
0^1
the Commons and, as they understood, accused of h i ^  treason before 
the Lords by another peer. This was the outcome of the proposal first 
made by Eliot on the 4th. Although his suggestion had then been 
ignored, Kerton had made a somewhat similar proposal, just before the 
conference on the 8th, when he moved for Buckingham’s sequestration on 
the basis of the Commons* charges.^ Sandys objected that the House 
had not asked for the sequestration of either Bacon or Middlesex, and 
Hoy, evidently thinlcing of Bristol’s charges against the Duke, 
declared that it was not for the Commons to direct the Lords what to 
do in a case before them. But although opposing Kerton’s motion, or 
at least its wording, Selden said that many precedents justified the 
commitment of a man accused of high treason. Presumably because of 
shortage of time the House arranged to continue the debate on the next 
day. By then the proposal to sequester had given way to the bolder 
notion of commitment, and the House needed little time to decide that 
high treason was a sufficient basis for this. However, opinions 
differed as to whether the Commons might properly ask for a commitment 
on a charge made only in the Lords, and, if not, Aether their own 
accusation provided a sufficient basis for such a request. Buckingham’s 
supporters put up a strong fight, but opinion had hardened against him 
as a consequence of his insolent behaviour during the presentation of
^ CjJ. i, pp.857, 858; Whitelocke, f. l82v. Kerton had first 
proposed sequestration from the Lords and the Court when on the 4th 
the Commons renewed their investigation of the Duke’s encouragement 
of papists* Whitelocke, f. 178.
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the charges on the previous day, and the motion to pray for commitment 
was passed by a majority of 119 votes. But the Commons* efforts were 
of no avail: the Lords never replied to their message and Buckingham
remained in the House.^
At the same time, the Commons ability to protect their own 
members came under test. Shortly before Rich’s delegation had gone 
to the Lords to ask for the Duke’s commitment, the King had told the 
peers that he intended to punish certain of those who had delivered 
the articles of impeachment. Soon afterwards the Commons discovered 
that Digges and Eliot had been spirited away to the Tower. Digges, 
who had introduced the accusation, had offended the King with his 
comments upon the charge concerning James’ last illness; while Eliot, 
in pronouncing the epilogue, had allowed his imagination full rein, 
blackening Buckingham’s character and comparing him with Sejanus, the 
unscrupulous minister of Tiberius. As soon as they had heard the 
Vice-Chamberlain criticise these speeches, the Commons suspended all 
other business and went into committee of the whole to consider what 
to do. Having been told that the papers of the two members had been 
ransacked they appointed a sub-committee to draw up a remonstrance.
On the next day they resolved that each member should take a protesta­
tion that cleared Digges of having spoken as the King had alleged, and
^ CjJ, i, pp.857, 858, 859; mitelooke, ff. I82v.-184, 186; 
Grosvenor, pp.60-70; Hulme, Life of Eliot, p.134. For Buckingham’s 
behaviour see Williams, op. cit.. i, p.103. He did subsequently 
withdraw during part of the proceedings on his case; Gardiner, 
Debates. 1624 and 1626, pp.201-2.
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shortly afterwards thirty-six members of the House of Lords voluntarily 
made a similar declaration. Thereupon the King released Digges, but 
Eliot remained in prison where he was subjected to a searching 
examination.^
To begin with, the Commons showed less concern for Eliot’s 
misfortunes than for Digges’, perhaps because they felt that he had 
spoken with excessive violence. But when they were told that the 
King had arrested him for matters over which the Commons had no 
jurisdiction, they demanded an explanation, and they began to contem­
plate asking the Lords for a conference to discuss the whole affair. 
Eventually, Charles announced that he had accepted Eliot’s denial, 
though of what was never specified, and he was restored to the House 
which at once gave him an opportunity to clear himself. Though the 
proposed conference never seems to have talcen place, work on a
remonstrance, later replaced by a bill, for the protection of the
2
Commons’ liberties, continued until the end of the Parliament.
After the presentatiôn of the Commons’ charges to the Lords, the 
case against Buckingham made poor progress. Although the Lords seem 
to have done their best to withstand the pressures upon them, as their 
kindness to Bristol indicates, Buckingham’s continued presence in the 
House undoubtedly had an intimidating effect. He took part in the
Hulme, Life of Eliot, pp.l37n, 141-2; M.A. Gibb, Buckinfdiam, 
1592-1628. p.238; Ruehworth, op. cit., i, pp.362-5; L. J. iii, pp. 
592, 627; C.J. i, pp.859, 86O; H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, pp.22, 24, 
25; Harleian MS 383, f. 32; Whitelocke, (MS 12.22), ff. 11, 14v.
 ^C.J. iÿ pp.860, 861; H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, pp.28-9; Hulme 
’Leadership of Eliot*, loc. cit.. pp.377-8; Whitelocke (MS 12.22), 
ff. 19. 22, 24-24V., 56v.
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debates on his case, persuading the Lords to allow him king's counsel,
and winning the concession that he should answer only the written
charges and not the additions, known as aggravations, made to these
by the Commons' speakers. Moreover, Charles never wavered in his
support for the Duke: when the Chancellor of the University of
Cambridge died, the King secured his favourite's election and withstood
the very considerable anger of the Commons that a man whom they had
impeached should be so advanced.^ On 8 June Buckingham handed to
the Lords his written answer, a carefully prepared rebuttal of the
Commons* charges. The Commons rapidly asked for a copy, which the
Lords sent after being told by the Lord Treasurer that the precedents
supported the Commons* right "to reply unto their Accusation". The
lower House referred the answer to the select committee of twelve
2
which at once set to work on it.
By asking the Lords for a copy of the answer the Commons were 
making an important innovation. No such request had been presented 
in 1624 when Middlesex had made his answer, and yet the Commons of I626 
seem to have had no hesitation in asking. It seems certain that they 
knew in advance that the procedure followed against Buckingham entitled
^ luJ. iii, pp.627, 629-30, 631, 650; C.J. i, p.866; H.M.C. 
Lowther*s Notes, p.31; Gardiner, Debates. 1^24 and l626, pp.1 9 ;  
Rushworth, op. oit.. i, pp.375, 378.
 ^L.J. iii, pp.655-67 (Buckingham's answer), 672; C.J. i, pp. 
869, 870; mitelocke (MS 12.22), ff. 150ff.
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them to make such a request.^ Moreover, as soon as the answer was 
received, Eliot, who had been responsible for the request, indicated 
the next stage by declaring that the Commons would have to reply.
It is possible that these developments are a further sign of the 
influence of Selden who regarded them as essential to an impeachment, 
but what is particularly important is that they show the Commons taking 
a much greater interest than previously in the detailed development 
of a case after its transmission to the Lords. Perhaps they feared 
that, without their intervention, the Lords might prove unequal to 
dealing with Buckingham; perhaps they acted in this way as a conse­
quence of the disappointments of 1624.
There is no doubt that the Commons intended to continue with the 
impeachment^ but they were also at work on another form of attack on 
Buckingham. True to their belief that only evil advisers kept them 
from their loving monarch, they resolved on an approach to the King 
himself. A grand committee was set up to prepare a declaration, 
listing all the hindrances and abuse they had suffered at the Duke’s 
hands, and asking for his removal. They dealt with a letter from the
^ Because Eliot,in his speech to the Lords on 10 May, had reserved 
the Commons* right to reply to the Duke’s defence (see p. 300 above).
^ C.J. i, p.869; l,Vhitelocke (MS 12.22), f. 46; Grosvenor, p.l?6; 
Selden, Of Judicature, p.109.
 ^As Ball has shown: ’Parliamentary Career of Eliot’, pp.208-10.
It is also clear from the declaration itself: Rushworth, op. cit.. i,
p.407.
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King demanding the passing of a subsidy bill within eight days, by 
tacking to the declaration a promise that they would give supply as 
soon as they received redress. On the 14th the Commons asked Charles 
to receive them with the declaration; on the 15th he replied with a 
dissolution.^
In 1626, for the first time, a Stuart had dissolved a Parliament 
to save a minister. It is quite possible that, if Charles had 
allowed the impeachment of Buckingham to run its full course, the Duke 
would have been acquitted by the Lords. By dissolving Parliament when 
he did, Charles appeared to be suggesting that in no other way could 
he control it. He thus magnified its authority and ultimately harmed 
his own. But, in fact, an act of Parliamentary judicature was not to 
compel him to choose between surrender and dissolution until I641.
In the Parliamentary session of l628, Charles warned members that a
revival of the trial of I626 would lead to an immediate dissolution,
2
and ten weeks passed without a renewal of the attack on Buckingham.
When Coke eventually exploded; "I think the Duke of Buckingham is the
C.J. i, pp.870, 871; H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, pp.32-3; Rushworth, 
op. cit. , i, pp.404-10 is the declaration. Roberts has pointed out 
the "revolutionary" nature of the declaration: it "announced the new
principle that there were faults that were not criminal and yet justified 
the removal from office of those who were guilty of them": op. cit.,
p.63.
2
Gibb, op. cit.. p.295. Four days before the opening of the 
session, some of the Commons’ leaders met at Cotton’s house. They 
seem to have been Coke, Eliot, Holies, Kerton, lÿm, Selden and Wentworth. 
They decided for the present not to renew the attack on Buckingham: 
ibid.. p.300.
307
cause of all our miseries", his clarion call that "that man is the
Grievance of Grievances" was followed, not by a revival of the
proceedings of 1626, as Selden proposed, but by a remonstrance to the
King asking for the Duke’s removal. Charles virtually ignored it
and Buckingham remained, as others in recent years had wrongly thought
themselves, "Parliament proofe".^
However, if the Commons had not yet learned how to coerce a
reluctant monarch into dismissing his minister, Charles had had to pay
quite a high price for his refusal to accede to their clearly expressed
wish. He had lost the subsidy and, in the eyes of the Venetian
2
Ambassador, he had lost much popularity. His reaction to the attack 
on Buckingham had been exposed to scrutiny, and if Eliot genuinely 
believed that Charles would have behaved differently if only the 
Commons had been able to remove the influence of the Duke, John Fÿm,
Gibb, op. cit.. pp.307, 310; Gardiner, History, vi, pp.305-6; 
McClure, op. cit., ii, p.374; Rushworth, op. cit.. i, p.615 
(Rushworth prints this remonstrance: pp.631-8); Hulme, Life of Eliot,
p.262. Clarendon makes the point about the benefit to Parliamentary 
authority which flowed from saving a man by dissolution: W.D. Macray,
ed., The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, i, pp. 
9-10. Ball has questioned whether Parliament was dissolved to save 
Buckingham: J.N. Ball, ’The Impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham in
the Parliament of I626’. Melanges Antonio Marongiu. Studies presented 
to the International Commission for the History of Representative and 
Parliamentary Institutions. vol. xxxiv (Palermo. 1968; , p.46.
C.S.P. Ven. 1625-26. p.512. The Venetian ambassador, Angelo 
Contarini, had a poor opinion of Charles. When the King declared that 
he would rather lose his crown than abandon Buckingham, Contarini 
commented that "he judges badly in this as in everything else": ibid.,
p.604.
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a man of vastly greater insight, was likely to have made more 
significant deductions. In particular, if îÿm’s handling of the 
impeachment of Strafford in I64I is ary guide, he must have thought 
deeply about the reasons for the Commons* failure in I626. The 
Commons* had proceeded too slowly and too publicly; they had missed 
the opportunity which, in charging Bristol, the King had seized, to 
frame an accusation of high treason against Buckingham, based on the 
suspicion surrounding James* death. This might have secui’ed his 
committal to prison. Instead, Buckingham had remained in the Lords, 
impeding proceedings against him and receiving the advice of some of 
the best available counsel. Strafford was to suffer from very 
different treatment fifteen years later, althou^ the process used 
against him was similar to that employed in 1626.^
Although the Commons failed to secure the downfall of Buckingham, 
1626 marked a further refinement in the technique of Parliamentary 
judicature. The Commons successfully based their charge upon common 
fame rather than upon specific information arising from petitions 
presented by named people - the more normal and surer method. In 
doing so, they acquired the resemblance to a grand jury of the kingdom.
Spielman, op. cit., pp.141-2. For accounts of Strafford’s 
impeachment, see C.V. Wedgwood, Thomas Wentworth. First Earl of Strafford. 
1393-1641* A Revaluation (London, 1964), pp.312ff; Spielman, pp.
147ff.
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to which Mallett had so strongly objected in April. They then 
indicted Buckingham of offences, whereas in 1624 they had merely- 
presented articles of accusation against Middlesex to the Lords.^
Whether this distinction, so important to Maude Clarke, was more apparent 
than real must remain an open question; but there is little doubt that 
the decision to draw up the charge in writing in 1626 represents the 
sort of advance in the Commons’ procedure and determination which 
lends support to Miss Clarke’s view. In addition, in 1626 the Commons 
took sole responsibility for the compilation of the charge iidiich, two 
years earlier, had been partly provided by the Lords. The Lords were 
about to occupy the position of judge and jury which subsequently has 
been regarded as their traditional function in an impeachment; when, 
in 1641, the Commons* managers of the impeachment conference became 
the prosecutors at the impeachment trial, the lower House, too, assumed 
what has long since been recognised as its proper share in an impeach­
ment. Again, by demanding a copy of Buckingham’s answer, the Commons 
made an important innovation. Yet this change was so readily accepted 
in both Houses as to suggest that it was known that the procedure 
adopted in I626 entitled the Commons to make such a request. It 
cannot, of course, be proved that they did not possess this ri^t in 
1624, but if they did it is curious that they made no use of it: 
circumstances were favourable and a copy of Middlesex’s answer might
^ Prestwich, op. cit.. p.485; •• ' Clarke, ’The Origin .of
Impeachment’, loc. cit.. p.268.
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have made up for their lack of a record of their charges. Perhaps 
the Commons of 1624 simply did not know that they had power to make 
such a request, hut it is at least possible that the changes of 
procedure in 1626 gave them an authority which the apparently rather 
different procedure of 1624 denied them. However, be that as it may, 
the Commons* request in 1626 shows that what happened to a case after 
its transmission to the Lords was a matter of increasing concern to 
them. Ultimately, it was their determination at that stage as much 
as their vigour while a case was still in the lower House which ensured 
the success of Parliamentary judicature.
As the records describe Buckingham as having been impeached while 
they do not use this word of his predecessors in misfortune, and as 
John Selden sat in Parliament in both 1624 and 1626, it seems legiti­
mate to consider whether Buckingham’s case was really the first 
impeachment in England in the seventeenth century. But such specula­
tions are not capable of definite proof. What is more important is 
to recognise the clear practical differences between this case and its 
predecessors, rather them the possible but unproveable theoretical 
distinctions.
The procedural changes made in l626 may have arisen directly from 
the need for the Commons to have greater control over a case involving 
a man of Buckingham * s stature. Moreover, it is possible that, quite 
apart from this consideration, the issues at stake in the case were 
recognised as differing from those in the trials of 1621 and 1624.
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In those years men had been accused of crimes and grievances committed 
in office: in 1626 Buckingham was really being attacked’because he
was thought incompetent to fill the offices he occupied. Hitherto, 
the attack had been largely legal in nature ; now it had become mainly 
political. There is some evidence that this distinction was recognised. 
Warnings without precedent in the seventeenth century were issued to 
the King - from sources which are, to us, unknown - about the conse­
quences of a successful attack on Buckingham: if he was "but decourted,
it will be the Corner stone on nhich the demolishing of his Monarchie 
will be builded". Charles was warned that if Buckingham suffered for 
obeying him "the next attempt will be to call the King to accompt ..."
The Bishop of Mende reported that Parliament was deliberately 
encroaching on the royal authority, and Charles was even told that 
those attacking the Duke wished to destroy the monarchy.^ However 
emggerated some of these utterances may be, the point is that apart 
from Lambe’s comment in 1621 there is no evidence that such warnings 
were ever directed at James. He had washed his hands of Bacon and 
Middlesex in a manner which his son steadfastly refused to imitate.
Of course, having acknowledged Buckingham’s responsibility as his own, 
Charles could not then dismiss the Duke without admitting his own fault. 
But however earnestly the Commons believed that Charles was innocent
Cabala. Mysteries of State, in Letters of the great Ministers 
of K. James and K. Charles, p.227; Rushworth. op. cit., i. pp.360-1: 
Paris Archives: Baschet’s Transcripts: P.R.O. 31/3/63, f. 8$.
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of the sins of his minister and favourite, by attacking Buckingham in 
this way and in these circumstances they were saying something about 
the monarch and his government which had not been said previously in 
the seventeenth century. It may be that this was barely, if at all, 
realised, but the change of emphasis in 1626 seems to be summed up in 
the decision to base the charge against Buckingham on common fame. 
Because of his closeness to the King no one was prepared to come forward 
with a detailed accusation, while the type of charge required agednst 
him was unlikely to lend itself to proof based on specific evidence. 
Finally, one may speculate that, if in the early seventeenth century 
the term impeachment had a special significance, redolent of the errors 
of medieval raonarchs and the reformation of their governments, it is 
perhaps not surprising that it first reappears in earnest in connection 
with the Gase against the Duke of Buckingham.
The only other case in this Parliament that was to have been 
submitted to the judicature of the two Houses, was that of Dr Richard 
Montague, He had first come to the notice of the Commons in May I624 
when had reported from the committee of religion the receipt of a 
petition from two clergymen, complaining of the Arminian character of 
Montague’s book, A New Gagg for an Old Goose. The House considered 
whether to send the petition to the King, but decided to report the 
matter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot, who told Montague 
to revise his book. Montague, however, replied to these attacks by
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writing a more extreme statement of his views, Apello Caesarea, which 
was licensed for publication by James just before he died.^ In 1625 
the Commons dealt with this defiance of their authority by committing 
Montague to the custody of the serjeant-at-arms for contempt. Shortly 
afterwards, Charles appointed him to a royal chaplaincy and tried to 
take the matter out of the Commons* hands. In a debate during the 
Oxford session leading speakers maintained the House’s right to examine
the King’s servants, and Montague only escaped further proceedings by
2
pleading sickness.
Before Parliament opened in 1626 the King withdrew his objections 
to the Commons’ examination of Montague’s opinions, although five 
bishops had pronounced them in no way contrary to the doctrines of the 
Church of England and had recommended the prohibition of further 
controversy about them. In the committee for religion the Commons 
duly set to work to investigate them, surely encouraged by the knowledge 
that in doing so they were also sniping at one of Montague’s chief 
supporters, the Duke of Buckingham. This committee rapidly set up a 
sub-committee to prepeire for a conference with the Lords, but not until
^ Gardiner, History. v, pp.351-4; Diary of Edward Nicholas: S.P.
Dorn. 14/166, f. 199; Diary of Sir Walter Erie: B.M. Additional MS
18597, f. 182.
^ Gardiner, History, v, pp.373, 400; Roberts, op. cit.. pp.51-2.
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after Easter was a full report presented to the Commons.^ This was 
made by Fym, whose performance was so masterly that Montague’s best 
friends left the House rather than take part in the divisions. Fym 
was careful to emphasise that the committee had concerned itself only 
with the effects, not witii the truth, of vhat Montague had written.
It had found that he had caused disturbances in the Church, that he had 
tended to create sedition by dividing the King from the people and the 
people from each other, and that he had violated the doctrine of the 
Church of England and endeavoured to reconcile the people with Rome. 
Some members - we do not know who - wished to implement at once the 
committee’s recommendation that, as he was a public offender against 
the peace of the Church, his case should be transmitted to the Lords; 
but Wandesford and Whitby wanted him to answer in the Commons first, 
an important confirmation of a growing tendency in these cases. 
Accordingly, the House arranged to give him notice that it would hear 
him if he wished, and in the meantime it imposed a fresh duty upon the
^ Rushworth, op. cit.. i, pp.202-3; W, Scott and J. Bliss, eds.,
The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud (Oxford, 
1847-60), Vi, p.249; Whitelocke, ff. 19, 20, 84, 85. On 24 March 
Erie told the committee for evils, causes and remedies, that Buckingham 
had greatly encouraged Montague, but Fleetwood said that the Duke 
detested Arminianism. If Buckingham’s support was waning at this 
time Meddus saw little sign of an estrangement later: writing on 22
May he described Buckingham as a great supporter of "Montagutians" : 
Whitelocke, ff. 84 , 85; Williams, op. cit.. i, p. 105. ' For Buckingham’s 
support of Montague at the York House disputation in February, see
I. Morgan, Prince Charles’s Puritan Chaplain (London, 1957), p.163.
Morgan sees this conference as marking the final disillusionment of 
Buckingham’s puritan friends, after which the real attack on the Duke 
began: pp.166, l68.
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sub-committee by asking it to frame appropriate questions to put to
him. Montague did not accept the Commons’ invitation and so, on 29
April, the House resolved on three charges, closely modelled on the
findings of the committee. Fym moved for the usual conference with
the Lords, but Rich objected and proposed instead that Fym should
deliver the charge in a message at the Bar of the Lords. He gave
three reasons: this method would be more public than a conference;
it was the ancient way which the Commons had employed in l6lif. against
the Bishop of Lincoln and which they must not lose; it would obviate
the risk that some of #iat was said at the conference mi^t be omitted
from the subsequent report to the Lords. Rich’s suggestion was adopted
and the Commons asked the committee to write down the objections to
Montague’s books, which would be handed to the Lords.^
The impeachment of Buckingham and its aftermath was presumably
responsible for the slow progress made by the committee, but early
in June several lawyers were added to it. On the 10th Fÿm reported
the charge and the articles, and the engrossing of the latter was
probably just completed when the dissolution brought the case to a 
2
sudden halt.
^ Williams, op. cit.. i, p.96; C.J. i, pp.845, 851; Whitelocke, 
f.l33; S.P. Dorn. W 2 5 ,  nos. 10, 87.
^ iy pp.866, 871; Whitelocke (LÎS 12.22), f. 50v. The case was 
revived in 1628 and Montague was invited to appear before the committee 
for religion. But although the House eventually ordered the transmission 
of his case to the Lords the Journals of that House contain no indication 
that this was ever done : C.J. i, pp.889, 911; Stowe Î/IS 366, ff. 234-
234v; H.M.C. Lowther’s Notes, pp.42-3.
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It is unfortunate from our point of view that the case against 
Montague in 1626 did not advance one stage further. It would be most 
interesting to know how Pym would have introduced it at the Bar of the 
Lords. Although Rich was correct in his reference to the case of 
Neile in I614, the Commons were varying the practice of the recent past 
in ordering Fym to present a message at the Bar of the upper House.
A few days afterwards they were to make another variation when they 
approved procedure by bill against Buckingham; but the reasons they 
gave for the changes were not similar and there is no suggestion that, 
at any time, they thought of presenting to the Lords a bill against 
Montague, although the evidence against him, but not apparently the 
charge, was to have been handed to the Lords in writing.^ Furthermore, 
the bill against Buckingham was presented at a joint committee meeting 
of the two Houses, not at the Bar of the Lords. Perhaps in altering 
their procedure in both cases the Commons were remembering their 
dis satisfaction at the outcome of the trials of Middlesex and the 
Bishop of Norwich two years earlier; while it may be significant that 
Selden believed that the case against Middlesex ceased to be an 
impeachment because the charge was not presented either in writing at
C.J. i, p.851; Whitelocke (MS 12.22), f. 50v. Montague wrote 
to Cosin on 20 April that he had been told that his pardon would not 
help him because the Commons intended to proceed "by an Act of Parlia­
ment which will avoid the pardon". Even if he was referring to a 
bill of the type used against Buckingham, it would be dangerous to 
accept his statement in the absence of ary corroborating proof in the 
Parliamentary records or diaries: G. Ornsby, ed., The Correspondence
of John Cosin (London, I869, 18?2:, Surtees Society, vols. Iii, Iv), 
part 1, pp.88-9. The articles against Montague are printed in State 
Trials, ii, columns 1263-6.
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the committee with the Lords or orally at their Bar. But there is 
no indication that Montague was to be formally impeached and Selden 
does not mention the case in his writings. Nevertheless, the modifica­
tion in procedure, unchallenged though it seems to have been, inter­
estingly foreshadows the change made at the same stage during Buckingham’s 
case, and both point to the continuing flexibility of the process of 
Parliamentary judicature.
IF Buckingham’s case looks temptingly like the climax of Parlia­
mentary judicature in the lé20s, it is not the final case in the series.
In Charles I’s third Parliament one man. Dr Roger Manwaring, who was 
chaplain to the King, was presented to the Lords by the Commons, and 
this study will conclude #lth an examination of his case. Charles had 
issued a warning that a revival in 1628 of the proceedings against 
Buckingham would be followed by an immediate dissolution, but he seems 
to have made no attempt to interrupt the attack on Manwaring which was 
well under way before Coke’s outburst against the Duke. We do not 
know how nor exactly when the Commons* enquiries began, and some of the 
dating in two of the printed collections of material is wildly 
inaccurate.^ But there is no reason to doubt the entry for 3 May
The first entry in State Trials is dated 23 June, 1629. It 
consists mainly of a speech by Fym, probabty delivered on 14 May, l628, 
though it may also contain elements of another speech by him of 31 May, 
and possibly of an earlier speech by Rouse, to whom State Trials 
credits the whole entry: State Trials, iii, columns 336^8; H.P. Snapp,
’The Impeachment of Roger Maynwaring’. Huntingdon Library Quarterly 
(1967), vol. XXX., no. 3, p.221; Stowe MS 366, f. 204; Diary of Sir
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in Sir Richard Grosvenor*s diary. On that afternoon a member, Rouse, 
reported from a sub-committee to the committee for religion that 
Manwaring was aiming at subverting the commonwealth and overthi’owing 
Parliament, robbing people of their property and condemning those who 
would not lend money to the King, and attempting to divide the monarch 
from hie people. These wide-ranging accusations stemmed from two 
sermons preached by Manwaring in which he upheld the King * s right to 
raise forced loans without the consent of Parliament, and castigated 
as impious and rebellious those who refused to pay. The committee 
probably held a debate on the report and it agreed to a motion of 
Spencer’s "to have a Bill to attaynt him".^  Doubtless because of a 
preoccupation with the Petition of Rigirit, the Commons did not hear of 
its committee’s resolution until 14 May, by which time Manwaring had 
preached further sermons reiterating the themes of his earlier ones.
But wiien Fÿm made his report Spencer’s motion was the centre of 
attention and caused some controversy. We do not know why he had 
proposed a bill of attainder but he gained the support of Phelips who 
seems to have been concerned about the need for haste, Phelips thought
Richard Grosvenor for 1628: Trinity College, Dublin, MS 612, pp.166-7
(references are to a typescript of this manuscript). A similar account 
among the State Papers has been supplied, subsequently, with the date,
11 June, 1628; S.P. Dorn. l6/l07, ff. 3-4v; G.S.P. Dorn. 1628-9. p.158.
^ Grosvenor, 1628, pp.110-1; State Trials, iii, column 335.
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that Spencer’s motion would not preclude the possibility of transmitting 
Manwai-ing’s case to the Lords, presumably in the customary way, at a 
later stage. But Digges had already objected to the bill on the ground 
that it would prevent Manwaring from receiving sufficient punishment.
Why he believed this is not recorded, but he did propose that the 
Commons should go to the Lords. However, a second speech by Fÿm is 
more enlightening. Diverging from his committee’s recommendation, 
he declared that a bill would debar the Commons from stating their 
reasons - presumably for their accusation. He also wai’ned the House 
that such procedure might provoke the Lords, because of their claim 
that bills of attainder should begin in the upper House; and he 
explained that the Lords held this view because the Commons were not 
empowered to administer the oaths upon which such a bill must be based. 
His opinion that the House should present itself to the Lords combined 
with Selden’s, who argued that attainder should be used only in cases 
where the defendant could not be brought before the Commons or where 
the issue at stake was outside the jurisdiction of the House, as in 
doctrinal matters. The debate concluded with a speech by Rich who 
advocated sending Manwaring’s case to the Lords but asserted that either 
method was within the Commons* power. The House resolved as most of 
these speakers had suggested, and thus, exceptionally, in the field of 
Parliamentary judicature, rejected the recommendation of one of its 
committees. However, it asked the sub-committee of the committee for 
religion to draw up the charge for presentation to the peers, though
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it added to this sub-committee five new members including lÿm and 
Selden.^
The sub-committee was given power to examine the printer of those
of Manwaring*s sermons which had been published, as well as the usual
authority to call for witnesses and records* Preparation of the charge
was nearly complete by the end of May, when Manwaring suddenly announced
that he wanted to be heard by the Commons, Eliot, who with Coke seems
to have taken little part in this case, pointed out that this could not
be denied him, and he was given a day to appear. In fact, there is
no indication that he took advantage of the opportunity, and on 4 June
a message was sent to the Lords asking for a conference. There is no
evidence of ary suggestion that the Commons should present their case
at the Bar of the Lords as they had done, through Fÿm, against Montague
in 1626. On the contrary, as in Buckingham’s case, both Houses
appointed committees which met on the afternoon of 4 June in the
Painted Chamber. Fÿm again bore the chief responsibility, though he
was probably assisted by Rich, Ball, Rowse and Hampden. But
Manwaring’s charge was not distributed among several speakers as
2
Buckingham’s had been.
^ B.M. Additional MS 27878 (a "True Relation", one of maiy copies), 
ff. 26O-26OV; Grosvenor, 1628, p.l68; Harleian MS 5324, f. l6v;
Diary of Edward Nicholas: S.P. Dorn. 16/97, f. 70v; Stowe, MS 366, ff.
165, 204; C.J. i, pp.897, 907. Further members were later added to 
the sub-committee which was soon being described as a committee. They 
included Noy, Hakewill and Littleton: C.J. i, pp.898, 907; Snapp,
op. cit., p.222. We do not know the names of the original members.
^ B.M, Additional MS 27878, f. 340v; L.J. iii, p.838; C.J. i, pp. 
901, 902, 906, 907, 908, 909; H.M.C. Lowther's Notes, p.35.
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Fym began by reading out a declaration against Manwaring, and 
this was later handed to the Lords. It describes itself as a "Bill 
of Complainte" and it does not "accuse and impeach" Manwaring of 
offences as the bill against Buckingham had done two years earlier.
Its approach is perhaps less direct; the Commons pray that he may 
be put to answer their complaints. They do, however, reserve the 
right to exhibit subsequently "any other accusa-coh or impeachment" 
against him, to reply to his defence and to offer further proof. The 
Commons were clearly safeguarding their interests in the later stages 
of the case and, in fact, writing into their bill many of the requests 
which Eliot had made in his concluding speech at the impeachment 
conference in 1626.^ If different types of Parliamentary judicature 
had previously existed or been recognised, it may be that they were 
now merging into one.
Having read the declaration Fÿm then made a long and elaborate
speech. Manwaring may have been a relatively insignificant person,
but in the year of the Petition of Right the position which he had
2
taken up was of fundamental importance. Fÿm conducted a detailed
L.J. iii, p.845. The declaration is among the acts of Parliament, 
kept in the House of Lords Record Office, and should be used in 
preference to the version printed in State Trials, iii, columns 338-40.
Snapp, op. cit.. p.217, believes that, from the standpoint of 
demonstrating the positions of Parliament and Crown, the case rivals, 
if it does not surpass, in importance the proceedings against Mompesson, 
Bacon and Middlesex.
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exaniination of Manwaring*s opinions and of the reasons for the 
Commons* objections. The conference ended with the Lords asking for 
time to consider the matter and promising the Commons an answer.^
V/hen on 9 June the Lord Keeper reported the conference proceedings 
to the peers, the House at once took action. Although it had yet 
to charge Manwaring, it ordered that he should be taken into custody - 
and thus established for itself a new precedent. On the following 
day the Lords examined witnesses, including five M.P.s who attended 
and were sworn with the consent of the Commons. Manwaring himself was 
brought to the Bar on the 11th and was charged by Mr Serjeant Crew and 
the Attorney General with the offences contained in the Commons* 
declaration. In the course of his speech the Attorney General pointed 
out the similarity between Manwaring*s offence and that of Cowell in 
l6lO. Manwaring then denied that he had had any intention of proposing 
an alteration to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and he annoyed 
the Lords by requesting them to refer to the bishops for judgment the 
logical deductions and inferences to be found in his printed sermons. 
They did, however, accept his plea for a copy of the charge and time 
to prepare his answer, and they permitted him to return to his house; 
but they denied him counsel to speak for him on the legal aspects of
^ Stowe MS 366, f. 217v. Fÿm’s speech is given in State Trials, 
iii, columns >340-351 •
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his case and they continued to employ a guard to watch over him.^ 
Buckingham had been treated far less severely.
Manwaring seems to have required little time to decide that a
submission would be preferable to a defence. On the 13th he came to
the Lords to deny that his sermons had any seditious or malicious
intent or that they aimed at "destroying ... the municipal laws of the
land, or slighting ... parliaments". His only objective had been "to
persuade those honourable gentlemen, who refused to conform themselves,
to yield a supply unto the present and imminent necessities of the
state". He concluded by begging "pardon and mercy of their lordships,
and of the commons ••• humbly beseeching them to accept of this 
2
submission".
This speech did not satisfy the Archbishop of Canterbury, -who 
administered a sharp rebuke to Manwaring before the latter withdrew; 
but the House as a whole showed itself rather less hostile, and resolved 
on a sentence i^ hich accepted some of his denials. He was to be
L.J. iii, pp.845, 846, 847; C.J. i, p.911; State Trials, iii, 
column 352; F.H. Relf, ed., Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords, 
officially taken by Robert Bowyer and Henry Blsing, Clerks of the 
Parliaments. A.D, 1621. 1625. 1628. pp.220n.. 221. On the 12th the 
Lords agreed to a Commons* request to examine Manwaring*s printer, to 
find out on whose authority his sermons had been published; B.M. 
Additional MS 27878, f.404; StowerMS 366, f. 244v; Relf, op. cit. . 
p.221. Manwaring claimed on the 13th that they had been printed at 
the King’s "special command": State Trials, iii, column 353.
2
State Trials, iii, columns 353-4.
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imprisoned during the pleasure of the House, fined £1,000, suspended 
from exercising his ministry for three years, prohibited for ever from 
preaching at Court or from holding ary ecclesiastical or secular office, 
and ordered to adcnowledge his offences to both Houses in a manner 
to be prescribed by a committee of the Lords. In addition, the Lords 
declared that his book of sermons should be burnt, and they resolved 
to ask the King to call in all copies and to prohibit any further 
printings.^
Whether the Commons would have exercised the right, mentioned
as long ago as lo21, of demanding judgment uninvited, we do not know.
For, as so often previously, the Lords rapidly issued the customary
invitation and the Commons presented themselves at the Bar. According
to the Lords Journal the Speaker declared that "the Knights, Citizens,
and Burgesses, of the Commons House of Parliament, have impeached
before your Lordships Roger Manwaring ... of divers enormous Crimes",
and one of the manuscript accounts tells us that he demanded judgment
2
against him "uppon the Complainte before mentioned". The sentence 
was then pronounced, and in due course Manwaring formally recognised 
the justice of his punishment and apologised for his offence in a
^ Ibid., iii, column 356.
 ^Ibid., iii, columns 355-6; L.J. iii, pp.855-6; B.M.- Additional
MS 27878, ff. 409V, 428; H.M.C. Lowther's Notes, p.47.
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statement which he read out to both Houses.^
Erom the moment when the Commons considered the possibility of 
attainder and rejected the recommendation of their committee for 
religion to proceed in this way, the case exhibits scane unusual 
features. The Commons sent to the Lords a written declaration, 
although their reason for adopting this course against Buckingham - 
the length and complexily of the case - hardly applied in 1628.
The declaration was not closely modelled on the bill of 1626, although 
men like Pym and Selden seem to have been intimately assocaited with 
the drafting work in both Parliaments. When the Commons* case was 
presented to the Lords, Manwaring was at once taken into custody, 
although he had yet to be charged. In the matter of counsel, his 
treatment was closer to that received by Middlesex than by Buckingham, 
and the requirement that he should submit in the Commons as well as 
in the Lords was an interesting comment upon the interest of the lower 
House in the case. Finally, there is evidence that by the end of the 
case, but not perhaps at its beginning, it was being referred to as 
an impeachment.
How Parliamentary judicature would have developed in the years 
after 1629 if Parliament had continued to meet, we can only guess.
State Trials, iii, columns 357-8; L.J. iii, p.870; C.J. i, 
p.916. The King issued the desired proclamation on 24 June: C.fi.P.
Pom. 1628-9. p.175. He pardoned Manwaring on 6 July and conferred 
on him the rectory of Stamford Rivers: Gardiner, History. vi, p.330.
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By the time when Strafford was brought to trial conditions were very 
different. But there can be little doubt that the trials of I626 
and 1628 consolidated and extended that judicature as a significant 
and important part of Parliamentary procedure.
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Conclusion
The Parliamentary judicature revived in 1621 was called into 
existence in response to the needs of the moment. The Commons resolved 
to go to tlie Lords when they discovered that their own powers were 
inadequate to cope with the requirements of the situation. Although, 
on occasion, they experimented with other procedures, they kept faith 
with this method and their trust in the Lords was, on the whole, 
rewarded. Cautiously, Parliament was regaining its power to right 
the wrongs which the coui’ts of equi% were increasingly failing to 
remedy. But this judicature was not to be confined to the private 
and personal: in 1626 Parliament declared Buckingham incompetent to
discharge the trust laid upon him. ^ This increased assertiveness was 
matched by a development in procedure; in particular, the Commons 
assumed a larger part ifi the cases of 1626 and 1628 than they had done 
in those of l621 and 1624. While we may suspect that the earlier 
cases resemble more closely the 'complaints^ of Selden and Elsynge 
than their 'impeachments*, we cannot be sure that such distinctions
F.H. Relf, ed., Notes of, the Debates in the House of Lords. 
officially taken by Robert Bower and Henry Elsing, Clerks of the 
Parliaments. AD l62ÏV 1623V 1^28. pp.xii-xlv. xviiiff.
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meant arything to the majority of members at the time, and there is 
some evidence that the two terms were being used to describe the 
same case in 1628, If there had previousty been two separate procedures, 
they were perhaps merging by the time when Manwaring was brought to 
trial. Nevertheless, when Selden and Elsynge distinguish between 
complaint and impeachment, they point to two main differences - whether 
or not the Commons present to the Lords articles against the accused, 
and whether or not the?lower House has an automatic right to partici­
pate in a case after its transmission to the peers. Now in the 
cases of 1621 and l624 the Commons were inclined to leave to the Lords 
the work of drawing up the articles of the charge. Certainly there 
are exceptions, but the tendency for the Commons to take on this work 
becomes much more marked in and after 1626. Furthermore, the trials 
of 1621 and 1624 show the Commons playing virtually no part in a case 
after it had left their House, until the moment when they are called 
upon by the Lords to demand judgment upon the accused. Here again 
the trial of Buckingham in I626 does not exhibit a clean break with 
past procedure, because on one occasion in 1621 the Commons had 
threatened to demand judgment uninvited; but in 1626 they inaugurate 
the practice of asking for a copy of the accused's defence and of 
claiming the right to reply to this. Moreover, the frequency with 
which the cases of 1621 and 1624 are described as complaints cannot
be overlooked; and even though this term is not absent from the 
t
records of 1626 and 1628, the appearance of the word impeachment
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during the trial of Buckingham should not be ignored.
Nevertheless, whether or not the distinction between complaint 
and impeachment has any practical application in the l620s, it is 
important to emphasise that impeachment did not, as is often assumed, 
re-emerge in its full form in 1621. Such an assumption obscures the 
very important developments in judicial procedure which occurred in 
both Houses in the 1620s. Not only do these developments point to 
the flexibility of that procedure, a procedure which, as Coke said of 
the medieval precedents, had "beene with some varietye"; they also 
yield evidence that the Houses modified their practice, cautiously 
and perhaps reluctantly, in response to the requirements of the moment, 
rather than in accordance with any long-term plan.
The judicature which has been the main subject of this study 
should probably be seen as a part of the general growth of the 
judicature of the two Houses separately, which preceded and accompanied 
its development. The various strands are perhaps different themes 
in the same story, of which Parliamentazy judicature is in many ways 
the most important aspect. Some, at least, of the other themes may 
have helped to determine its development. Much the same may be said 
about the medieval records which the Commons so eagerly studied.
Many members tried to follow precedent and seem to have felt that 
they were picking up the threads of the past, but they were no more 
bound by precedent than by the rigid rules of contemporary courts of 
law. Like their predecessors in 1388, the Commons applied what they
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called the "laws of Parliament” : these might be age-old or they 
might be newly created, but they were invoked or ignored as circum­
stances required.^ In consequence, although Parliamentary judicature 
showed considerable qualities of adaptability, it also possessed 
sufficient substance to attain its objectives. To study its power 
in evolution is to understand more fully the advance in Parliamentary 
authority during the early seventeenth century.
J. Rushworth, Historical Collections, i, p.407; KV. Clarke, 
'The Origin of Impeachment*. Fourteenth Century Studies, p.269;
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